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F.O.
424

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

CLOSED
UNTIL
1974

TURKEY.

PART V.

JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1923.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part V.

No. 1.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 371.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 1, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 368.

Parker telegraphed 29th June that he will leave Angora on 4th July at latest.

He states that Turkish Government, realising that if company's claims were submitted to neutral arbitration company would certainly win, insisted: (1) on reserving to itself choice of final referee; (2) on limiting maximum sum to be received by company to amount of net paper money receipts during Turkish administration (which was both [? faulty] and dishonest); (3) that arbitration be deferred to an indefinite date.

He requests views of His Majesty's Government.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 107.)

[E 6822/35/44] No. 2.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 375.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, June 26, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 363 of the 19th instant, to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the joint note which, after some hesitation on the part of the Italian Acting High Commissioner, I induced my colleagues to address to the Turkish representative here in regard to the violation by the Turks of the Mudania Convention, as established by the guns captured on board the steamship "Umid."

2. After a week's silence, Adnan Bey came to see me yesterday to protest against this seizure. His representations were of the most half-hearted nature, and consisted of what amounted practically to an appeal to my goodwill in arranging for the return of these guns on the ground that they had not been imported into Eastern Thrace, but, having been hidden there by Djafer Tayar on the disbandment of his forces, had recently been discovered there. I pointed out to Adnan Bey that his story was on the face of it most improbable. Djafer Tayar had given the British authorities a written declaration to the effect that all the guns in his possession had been handed over. Moreover, the captured guns were in excellent condition, and when seized were being accompanied by the entire equipment of regular batteries, including horses and artillerymen. The latter could scarcely have been concealed with the guns. Adnan Bey admitted that the evidence on the face of it looked rather black from the Turkish point of view. He said that he had himself expressed surprise to Refet Pasha that the guns should have been accompanied by artillerymen, but that Refet had explained that among the

gndarmerie who were being demobilised there were a number of former artillerymen, and that he had thought it suitable to send them with the guns.

3. As Adnan's representations were merely verbal, I made no mention of the fact that some of the guns bore marks showing conclusively that they had been in the Tophané depot as late as last July. I told him that I saw no prospect of the guns being returned until after peace, but I asked him to furnish me with a full and detailed explanation showing when and where and how they had been discovered. Adnan replied that he had telegraphed to Angora for the necessary details. When I observed that this could more easily be obtained from Refet Pasha, Adnan entered upon a lame explanation about Refet being merely a guest in Constantinople and in no way under his orders.

4. Our conversation was in fact farcical. Adnan fully realised that I did not believe him, and he made no serious attempt to convince me.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Allied High Commissioners to Adnan Bey.

IL a été porté à la connaissance des Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie par le Général commandant en chef les forces alliées en Turquie que le 17 du mois courant le vapeur turc "Umid" a été arrêté au large de Silivri ayant à bord, à part des hommes de troupe et des chevaux, un nombre de canons de montagne et de pièces de campagne.

Il a été établi que ces canons ont été chargés à bord de l'"Umid" dans le port de Silivri même.

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ne peuvent que constater que la présence de ces canons en Thrace orientale constitue une preuve définitive de la violation par les Turcs de la Convention de Moudania et est en contradiction flagrante avec les assurances répétées à maintes reprises par les autorités turques que les conditions de cette convention ont été loyalement observées par elles.

Les Hauts-Commissaires alliés se sont empressés de notifier ce fait à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

JESSE CURELY.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
MAISSA.

Constantinople, le 21 juin 1923.

[E 6823/52/44]

No. 3.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July 2.*)

(No. 376.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 27*, 1923.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 361 of the 24th instant relative to the future of the Œcumenical Patriarchate, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of the note addressed by the Patriarchate to the Allied High Commissioners on the 21st instant, informing them of the refusal of the Mixed Council to accept the resignation of Mgr. Meletios until such time as the future relations of the Patriarchate with the Turkish Government, as well as the method of election of the new Patriarch, are clearly defined.

2. A letter in similar terms has been addressed to the United States, Jugo-lav and Roumanian representatives here, and I understand that the whole position has been explained at length to M. Veniselos, who has been requested, if possible, to take action at Lausanne to give effect to the Patriarchate's decision, even though it be in direct contradiction to the advice offered by that statesman to the Patriarch and to the assurance given by him to the Turkish delegation that Mgr. Meletios would definitely resign on the conclusion of peace.

3. I do not think that M. Veniselos will be able to assist, or that, even if he were willing, he would succeed. Mgr. Meletios, as your Lordship is aware from Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 1118 of the 10th December, 1921, was elected to the Patriarchal see on the 8th December, 1921, under conditions of grave irregularity, and his whole record has been such as to render his name anathema to the Turks in general and to the Angora Government in particular. It is most improbable, therefore, that the Turkish Government will agree to enter upon any such discussions until the promise of the resignation of Mgr. Meletios has been definitely fulfilled. The Turks will maintain that questions affecting the Patriarchate are matters of purely internal politics, and that, as such, no foreign intervention can be tolerated.

4. Although from this point of view the decision taken by the Patriarchate must in present circumstances be considered as unfortunate, it is difficult not to sympathise with the decision which has been taken. The person of the Patriarch is regarded as the only bulwark of the Orthodox Church against the attacks with which the institution is menaced. The apprehensions expressed in the accompanying note as to the determination of the present rulers of Turkey to degrade the Patriarchate are certainly not exaggerated. There is, in fact, good reason to believe that the Turkish authorities were more or less directly responsible for the recent Patriarchal troubles which culminated in the announcement that a representative of the Anatolian or Turkish Orthodox Church would be established in Constantinople.

5. For various reasons as stated in the note from the Patriarchate, the regulations governing the election of the Œcumenical Patriarch are out of date. The resignation of Mgr. Meletios himself would, I fear, not suffice to disarm Turkish resentment against the institution as a whole. Neither would the appointment of any *locum tenens*—unless he were a puppet of the Turks—be recognised by them. The next step would probably be a demand for the reorganisation or even dissolution of the Holy Synod and the Lay Council on the ground that it is improperly constituted. It is, moreover, a fact that the election of some members of both of these bodies was irregularly conducted at the time of the appointment of Mgr. Meletios. In the present circumstances, the appointment under Turkish control of new members of these bodies would be merely farcical. Any amendment in their composition or in the regulations governing a new election would merely be contrived to suit the Turks' plan of converting the Patriarchate into a Turkish Orthodox institution.

6. The maintenance therefore of a Patriarchate in Constantinople, with its quasi-political status definitely abolished and entirely subservient to a Moslem Government, can scarcely, from a religious point of view, be regarded as otherwise than undesirable. Falling into increasing disrepute, it would cease to have influence either at home or abroad, and would merely become contemptible as a result of the inevitable intrigue and corruption to which it would be exposed.

7. Nor do I think that much would be gained even if—which I much doubt—the Turkish authorities expressed their willingness to discuss the regulations affecting the future of the Patriarchate before the resignation of Mgr. Meletios. The Turks would either impose conditions which would be altogether unacceptable or, at most, record a paper agreement, which, after it had served to secure the resignation of the present Patriarch, would be so manipulated as to serve the Turkish purpose.

8. For the above reasons, I incline to the opinion that the interests of the Orthodox Church would best be served if Mgr. Meletios did not yet resign, and if he and the entre Patriarchate were removed from Constantinople before the evacuation of the Allied forces. If it remains there would seem to be no guarantee against the grave risk, to which reference is made in the letter to your Lordship of the 12th instant from the Archbishop of Canterbury, of seeing Papa Eftim or some other creature of the Turks seated on the Patriarchal throne, the Patriarchate itself made into a public laughing-stock, its traditions destroyed and its records and treasures in the hands of a tool of the Moslems.

9. The suggestion that Mount Athos should, as neutral ground, become the new seat of the Patriarch was at one time regarded with favour, I believe, by Mgr. Meletios himself. Only outside Turkey would the Patriarch be free, in the present temper of the Turks, to exercise his true functions as head of the whole Orthodox Church; nor need the loss of all the sacred and historical associations of Constantinople be regarded as final. The Papacy itself has had its periods of absence from Rome. The principal objection to the adoption of such a course is naturally the repugnance of the Patriarch to desert his flock. But, on the other hand, though a certain amount of initial disquiet would inevitably ensue, I doubt whether such a transfer would be altogether injurious to the Greek population of Turkey, many of whose troubles may indirectly be

attributed to Patriarchal activities. It is even possible that it may result in the Turkish authorities showing rather increased favour towards the Greek population. Moreover, it is to be trusted that in the course of time circumstances will so change as to render possible the return of the Patriarchate to Constantinople under conditions more favourable to itself and the whole Christian world.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure No. 5

Ecumenical Patriarchate to British High Commissioners

LE Patriarcat Ecumenique a l'honneur de remettre entre les mains de Messieurs les Hauts Commissaires de la Grande Bretagne, de la France et de l'Italie à Constantinople, la présente note, par laquelle Sa Sainteté le Patriarche Oecuménique désire porter à la connaissance de Leurs Excellences les Hauts Commissaires les faits suivants, qui se sont déroulés depuis la signature de l'armistice de Moudros jusqu'à ce jour, et qui constituent une violation flagrante des droits les plus sacrés de l'homme et des principes de la civilisation moderne.

Lors de l'occupation de Constantinople par les troupes alliées, le Patriarcat Oecuménique, qui, depuis plus de quinze siècles, a été le centre spirituel de l'Orthodoxie, a été considéré par les Puissances alliées comme un organisme international, et a été placé sous leur protection.

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Constantinople le 21 juin 1923.

E 6824 199 44 No. 1

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon. (Received July 2)

No. 7

Constantinople June 27, 1923.

My Lord,

THE chief electoral feature of the past week has undoubtedly been the election of the secondary electors in all sections of the town. Your Lordship is already aware from my previous despatches of the manner in which these elections have been organised. Nevertheless I should say that the secondary electors were chosen in the less favourable circumstances owing to the fact that two days before the ballot boxes were opened for the voting of votes the partisans of Mustafa Kemal [illegible] to accordingly the population of Constantinople with candidates of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

police one for Constantinople but the latter was to be transferred as stated to the entrance of the Kiel Canal. Such a force composed as it was of units from the principal Powers would be a symbol of the concert of Europe and would support the efforts of the Ambassadors to keep the peace between the Powers and to secure fair treatment for the subject races.

The Ambassadors' Conference might also appoint a Commission to supervise the reforms in Asiatic Turkey and to see that the money provided for the relief of the Armenians was properly spent. The Commission should consist of three members, one appointed by the United States, one by Germany and one by Austria-Hungary. Its duties would be to travel throughout Asiatic Turkey, to receive petitions from Armenians and to report to the Ambassadors' Conference on the progress of the reforms. It would be necessary to give the Commission the right to call for the assistance of the local authorities and to demand an escort of troops when it thought fit.

Yours &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON

E 6801 1 44 No. 4

Letter from Lord Kinnoull to Mr. Balfour

Dear Mr. Balfour,

I CONSIDER that the Armenian question is the most important and pressing question which has arisen since the Treaty of Berlin. The massacres of Armenians which have been perpetrated by the Turkish Government during the last two years have shocked the conscience of the civilized world. The Powers have been unable to prevent them, and the Armenians have been left to the mercy of their oppressors. The Powers have failed in their duty to the Armenians, and they have failed in their duty to themselves. The Armenians have been left to the mercy of their oppressors, and the Powers have been left to the mercy of their own consciences.

The Armenians have been left to the mercy of their oppressors, and the Powers have been left to the mercy of their own consciences

[illegible]

No. 5

Sir Horace Rumbold (Berne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 2)

(No. 1067)

Telegraphic

Berne, June 30, 1923

I CALLED on the President of the Confederation this morning and communicated to him the substance of your telegram No. 282 of the 28th instant.

M. Haab replied that he was very glad to receive this communication, which would enable him to reassure his colleagues, who had been somewhat disturbed by the rumours which had been circulated in the Press. He would at once call a meeting of the Federal Council, which would be held on Monday next, and would inform me of the result of its deliberations.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 6

Sir Horace Rumbold (Berne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 2)

(No. 1069)

Telegraphic

Berne, June 30, 1923

M. Haab has just informed me that the Federal Council has decided to accept the proposals contained in your telegram No. 282 of the 28th instant, and that the Swiss Government will inform the French Government accordingly.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 7

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

(No. 281)

Telegraphic

Foreign Office, July 2, 1923

THE position which has now been reached in the negotiations at Lausanne is shown in Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams Nos. 232, 233, 234, which your Excellency will have received by this time. The latter sums up the situation as viewed from Geneva, and I shall be glad to have the observations of the French Government upon the proposals which it contains.

[illegible]

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 8

Sir Horace Rumbold (Berne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 2)

(No. 1071)

Telegraphic

Berne, July 2, 1923

SIR H. RUMBOLD reports in his No. 1067 that the Swiss Government have decided to accept the proposals contained in your telegram No. 282 of the 28th June, subject to the following observations:—

[illegible]

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

time with them for years stood between Greece and Constantinople and thus prevented her from striking a blow at Enver and perhaps settling whole question in a manner satisfactory to herself as well as to us without any cost to ourselves.

At present whether we acknowledge it or not we are using the menace of Greek army to secure concessions at Lausanne and of course presence of that army on Maritza must strengthen our position at Constantinople. Demobilisation must perforce weaken efficacy of that menace. According to press Greek Prime Minister stated yesterday that if coercive measures against Turkey are realised Greece will not participate.

If after all that has passed our failure to save Greece from collapse after she had put herself in our hands would be a fatal blow to our prestige throughout East. Our failure to help solve refugee problem would prevent Greece from ever attempting stand on Maritza and recovery of Eastern Thrace—we are now to come as suppliants to Turkish Government with which we have severed relations and whilst offering them a bribe in return beg them not to make a separate peace. Our position in the East if the world will be tried indeed.

If we *must* beg Greek Government not to make separate peace would it not be more seemly at less expensive to change our line from a futile offer to reoccupy Adrianople Vilayet to a definite offer to reoccupy Adrianople Vilayet with British troops to help Greece to keep it and maintain solid front with us?

(Sent to Constantinople No. 135.)

No. 9

Mr. Hodgson (the Hague) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 3.*)

No. 374.
Telegraphic.
MY telegram No. 364. *Constantinople, July 2, 1923.*

Minister repeats to me most enclosed new despatch No. 345 stating that guns were found on British steamer Leicestrian the commander of which refused to permit search. Minister considers this incident very serious.

Pending explanation which I have called for from Soviet Government I shall not recommend any further steps.

Repeated to Berne No. 199.

No. 10

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 3.*)

No. 242.
Telegraphic.
Lausanne, July 2, 1923.

CONSIGNOR MONTAGNA is instructed to inform Ismet that Council of Ambassadors has decided to instruct Allied Commissioners to proceed to Constantinople to discuss with Turkish representatives question of Ottoman debt and to report to Council of Ambassadors. Ismet will be informed that Council of Ambassadors has also decided to instruct Allied Commissioners to discuss with Turkish representatives question of Turkish gold coin deposits in London banks

No. 12

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 3)

No. 245.
Telegraphic.

Lausanne, July 2, 1923.

[illegible] evening conference.

I have received [illegible] instruction dispatches [illegible] with regard to [illegible] question [illegible] Turkish [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No 16

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Hentsch at Constantinople

No 241
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office July 3 1923

YOUR telegram No 237 of 1st July

You should inform His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot take the responsible Expressing my views on the Turkish offer
(Repeated to Lausanne No 1045)

No 17

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Lausanne

(No 1053)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office July 3 1923

Your despatches Nos 235 and 239 of 29th and 30th June Separate Greek and Turkish negotiations

Your reply to M Venizelos's aide-mémoire to the effect that we greatly appreciate his past and present attitude in matter but we fully understand his position and that of his colleagues and that in the circumstances we shall leave the decision and the responsibility with them

It is therefore for him to decide whether his reply to the last possible moment Do not repeat not inform M Venizelos that we are sorry to learn from No 236 that you are not able to hold out any hope of success

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No 18

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Lausanne)

(No 1054)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office July 3 1923

YOUR telegram No 240 of 30th June

In the circumstances stated in your telegram No 238 of 29th June we agree that it would be useful if you could arrange for Ismet to be informed that we regret that the Greek Government have not been able to accept the Turkish offer and that we are sorry that the Conference has failed to come to an agreement

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No 19

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received July 5 1923

(No 246)
(Telegraphic)

Lausanne July 3 1923

M Venizelos engaged me in lengthy conversation yesterday morning to which the record of the meeting to-day will refer in detail

Ismet Pasha and the Turkish Delegation were evidently disappointed at the attitude of the Greek Delegation at the meeting to-day and Ismet Pasha informed me that he would be unable to accept the Greek proposals in their present form

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telegram No 245 of 2nd July and I received a very powerful attack by my French colleague whom he saw after leaving me Following is record of to-day's proceedings —

Second Committee Articles 45 48 49 and 52

Outstanding question here was that of providing for them to Greek responsibility for share of debt of area in Western Thrace ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey in 1913 and now ceded to Greece (see reports of experts of 12th June my despatch No 161 of 4th July)

This question was taken together with that of Article 58 (Greco-Turkish reparation) see above-mentioned report of 12th June which was still outstanding owing to Greek attitude regarding payments for Greek requisitions M Venizelos and Ismet Pasha explained that they had discussed both these questions and were awaiting further instructions from their Governments Greek experts were instructed to endeavour to arrive at complete agreement in a few days and to further inform the Drafting Committee of the result of their meeting on these two questions unnecessary

Article 60

Ismet Pasha accepted the draft text agreed upon by the experts in their report 29th June see my despatch No 217 of 30th June but evidently had not come to any decision with M Venizelos's strong support in Greek interest to agree with the draft text few days ago and I have reason to believe that he then thought that Greek Government would be prepared to accept the text as it stands in Annex It was arranged that if there were such an agreement they should return to Geneva without necessitating a further meeting

Delegates to Geneva Conference without necessitating a further meeting

Articles of 1908 and 1909 and lists of Greek and Turkish properties referred to in Articles Copies of these lists will be sent by first draft translation These lists will not include all properties retained by Greek in 1909 as taxes mentioned in paragraph 10 of Protocol thus greatly increasing number of that will be left in Turkish properties in the countries will be entered into relations with Greek Government under Article 55

Article 70 (Reparation Indemnity for Damages Acts of Constantinople Government and Council &c since the Armistice)

It was understood that while the question of the gold sequestrated in 1919 and 1920 by the Ottoman Bank at Debt Council secured on this gold had been referred to Constantinople telegram No 154 of 29th June to me and approved in mine No 226 of 3rd July, he was still against concessions from Allies Government declining to accept draft letter from Turkish Government Debt Council and experts report of 28th June (see my despatch No 217 I, but they agreed to be merely willing to accept this and to add Question with Ottoman Police and also to accept in Allied declaration [illegible] that we regret to find [illegible] sequestration of the Ottoman Public Debt and other taxes pledged to secure loans Ismet made a declaration with Riza Nour for Turkish Government to the effect that the expression should not [illegible] Article 30 see my despatch No 239 30th June

Second Committee Article 72

Article declaration regarding Turkish property in Egypt and measures taken against it dated 11th September and 27th June (see my despatch No 215 29th June) draft was accepted by the Turkish Delegation

Reference to one of the articles agreed upon in the experts report of 29th June (see my despatch No 218 of 30th June was agreed to and it was also decided that these words at the end of the first sentence of last paragraph be struck

Article 72 (Restitution of Property

The draft article contained in the experts report of 29th June (see despatch No 218 was accepted with the declaration that reparations should be carried out and accepted by the Allied delegations

Article 109 (Freedom of Transit)

Lord Balfour's paragraph 4 (based on the Drafting Committee's report of 25th June) was then read (see text in No. 260). Lord Balfour explained that it was intended to cover the case of Syria, Iraq and Palestine, and to ensure that no transit dues should be charged on goods passing through Turkish territory.

Article 115

It was agreed that Lord Balfour's paragraph 4 should be struck out, and was reserved for further consideration on other articles which have been provisionally passed.

Article 117

Lord Balfour explained that the object of this article was to ensure that the Straits should be open to the ships of all nations in time of peace and war. The Greek delegate pointed out that Greece was at present in a state of war with Turkey, and that Greek ships would be prevented from passing through the Straits. Lord Balfour replied that this article was intended to cover the case of Greece when she had become reconciled to Turkey. This was agreed to.

Article 118

Lord Balfour explained that the object of this article was to ensure that the Straits should be open to the ships of all nations in time of peace and war. The Greek delegate pointed out that Greece was at present in a state of war with Turkey, and that Greek ships would be prevented from passing through the Straits. Lord Balfour replied that this article was intended to cover the case of Greece when she had become reconciled to Turkey. This was agreed to.

article 109, article 46 *bis*, and 50 which [illegible] the delegates' settlement), article 70 [illegible] the [illegible] regarding [illegible] commercial [illegible] on [illegible] principle but Article still undecided regarding [illegible] of [illegible] benefit by [illegible] continuance of pre-war service) and declaration to be made by Turks regarding Allied lighterage service in Turkish ports.

No. 20

Note from Reshadieh to the High Commissioner of Kurdistan (Received July 4.)

(No. 247.)

(Copy.) *Lausanne, July 3, 1923.*

[illegible] MANIAN and Secretary-General called to-day together to say they were [illegible] state of concern [illegible] reports of an attack to [illegible] Turkish *gendarmerie*. They pointed out that [illegible] would [illegible] that they were not [illegible] with Turkey. They therefore [illegible] [illegible] which [illegible] to a rupture of conference [illegible] which [illegible] the rupture. They said that wish to [illegible] Article 62 [illegible] to [illegible] economic [illegible] points, [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] which [illegible] difficult to [illegible]. They said that they were going to speak to [illegible] to [illegible] these [illegible].

[illegible] that [illegible] stress that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No 22

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 4)

(No 375)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, July 4, 1923*

I HAVE received telegram *en clair* from Mr Parker stating that he has concluded very satisfactory agreement on behalf of Admiralty

He is due to return to-morrow or day after when I will confirm

(Sent to Lausanne, No 201)

No 23

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 5)

(No 377)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, July 4, 1923*

TELEGRAM No 281 to Paris

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has sent me copy of his telegram to War Office No 41 54 treaty drawing attention to difficulties of situation created by evacuation, as suggested in last three paragraphs of your telegram No 247 Repeated to Constantinople, and concession of questions be settled

I entirely share General Harington's views that if occupation is to continue in such circumstances legal position should be clearly defined

My own view is that there are three courses open to us either *a* evacuate Constantinople and Gallipoli as soon as possible *b* to resume effective control there or to evacuate Constantinople but not Gallipoli or Dardanelles or Straits

a is to my mind a course of satisfactory treaty *b* that of rupture and *c* that of treaty in which the outstanding questions cannot be settled

b would result in resumption of political control and other measures which would probably be resisted to an extent likely to lead to serious incidents It is not the course to adopt unless Powers are prepared for all possible contingencies Prestige of Allied troops would only be upheld if forced to be were opposed

If a treaty with reservations be signed to-day and persuasive effect of maintenance of occupation of Straits seems to me the most equally powerful as would be effect from occupation of Constantinople area, being far less irritating and easy to manage are likely to produce on the cited alternative solution

(Sent to Lausanne No 203)

No 24

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston —(Received July 4)

(No 378
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople July 4, 1923*

YOUR telegram No 207

Arrangements are being made for Patriarch to leave for Mount Athos on 8th July on British destroyer

Holy Synod has approved his departure and Turkish authorities have granted the necessary visas

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No 25

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 4)

(No 249)
(Telegraphic) *Lausanne July 4 1923*

PARIS telegrams Nos 939 and 940

French Government appear to try wish to put set themselves as going a long way to meet us by accepting but I am try to telegram No 232 and agreeing to confront Turks with two separate notes regarding debt, viz (*a*) acceptance of Paris loan or (*b*) a guarantee of duration of bonds to be subject to reservation on our part of our right to protect interests of latter in so far as they are Allied subjects They

attach however to (*b*) conditions which, as I explained in my telegram No 233, would inevitably make it as alternative as unwelcome to Turks as (*a*) Turks are growing daily more sensitive and suspicious regarding evacuation question If we should now hold them that we can only sanction declaration to shareholders on two conditions—

1 That evacuation will in any case be deferred until six weeks after ratification by Angora in the hope that they will thus have time to reach agreement with bondholders and

2 That failing such agreement within that period evacuation will be still further postponed

Their attitude will be the same as that of ultimatum and they will refuse to sign treaty In this connection see my telegram No 247

I have spoken to General Pellé in the above sense and told him that effect on French Government's policy would be to create another Ruhr question My Italian colleague who was present at interview supported my views throughout and is so reporting to his Government

French are thus still seeking to maintain a policy which means rupture of conference if they refuse to face the consequences of such rupture These consequences are—

1 Incident to restarting of peace

2 Probable necessity of fighting regular Turkish army in Constantinople where we cannot ensure dignity or safety of Allied troops in present basis

3 Possible resumption by Turks of hostilities in one or more of three directions, viz Constantinople and Chanak Syria or Iraq

Even at first these consequences as I fought will change, having regard to present state of unrest in the Balkans and Near East Second means that we should assume responsibility for administration of Constantinople and some measure of responsibility for East Thrace unless we ask Greece to step over Third means that there are interests of which cannot be foreseen

M Poincaré dismisses possibility of Turkish resistance slightly or appreciates consequences so imperfectly that when asked what he will do in certain eventualities sent for reminds I Constantinople these says that this is the last thing anyone wishes It is our duty to say that above consequences should be put before British public and that danger of Constantinople area is Black Sea of Allied forces and that reinforcements would have to be sent from Malta Gibraltar and Atlantic coast of the Straits In these circumstances I cannot see how French can assert public opinion in the French Chamber a majority of whom are reported to be anxious to withdraw from Levant altogether and who would not hesitate to withdraw altogether from Turkey I do not see how though this is a question for very rather than for me how we could justify to British public a rupture of conference involving so much certainty and danger In my considered opinion the best chance of avoiding disaster is to follow course recommended in my telegram No 232

It is quite true that even if question which as matter of proceedings at Angora is much a British as a French question is still outstanding but to my mind there is little doubt that Ismet Pasha will, on receipt of his present instructions from Angora, be in a position to and must in order to settle it in a more or less satisfactory manner Question arises if there is not danger of such a course as that of bluff and in so far as it is to be made to appear more a British than a French interest is for that very reason more likely to be settled against

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople)

No 26

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 4)

(No 250)
(Telegraphic) *Lausanne July 4, 1923*

MY telegram No 247

M Diamandy told me in confidence that he had invited Greek delegation to join him and M Yovanovitch in making these representations to British French and Italian delegations He had pointed out advantage of such action from point of view of Greece's anxiety to join in Little Entente

M Venizelos whom M Diamandy had seen in presence of M Alexandris had been very anxious to accept in principle but M Alexandris said that he could not agree M Diamandy stresses that this was due to the latter's wish to keep a complete free hand for Greece in case the latter should not agree to enter into negotiations with Turkey

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E 6984 3579 44] No 97

Memorandum respecting recent Negotiations with the Near Eastern Powers.

THE conference and the series of Armistices with Turkey resulted in the liberation of the territories in European Turkey, and also of those occupied by the subject races and soldiers of the Entente Powers who were living or were serving in the Turkish forces. The Turkish Government had also undertaken to withdraw their troops from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, and to enter into negotiations with the Allied Governments for a Turkish contribution towards the cost of such evacuation and occupation. The Armistices with Turkey will be found in Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous No. 1 (1919) Cmd. 292 and Miscellaneous No. 1 (1920) Cmd. 544.

The obligations of Allied and Turkish Governments under the Armistices were complementary to those which the Allied Governments had undertaken under Articles 94 to 99 of the Treaty of Sèvres, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, and the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands to Italy.

3. The Armistices provided that the Turkish Government should allow all persons belonging to races or parties which had been hostile to the Entente Powers before the outbreak of war, and all foreigners who were in the Constantinople Government's territories on the 30th October, 1918, to depart, and that no measures should be taken to prevent the departure of Turkish Government officials who wished to leave the country, or to confiscate their property, unless they were required for the service of the State. The Turkish Government undertook to facilitate the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and to furnish the Allied Governments with information as to the graves of deceased prisoners of war and interned civilians. The Armistices also provided for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Persia, Transcaucasia and Tripoli, and for the transfer to the Allies of the Turkish garrisons in Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, Mesopotamia and Cilicia, and for the surrender of Turkish warships and merchant vessels. The Armistices also provided for the occupation by the Allies of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts, and of the Taurus tunnels, and for the free passage of warships and aircraft through the Straits. The Armistices also provided for the occupation of Batoum, Baku, Constantinople and Armenian territory in the event of disorder arising.

4. The Turkish Government undertook to surrender to the Allies all persons charged with offences against the laws and customs of war and humanity, and to bring to trial before Courts-Martial those officers and officials who had been responsible for the massacres of Armenians during the war. The Turkish Government undertook to bring to trial before Courts-Martial those officers and officials who had been responsible for the massacres of Armenians during the war. The Turkish Government undertook to bring to trial before Courts-Martial those officers and officials who had been responsible for the massacres of Armenians during the war.

5. The Armistices provided that the Turkish Government should allow all persons belonging to races or parties which had been hostile to the Entente Powers before the outbreak of war, and all foreigners who were in the Constantinople Government's territories on the 30th October, 1918, to depart, and that no measures should be taken to prevent the departure of Turkish Government officials who wished to leave the country, or to confiscate their property, unless they were required for the service of the State. The Turkish Government undertook to facilitate the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and to furnish the Allied Governments with information as to the graves of deceased prisoners of war and interned civilians. The Armistices also provided for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Persia, Transcaucasia and Tripoli, and for the transfer to the Allies of the Turkish garrisons in Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, Mesopotamia and Cilicia, and for the surrender of Turkish warships and merchant vessels. The Armistices also provided for the occupation by the Allies of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts, and of the Taurus tunnels, and for the free passage of warships and aircraft through the Straits. The Armistices also provided for the occupation of Batoum, Baku, Constantinople and Armenian territory in the event of disorder arising.

6. The Armistices provided that the Turkish Government should allow all persons belonging to races or parties which had been hostile to the Entente Powers before the outbreak of war, and all foreigners who were in the Constantinople Government's territories on the 30th October, 1918, to depart, and that no measures should be taken to prevent the departure of Turkish Government officials who wished to leave the country, or to confiscate their property, unless they were required for the service of the State. The Turkish Government undertook to facilitate the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and to furnish the Allied Governments with information as to the graves of deceased prisoners of war and interned civilians. The Armistices also provided for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Persia, Transcaucasia and Tripoli, and for the transfer to the Allies of the Turkish garrisons in Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, Mesopotamia and Cilicia, and for the surrender of Turkish warships and merchant vessels. The Armistices also provided for the occupation by the Allies of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts, and of the Taurus tunnels, and for the free passage of warships and aircraft through the Straits. The Armistices also provided for the occupation of Batoum, Baku, Constantinople and Armenian territory in the event of disorder arising.

concerned, with this subject, the draft treaty will have lost their justification, and it would seem that the conclusion of peace should be greatly facilitated thereby. It would only be in the event of no agreement being reached in regard to the suggested arrangement with the Soviet Government that the Allied Powers would have to insist on the terms of the treaty itself of demand provisions approximating to those appearing in the draft of the 28th January last, and so safeguard the vital interests of their nationals.

I met the Turkish delegates at the Foreign Office between representatives of the various Balkan States concerned, the Allied Ambassadors and representatives of the Foreign Office and Board of Trade to arrange details, and it was decided that the Ambassadors should be represented by Sir Horace Rumbold.

It was the 8th April the Turkish reply to the Allied note of the 28th March regarding the question of a gold guarantee was made to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople. The following is a summary of the message in dealing with the present and concessions:—

> Nevertheless Turkey, by accepting the wishes expressed by the Allied Powers, is ready to settle the matter by the method of arbitration, and to submit to a mixed commission, composed of representatives of Turkey, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Japan, the question of the amount of the Ottoman debt which ought to be borne by the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne, and the question of the amount of the Ottoman debt which ought to be borne by the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish Government is also ready to submit to the same commission the question of the amount of the Ottoman debt which ought to be borne by the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne, and the question of the amount of the Ottoman debt which ought to be borne by the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.

> This was the first attempt to be made by any nation assembled by the Peace Conference to the Turkish Government to submit its case not only as to the amount of the public debt properly attributable to the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres, but also as to the amount of the public debt which ought to be borne by the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne, and the question of the amount of the Ottoman debt which ought to be borne by the territories detached from Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.

> The Turkish Government is also ready to submit to the same commission the question of the amount of the Ottoman

ANNEX A.

NOTE of principal concessionary companies in Turkey in which British interests predominate or are exclusively vested

1. *The Ottoman Railways, formerly subject to Irade of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey*

A Turkish company formed in 1856 under Turkish law.

The capital is understood to be held almost entirely by British banks. The amounts actually issued are as follows:

	£
Ordinary shares	294,360
4 per cent 1st debenture stock	2,264,150
5 per cent 2nd debenture stock	1,629,567

2. *The National Bank of Turkey*

A Turkish company founded in 1909 under Turkish law although it makes returns to His Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue.

The shares are almost entirely in British hands. The authorised capital consists of 100,000 shares of £20 each, all paid. The British Trade Corporation holds 96,810 shares, the balance of 3,190 shares being held by various persons in the country of £42,920.

3. *The Ottoman Hydraulic Exploration Company*

A British company formed under Turkish law.

The issued capital consists of:

	£
6,000 Ordinary shares	25,000
6,000 Preferred ordinary shares	5,000
6,000 Deferred shares	96,200

4. *The Smyrna Quay Company*

A Turkish company.

The capital consists of 17,000 shares of £50 each = £850,000.

Further assets consist of shares to be issued in England ranking before British Government Navy and Treasury preferential interests.

5. *Smyrna Railway Concessions*

This is a private British concern, which holds direct concessions from the Turkish Government regarding which no detailed information is available.

6. *Ottoman Company for Irrigation (Smyrna)*

A British company which proposes to irrigate the town of Smyrna. Issued capital, 75,000.

The following companies operate primarily in Turkey but have important concessions from or contracts with the Turkish Government:

1. *Société Générale de Constructions et Entreprises Maritimes (France)*. These two great firms have combined to form a private syndicate known as the *Ateliers de Construction et Chantiers Réunis*, which holds important concessions for the Turkish Government for the construction of naval docks at Constantinople. It is however impossible to say how large a proportion of the total capital of the two firms is devoted to this particular undertaking.
2. *Eastern Telegraph Company*. This British company, with an authorised capital of £9,000,000, has important contracts with the Turkish Government in respect of terminal stations, cable landing rights, &c.
3. *Ottoman Land and Immovable Property Company*. A British company, with an authorised capital of £500,000. It has concessions all over the world and is possibly the only company which operates in Turkey as a holding company. The proportion of its funds which may be invested in Turkey

There are also numerous British concerns, such as the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company, a considerable portion of whose funds are no doubt indirectly invested in Turkey, but it is difficult to say to what extent the prosperity of such undertakings would be affected by the repudiation by the Turkish Government of pre-war contracts.

Lastly, a large number of minor private companies such as the Koshan Collieries Limited, Abbotts' Emery Mines &c., hold concessions from the Turkish Government. They are for the most part understood to be registered as Turkish companies but, although the capital invested is British, the shares are for the most part held by local merchants and the sums affected are understood to be comparatively small.

ANNEX C3.

E 2569/1 44]

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe, Paris

No. 567. Most Secret. *Foreign Office, March 31, 1921.*

I have had a long conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, who came to see me as the result of a request from Mr. Lloyd George, that His Majesty's Government should be prepared to consider the possibility of a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. I told the Ambassador that I was quite willing to do so, but that it was useless to enter into any discussions with the Turkish Government unless they were prepared to withdraw their troops from Cilicia, and to enter into a general settlement of all the questions at issue between Turkey and Europe, including the Greek question. I pointed out that the Treaty of Sèvres had been the result of long and laborious negotiations with the Turkish Government, in which all the Allied Governments had participated, and that it was impossible to contemplate any revision of it except in consultation with all the Powers concerned. I added that I was not prepared to enter into separate negotiations with the Angora Government, and that I could not consent to any revision of the Treaty of Sèvres which was not approved by all the Powers who had been parties to it.

The Ambassador then proceeded to explain that the Angora Government were prepared to enter into negotiations with the Allied Governments for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and that they were willing to send a delegation to London for the purpose. He added that they were also prepared to withdraw their troops from Cilicia, provided that the French Government would undertake to withdraw their troops from Syria. I replied that I was glad to hear that the Angora Government were prepared to withdraw their troops from Cilicia, but that I could not undertake to enter into negotiations with the Angora Government for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, which was a matter that concerned all the Allied Governments, and not only Great Britain and France. I added that I would, however, be glad to receive the Angora delegation in London, and to discuss with them the question of the withdrawal of their troops from Cilicia, provided that the French Government would undertake to withdraw their troops from Syria.

The Ambassador then asked me whether I would be prepared to discuss the question of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres with the Angora delegation, if they were to arrive in London. I replied that I would be prepared to discuss with them any proposals which they might have to make for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, provided that they were prepared to withdraw their troops from Cilicia. I added that I would be glad to receive the Angora delegation in London, and to discuss with them the question of the withdrawal of their troops from Cilicia, provided that the French Government would undertake to withdraw their troops from Syria. I added that I would be glad to receive the Angora delegation in London, and to discuss with them the question of the withdrawal of their troops from Cilicia, provided that the French Government would undertake to withdraw their troops from Syria.

I went on to point out to the Ambassador that the Angora Government were dealing with the Turkish proposal to reopen the negotiations, also that we must wait till the Angora Government had made their proposals before we could proceed further. I have myself a fairly clear idea of the manner in which we should proceed with

al probability I should address the French Government on the subject. In the meantime I can call the attention of His Excellency to the fact that, whereas M. Poincaré in his note is quite clear to us here that along with ourselves we regarded the Montagnini formula and the proposals put forward by M. Bonnard at the last moment concerning the economic section as having lapsed owing to their failure to secure the signature to the treaty, which they had been put forward to effect, nevertheless, no intimation of the French point of view had been conveyed to the French High Commissioner at Constantinople or to Adnan Bey, and a persistent effort was now being made to represent the French as being willing to offer concessions to the Turks, against which the British alone were standing out. This was all to misrepresentation of the situation which would soon be found out, but meanwhile it seemed to me unfortunate that the French Government had kept their High Commissioner and the Turks in the dark as to what were their real views and intentions.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

ANNEX (c).

COPY of letter addressed to the secretaries of the following companies:

Smyrna Aidin Railway.
2. Ottoman Gas Company of Smyrna.
3. Eastern Construction Company.
4. Constantinople Telegraph Company.
5. Eastern Telegraph Company.
6. National Bank of Turkey.
7. Constantinople Quays Company.
8. Borax Consolidated Limited.

E 3244/1/44]

SIR, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1923.*

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to invite you to send a representative to a meeting in the Ambassadors' waiting room at the Foreign Office at 11 A.M. to-morrow, the 28th March, to discuss the following matter.

2. As you are aware, in articles 93 and 94 of the draft Treaty of Peace presented to the Turks at Lausanne provision is made for the maintenance of pre-war concessions in Turkey held by normally Ottoman companies, of which the capital or controls actually Allied. Provision is also made for certain conditions for the possible prolongation, revision and resumption by the Turkish Government of these concessions, and for compensation for concessions which are damaged or suffered during the war.

3. The Turkish delegates at Lausanne professed to entertain, in the interests of attracting foreign capital to Turkey, not only to maintain these concessions but also to treat the concessionaires fairly as regards the prolongation of their concessions and compensation, but they resolutely refused to provide for these matters in the treaty, insisting on the plea that the companies were a matter for the Turkish Government must be left free to deal directly with the parties concerned. This was one of the grounds on which the Turkish Government refused to sign at Lausanne. In their counter-proposals the Turks however have since proposed to separate all the economic clauses from the treaty and to deal with them by separate negotiations later. The Admiralty experts, who have been in London to consider these proposals, have unanimously agreed to refuse this procedure, but the French Government have proposed that, in order to remove one of the practical difficulties to the negotiation of the peace, and to give the Turkish Government assurance of seriousness of their professions at Lausanne, the Turkish Government should be invited at once to enter into negotiations with representatives of the private concessionary companies concerned with a view to endeavouring to agree with them upon the general principles upon which each of them should have their concessions maintained, revised or renegotiated, and should receive compensation for damages suffered. These negotiations should begin as soon as possible, preferably in Turkey, and should proceed concurrently with the resumed negotiations for

a general peace with Turkey. The Turkish Government would at the same time be warned that, should the Allies find, when the general negotiations are drawing to a close, that their concessionaires are not being satisfactorily treated in their private negotiations with the Turkish Government, they will be forced to re-insert in the treaty something like the present articles dealing with concessions. On the other hand, should the private negotiations succeed before the conclusion of the main negotiations an article would merely be inserted in the treaty taking note of the results of the former.

4. The British Government consider this procedure constructive, but are anxious in the first instance to learn the views of the companies concerned. They would, if possible, like to obtain the general decision of the companies to this proposal before they leave London. They regret that it was not found possible to give the companies longer warning of the proposal, which has only been explained to the French delegates at this meeting, and discussion between the Governments was necessary before the companies could be consulted.

5. It is understood that, as a matter of fact, the French companies concerned have already formed a group and appointed representatives who are prepared to start from Paris as soon as the Foreign Office Allied committees are ready, and discussions as the invitation has been accepted loyally by the Turkish Government.

Similar letters are being addressed to the Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin, the Ottoman Gas Company of Smyrna, the Eastern Telegraph Company, the National Bank of Turkey, the Borax Consolidated Limited, and Mr. Cecil Lubbock of the Constantinople Quays Company.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

ANNEX (d).

Draft Statement of Principles that might be submitted to Lausanne on June 4, 1923.

LES concessions accordées avant le 29 octobre 1914 et dont les ressortissants alliés ou les entreprises foncières ou minières alliées ont été dépossédés par la force majeure, seront rétablies par le Gouvernement turc dans les conditions prévues par les contrats primitifs, sous réserve des modifications ci-après.

Les accords intervenus avec le Gouvernement ottoman depuis le 30 octobre 1918 relatifs aux concessions visées à l'article précédent entreront en vigueur, sous réserve de leur soumission à la même loi du Gouvernement turc à l'examen des experts dans le délai de trois mois à compter de la mise en vigueur du traité. Dans ce cas, l'accord sera exécuté ou modifié selon les recommandations des experts.

3. Les provisions des contrats de concession seront:

a) Maintenues en conformité des clauses originales et actuelles;

b) Réduites comme reparation des préjudices subis par suite de la guerre. La revision à être effectuée pourra consister en la prolongation des prix exigibles aux termes de la concession, la modification des droits payables au Gouvernement turc conformément aux dispositions de la concession et la prolongation de la durée de la concession.

4. Au cas où cette revision ne suffirait pas à assurer la réparation des préjudices subis, les concessionnaires auront droit à présenter des réclamations qui devront être soumises à une commission spéciale qui devra se réunir à Constantinople dans les trois mois de la mise en vigueur du traité. Dans le cas où la commission ne parviendrait pas à un accord, par deux experts dont chaque partie nommera un, ou si les experts n'arrivent pas à un accord, par un tiers-expert qu'ils désigneront.

Annex (b)

Project of Protocole

L'EMPIRE britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'Etat serbe-croate-slovène et la Turquie, animés du même désir de maintenir et de régler leurs rapports et ceux de leurs nationaux conformément aux principes d'équité et de respect des engagements réciproques, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Section I

1. Les contrats de concessions ainsi que les accords subséquents y relatifs intervenus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité compétente, d'une part, et les ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'autre part, sont maintenus sous réserve d'application ou non conformément aux dispositions ci-après.

2. Les contrats précédents jusqu'au 2 octobre 1918 inclus, toutes les formalités prévues ou acceptées en accord avec les autorités compétentes, dans les délais fixés, s'étant trouvées empêchées par force majeure, ces délais sont prolongés d'autant. Il en est de même pour l'obligation d'exploiter, les contrats ou accords conférant à l'exploitation forestière un caractère d'urgence.

Les sommes provenant des règlements des contrats aux bénéficiaires desdits contrats et accords à raison de la saisie ou de la liquidation de leurs propriétés ou de leurs avoirs seront, sur leur demande, payées directement à ces derniers par le Gouvernement ottoman conformément aux dispositions desdits contrats et accords, sans préjudice de l'application de l'article 6 ci-après.

3. Les contrats ou accords ci-dessus visés ne pourront être modifiés que d'un commun accord entre le Gouvernement ottoman et les parties intéressées.

4. Les différends qui viendraient à s'élever au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution des contrats ou accords ci-dessus visés seront, à défaut d'accord amiable, soumis à l'arbitrage d'un ou de plusieurs experts désignés par le Président de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de La Haye, sur la demande de la partie la plus diligente.

Les experts seront choisis parmi les personnes présentées par le Département fédéral des Affaires étrangères suisses.

5. Les contrats de concessions ainsi que les accords subséquents y relatifs intervenus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité compétente, d'une part, et les ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'autre part, sont maintenus sous réserve d'application ou non conformément aux dispositions ci-après.

6. Les contrats de concessions ainsi que les accords subséquents y relatifs intervenus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité compétente, d'une part, et les ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'autre part, sont maintenus sous réserve d'application ou non conformément aux dispositions ci-après.

7. Les contrats de concessions ainsi que les accords subséquents y relatifs intervenus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité compétente, d'une part, et les ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'autre part, sont maintenus sous réserve d'application ou non conformément aux dispositions ci-après.

8. Les contrats de concessions ainsi que les accords subséquents y relatifs intervenus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité compétente, d'une part, et les ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'autre part, sont maintenus sous réserve d'application ou non conformément aux dispositions ci-après.

Section II

Dans tous les territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques, soit à la suite du Traité de Paix du 10 janvier 1920, tous les ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'ancien Empire ottoman, sans distinction de nationalité, jouissent, à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, de tous les droits et intérêts de toute autre société constituée en conformité de la loi locale, sans préjudice des droits que l'Etat exerçant l'autorité sur le territoire en question soit en vertu des dispositions du présent traité, soit en vertu de la législation locale, aura le droit d'exercer contre la société ainsi constituée.

Les transferts de biens, droits et intérêts qui auront lieu entre ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'ancien Empire ottoman, ainsi que les transferts de biens, droits et intérêts de sociétés établies dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, sont exempts de toute taxe spéciale ou droit de mutation.

Les dispositions ci-dessus ne portent pas préjudice aux droits que les Puissances contractantes ou leurs ressortissants tiennent, le cas échéant, des traités de paix conclus avec la Turquie.

Section III

Les dispositions de la section II ci-dessus ne s'appliquent pas aux sociétés ressortissant à l'une des Puissances contractantes ou constituées sous l'empire de la législation de l'une d'elles, qui, ayant obtenu des concessions ou ayant acquis des droits ou intérêts dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, ont, depuis le 29 octobre 1914, transféré leur siège social hors de ces territoires.

Toutefois, les dispositions de la section II ci-dessus ne s'appliquent pas aux sociétés ressortissant à l'une des Puissances contractantes ou constituées sous l'empire de la législation de l'une d'elles, qui, ayant obtenu des concessions ou ayant acquis des droits ou intérêts dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, ont, depuis le 29 octobre 1914, transféré leur siège social hors de ces territoires, à moins que la Puissance intéressée n'y fasse opposition dans un délai de six mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité.

Section IV

1. Toute société constituée conformément à la loi ottomane et fonctionnant dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques, soit à la suite du présent traité, et dont les intérêts principaux sont compromis par la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix du 10 janvier 1920 avec la Turquie, aura le droit de transférer ses biens, droits et intérêts à toute autre société constituée en conformité de la loi locale, sans préjudice des droits que l'Etat exerçant l'autorité sur le territoire en question soit en vertu des dispositions du présent traité, soit en vertu de la législation locale, aura le droit d'exercer contre la société ainsi constituée.

Les transferts de biens, droits et intérêts qui auront lieu entre ressortissants, sociétés ou groupes de l'ancien Empire ottoman, ainsi que les transferts de biens, droits et intérêts de sociétés établies dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, sont exempts de toute taxe spéciale ou droit de mutation.

Les dispositions ci-dessus ne portent pas préjudice aux droits que les Puissances contractantes ou leurs ressortissants tiennent, le cas échéant, des traités de paix conclus avec la Turquie.

2. Les dispositions ci-dessus visées ne s'appliquent pas aux sociétés ressortissant à l'une des Puissances contractantes ou constituées sous l'empire de la législation de l'une d'elles, qui, ayant obtenu des concessions ou ayant acquis des droits ou intérêts dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, ont, depuis le 29 octobre 1914, transféré leur siège social hors de ces territoires, à moins que la Puissance intéressée n'y fasse opposition dans un délai de six mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité.

Projet de Déclaration de la Délégation ottomane

Le Gouvernement ottoman se déclare prêt à accepter les stipulations de la première section du projet de protocole relatif aux concessions ottomanes sous réserve des dispositions qui suivent.

Les dispositions de cette section ne sont pas applicables aux concessions ou contrats qui ont été reconnus par les autres Puissances contractantes comme ayant été abrogés.

Il est entendu que le bénéfice de ces dispositions ne pourra être invoqué par les sociétés ou groupes étrangers dans lesquels les intérêts ottomans seront prépondérants.

Note Annexe (c)

[illegible] protocol relative to the [illegible] treaty presented to the Turkish Delegation on the 31st January 1923 [illegible] the principal grievances of the Turks to those articles was that by [illegible] the treaty of the companies and by certain clauses [illegible] were very [illegible] in respect of treaty revisions. Thus the treaty has been [illegible] by making the protocol applicable to Ahmedeh and Adalia [illegible] by providing for the extension of [illegible] by the Turks [illegible] by a separate [illegible] to be made by the Turkish delegation.

The Turkish delegation further [illegible] ratifying any of the acts of the Constantinople [illegible] during the [illegible] period. A reminder was [illegible] the protocol which, while safeguarding the interests of the companies in this respect [illegible] the appearance of making the Angora Government responsible for the acts of the Ottoman Empire.

It was [illegible] to the concessionaires [illegible] for war damage [illegible] the guns of the Goeben, has been abandoned, as has also that for the [illegible] of concessions beyond the ordinary [illegible] to the period of hostilities.

Apart from this, a certain [illegible] of the [illegible] articles have been noted especially as regards the continuance of the privileges, concessions, meaning those [illegible] by articles whose exercise has been [illegible] but which has not been [illegible]. Provision is also made for [illegible] which was in progress with a view regarding [illegible] concessions [illegible] to be [illegible], and for [illegible] of [illegible] concessionaires [illegible] and not [illegible] in the specific cases provided for in the [illegible].

Foreign Office, July 4, 1923.

[E 6948, 1/44] No. 28

Ismet Pasha to Lord Curzon (communicated by British Delegation, Lausanne)
(No. 7) (Received 4th Foreign Office, July)

MM. les Plénipotentiaires, *Lausanne, le 2 juillet 1923.*

LES Puissances invitantes en proposant, le 26 mai 1923, de régler la question des réparations grecques, avaient spécifié que l'enquête et le rapport des experts dans les questions financières et économiques auraient à servir de base aux délibérations de la conférence. Aussitôt après le règlement de ces questions, les représentations alliées auraient à déterminer sur le régime politique et économique et les sanctions à appliquer successivement et sans intervalle, l'exemple de ces questions des réparations pour régler avec toutes les autres.

Ce mode de procéder était logique et aurait dû commencement. De la sorte, on aurait évité de s'égarer dans le labyrinthe inextricable des questions qui se présentent sur la route de la paix.

La délégation turque a fait tout son possible pour aplanir les difficultés qui se sont présentées et a mis de bonne foi tous les renseignements nécessaires à la disposition des experts. Elle est d'autant plus désireuse de voir aboutir les travaux de la conférence que la question des réparations grecques ne peut être résolue que par un accord entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Les Alliés ne peuvent pas tenir compte de l'état financier de la Turquie. Il suffit de constater l'acceptation par leurs délégués du règlement de la question des réparations qui a imposé aucune charge au budget de la Turquie, et leur décision de faire porter la Turquie de toutes les dettes qui lui incombent, et des créances très considérables que l'Allemagne possédait contre elle. Si les circonstances économiques et autres nous avaient fait preuve des dispositions les plus bienveillantes, nous avons cependant, pris notre engagement quant à la manière dont seraient résolues les questions pécuniaires en suspens.

Votre Excellence a pu également constater l'empressement avec lequel la délégation turque a contribué à la solution de toutes les questions. Nous tenons à faire observer que nos efforts ont consisté non-seulement à accepter, et même à solliciter, des instructions de la délégation turque afin de rendre possible une solution.

En ce qui concerne les concessions, la délégation turque a déclaré dans la séance du 23 juin que cette question n'était pas de la compétence de la conférence. Il y a quelques jours seulement votre Excellence s'est déclarée prête à la discuter.

Les Puissances invitantes ont toujours insisté sur le fait que la question des concessions n'était possible pour elles, dans le traité, que dans les négociations qui s'y rattacheraient d'imposer aux porteurs des emprunts ottomans y compris les porteurs neutres, le paiement des coupons dans des conditions autres que celles prévues par les contrats d'emprunt. Les délégués de ces Puissances se sont opposés en efforts pour trouver à cette question une solution qui, sans léser en rien les droits du capital, tiendrait compte de la situation financière de la Turquie. Nous n'avons fait obstacle à l'étude d'aucune suggestion inspirée du désir de trouver une telle solution. Mais la délégation turque n'était pas en mesure d'apporter des suggestions les concernant, tout le monde savait que les auteurs avaient à attendre la décision du Gouvernement turc. Nous avons chargé un de nos experts de faire savoir à la délégation turque que toute proposition de cette nature était inacceptable. Il est question de cette conversation que fait la proposition à notre expert la somme à laquelle votre Excellence a caractérisé comme représentant le résultat d'une discussion avec un expert.

La troisième question soulevée par votre Excellence est celle de la souveraineté. Nous avons à plusieurs reprises fait connaître nos dispositions favorables à ce sujet, subordonnant la solution de cette question à celle des deux autres questions. Nous avons déclaré que, tant que nous ne pourrions aborder l'examen et la discussion de la question de l'évacuation et des autres questions restant en suspens.

Dans ces conditions nous sommes disposés à procéder de suite, de concert avec votre Excellence, au règlement dans le même sens de toutes les questions restées en suspens. La date de cette séance sera fixée aussitôt que nous serons en possession de toutes les décisions que dans les circonstances présentes nous avons le devoir de soumettre à votre Excellence.

Veuillez agréer &c.
ISMET
HORACE RUMBOLD
J. C. MONTAGNA

[E 6951, 1/44] No. 29

Abdul Hak Adnan (Ismet Pasha) (communicated by British Delegation, Lausanne)
(No. 12) (Received 4th Foreign Office, July)

M. le Président, *Lausanne, le 2 juillet 1923.*

NOUS avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note de votre Excellence en date d'aujourd'hui.

Nous avons le regret de devoir faire observer que nos efforts ont consisté non-seulement à accepter, et même à solliciter, des instructions de la délégation turque afin de rendre possible une solution.

En ce qui concerne les concessions, la délégation turque a déclaré dans la séance du 23 juin que cette question n'était pas de la compétence de la conférence. Il y a quelques jours seulement votre Excellence s'est déclarée prête à la discuter.

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Dans ces conditions nous sommes disposés à procéder de suite, de concert avec votre Excellence, au règlement dans le même sens de toutes les questions restées en suspens. La date de cette séance sera fixée aussitôt que nous serons en possession de toutes les décisions que dans les circonstances présentes nous avons le devoir de soumettre à votre Excellence.

Veuillez agréer &c.
ISMET
HORACE RUMBOLD
J. C. MONTAGNA

[E 6946, 1/44] No. 30

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 7)
(No. 588)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith to Mr. Poincaré respecting the proposal for direct negotiations with bondholders at Angora.

Paris, July 3, 1923.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30

Mr. Poincaré to the Marquess of Crewe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 3 juillet 1923.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer ci-joint à votre Excellence le texte du télégramme du Général Pellé dont je vous ai parlé hier.

Je serais très heureux que le Gouvernement britannique voulût bien donner d'urgence pour instructions à Sir Horace Rumbold l'autorisation de mettre l'accord avec le Général Pellé et M. Montagna sur les propositions turques à faire à la délégation turque touchant les questions restées en suspens.

Les propositions contenues dans la lettre de ce jour de Son Excellence ont pour but de remettre en concordance avec celles soumises à M. Scott Aldrovandi le 29 juin dernier, effectivement remises par le Général Pellé à Son Excellence Rechad Hassan Bey, Directeur des Affaires politiques du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, qui les a acceptées ad referendum. Il est donc nécessaire que le Général Pellé soit immédiatement autorisé à compléter son accord avec Rechad Hassan Bey, afin que le Président de la République puisse, dès son retour à Paris, soumettre le projet définitif au Parlement et le faire ratifier avant la fin de la session parlementaire.

Ou bien le texte inséré dans la lettre d'aujourd'hui de Son Excellence Rechad Hassan Bey au sujet du décret de Mudania, qui sera incorporé dans le traité sous le paragraphe 6 de la lettre susvisée.

Ou bien l'insertion d'une déclaration interprétative par les Alliés, aux termes de laquelle ce décret de Mudania ne fait pas obstacle à ce que les Alliés exercent leurs droits de souveraineté avec les forces qu'ils jugeront nécessaires.

Avant de passer aux paragraphes de la lettre susvisée de Son Excellence Rechad Hassan Bey, j'attends votre réponse à ce sujet.

Veuillez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30

General Pellé to Monsieur

(Télégramme) *Lausanne, le 2 juillet 1923.*

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD n'a pas encore reçu d'instructions du Gouvernement de Londres.

Avec regret je puis constater que cette attitude prolonge de façon inexplicable la situation. Elle épuise les efforts déployés à Ismet, suivant une méthode habituelle à tous les Orientaux, sous les auspices qui lui permettent de se soustraire.

Aujourd'hui Zekki Bey est venu présenter à Monsieur Montagna, comme le résultat de ses propres réflexions, une nouvelle solution à sept chefs qui paraît être en contradiction avec celle des Alliés et avec la déclaration écrite signée par la délégation turque, à la date du 29 juin dernier. Monsieur Montagna lui a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas accepter le texte apporté et qu'il ne pouvait que le soumettre à son gouvernement. Le Général Pellé a déclaré que, si le Gouvernement turc persistait dans ses nouvelles propositions, il ne pourrait plus poursuivre la discussion avec les délégués turcs et qu'il se retirerait.

Le Général Pellé a ajouté que, pour éviter toute rupture, il était prêt à demander à son gouvernement de faire encore un effort de conciliation, mais que, si cet effort échouait, il ne pourrait plus rien faire

I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government and French Government will if possible reach speedy agreement and send us identic instructions not later than end of this week.

You will see from my immediately following telegram that I have also kept M. Venizelos supplied with information and intend to do so here until Sunday.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 32

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 5.*)

(No. 252.)

Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 5, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 105.

M. Venizelos called this morning and I felt I could no longer defer replying to the letter which he had addressed to you in my telegram No. 235. I spoke to him in the sense of your first instruction but he another went on to speak to him in the sense of my telegram No. 239 as authorised by you making it perfectly clear that I was speaking in an entirely personal capacity and on my own initiative.

M. Venizelos replied that he understood and appreciated the considerations which I had submitted to him. He stated that he did not think anything would be gained by supposing there was any picture of collusion. He was deeply concerned to secure the immediate release and repatriation of the Greek prisoners of war in Turkey. He said that as far as 80,000 pieces of Greek property which had been left behind by the Greeks. It was urgent that he should speak to the Turkish Delegates at the earliest possible moment and he was anxious to give them a definite proposal for the exchange of populations in order that the scattered and their families should finally settle down in the lands to be vacated by the compulsory exchange of Populations Agreement could not be effected by 1st October another agricultural year would be lost and Greece in the interval would be burdened with the maintenance of refugees. He added that if there was danger of a rupture unless Greek troops were withdrawn from Eastern Thrace by the 15th August he would be prepared to withdraw them at once. These were his personal views and he would not commit the Greek Government to anything definite without consulting his colleagues. He would like to see the Turkish Delegates at once and to confer with them daily. He would be prepared to withdraw the Greek troops from Eastern Thrace as soon as the Turks had given satisfactory guarantees for the protection of the Christian minorities in Turkey. He would not insist on the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace before the Turks had given satisfactory guarantees for the protection of the Christian minorities in Turkey. He would not insist on the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace before the Turks had given satisfactory guarantees for the protection of the Christian minorities in Turkey.

I took a opportunity to telegraph to M. Venizelos to-day to inform him that I expected to receive a Note next week from the Turkish Delegates with regard to the question of the Greek prisoners of war and that I would communicate with him again as soon as I had received the Note.

Repeated to Athens.

No. 33

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 5.*)

(No. 379.)

Telegraphic. D. *Constantinople, July 5, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 374.

I am reporting if possible with details to the effect of observations furnished by the Greek Minister and to the effect that Turkish explanation cannot be accepted. In view of facts already reported the striking proof of guns having been smuggled out of the Kemptepe lately as last June. All have long been aware that a great deal of smuggling of munitions of war in which Turks have been violating article 13 of Mudania Convention, and I am sceptical myself of small amount of excess military equipment recently retransported from Thrace to Anatolia. Several soldiers on steamship "Imbat" admitted being artillerymen disguised as gendarmerie. It is hardly credible that guns could have remained hidden even if Tavar's declaration were true over the four years of Allied and Greek occupation of Eastern Thrace. Despite of my request have Turks supplied any details as to locality, date and conditions of discovery of guns.

It is possible that above details might be useful for communication to British press in question with this affair.

(Sent to Lausanne No. 205.)

No. 34

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe, Paris.

No. 284.

Telegraphic. D. *Foreign Office, July 5, 1923.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 639 to 642 (inclusive) Lausanne.

Please take the following note to the French Government in the following sense:

His Majesty's Government regret that they had a further exchange of views with the French Government necessary before they can send Sir H. Rumbold further instructions.

The latest French proposals contained in Monsieur Briand's telegram No. 642 appear to His Majesty's Government to involve the risk of a breakdown of the Conference on the question of the Greek prisoners of war in Turkey. The Turks will not, they believe, accept the French formula as a basis for discussion. General Pellé will doubtless have communicated to the French Government the views of the Serbian and Roumanian delegates on this question, together with Ismet's statements that the Turks will not only not interest themselves in the repatriation of Greek prisoners of war but that they would not even permit the Greek Government to repatriate them at their own expense. His Majesty's Government are disposed to regard the Turkish standpoint as reasonable.

His Majesty's Government take note of M. Poincaré's statements that he must maintain the Turkish counter-proposals (Constantinople telegram No. 639) and that the last thing he desires is a rupture between the Allies and Turkey (Paris telegram No. 642). They appear to His Majesty's Government to be inconsistent with a policy of insistence on a solution of the Thrace question which is generally regarded as calculated to lead to a rupture with the Turks.

His Majesty's Government do not think it necessary to explain that in the assumption that Mr. Ismet's refusal to allow the Greek prisoners of war to leave Turkey is not due to any intervening change of instructions from Angora, they would be prepared to support the Turkish proposals for the exchange of populations in the latter part of which Ismet's statement referred to above, and would be prepared to sign a treaty which would give effect to the agreement as to date of evacuation.

His Majesty's Government would be very glad to be informed at the earliest possible moment by the French Government whether the French proposals which require Turkey to agree to the immediate evacuation of Eastern Thrace before the Greek Government have fulfilled the conditions of the postponement of evacuation are to be regarded as likely to lead to a rupture. If they are, His Majesty's Government would therefore only ask the French Government to consider the possibility of a declaration to the effect that the treaty will fully reserve the rights of the landholders in the area to be evacuated pending the settlement of evacuation.

Should the French Government, as they hope, see their way to adopting the above proposals in this sense, it seems desirable that before the same time must be invited to submit to the Turks a multilateral declaration covering the concessions. His assent also would be required to a further declaration on this second question which is of almost greater importance to

Vital interests since the Lausanne Treaty would remain valid in equity were the rights of Allied nationals to be safeguarded by definite stipulations the drafting of which questions it is suggested should be reported together with their solution to the Conference of Ambassadors for consideration of Turkish satisfaction on the matter

Repeated to Rome No 202 Belgrade No 107 and Constantinople No 210)

No 35

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R Graham (Rome)

(No 260)
Telegraphic
Foreign Office July 5 1923

LAUSANNE, telegram No 242 repeated to you as No 3rd July

Please suggest to Italian Government that as their chief preoccupations at Lausanne appear to centre round Article 4 of Treaty of Sèvres instructions of Italian Delegates should be framed with a view to securing the withdrawal of that article

Procedure to be followed in discussions and Conference should be settled by Allied Governments before Conference meets and Italian Delegates should be provided with full instructions

Repeated to Lausanne No 103)

No 36

Mr Barrère to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 6

(No 261)
Telegraphic R
Athens July 5 1923

My telegram No 257

Public opinion and Press here have never for a moment thought that Greece would refuse to sign Treaty before signature of Peace Treaty with Turkey

Repeated to Constantinople)

No 37

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 7)

(No 50)
Telegraphic D
Rome July 6 1923

Your telegram No 264

President of Council has to-day received Allied representatives and has given them assurance that Government intends to sign Treaty

Repeated to Lausanne Constantinople)

No 38

Sir R Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 6)

No 1064)
Telegraphic
Rome July 6 1923

Your telegram 263

I have represented to the President of Council the necessity for the Italian Delegates at Lausanne being instructed to support the British proposals for the demilitarisation of the Straits and the restoration of Thrace to Turkey

Repeated to Lausanne No 212

No 39

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 6)

No 654)
Telegraphic
By telephone
Paris

Your R telegram No 284

The following is the central portion of note from French Government just received containing instructions sent to General Pellé to-day

Following is in French

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a adressé par télégramme au Général Pellé les instructions suivantes relatives à la question de la cession de territoire à la Grèce. Il a été spécifié que cet intérêt exprimait à la conférence une déclaration du Gouvernement et non pas un désir des Détroits

Si la question vient à la conférence il faudra s'en tenir à la lettre et à l'esprit de l'article 4 du traité de Sèvres

Il est bien entendu que cette note est secrète et ne doit pas être communiquée aux délégués turcs qui ne doivent connaître que les instructions données aux délégués alliés

Répondu à Lausanne

No 40

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R Graham (Rome)

(No 264)
Telegraphic D
Foreign Office July 6 1923

My telegram No 284 of Paris repeated to you No 262 of 5th July Lausanne

Please inform Italian Government that I should regret if anything which proceeds from Italian Government should shake Sir H Rumbold's proposals in which we understand M Mussolini entirely concurs for settlement of Eastern question

Repeated to Paris No 280 Lausanne No 110 and Constantinople No 218

No 41

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 7)

No 655)
Telegraphic
Paris July 7, 1923

Your R telegram No 284

In pursuance of your Lordship's instructions I have called upon M Poincaré this morning and handed him confidential *aide mémoire* setting forth substance of above telegram M Poincaré said he feared from what Mussolini's Government had stated to representatives at Rome that Italian Government intended to sign Treaty whether Turkey signed or not He seemed to think that Italy was afraid lest after Lausanne Treaty Great Powers might lose interest in Mediterranean question and might not support Italian claims in Asia Minor Ambassador replied that Italian Government on the contrary feared the ex-Hellenic Powers might gradually withdraw from and abandon Near East and thus leave Italy alone to face Turkey Ambassador went on to point out that Italy had much to gain and little to lose by signature of Treaty M Poincaré admitted this argument but pressed M Poincaré strongly to consult with Mussolini and the latter's views would not be safeguarded as well as was possible if he were asked by Powers to make declarations outside the Treaty In this the latter was exceedingly urgent as Italian Parliament meeting was due to end at Lausanne to-morrow and that if Mussolini found that unless some thing

...d be settled before Sunday next. Proceedings of Grand Committee to take effect to terms with Turkey. The President of the Council said that this was not the stat... sensible and sensible. M. Venizelos could not discover any reason during the Peace Conference why the Greek M. Venizelos should be excited to cause ... use of threats. As to the danger of a Turkish attack, he might to say that there ... from Lausanne to the Roumanian and Serbian attitude did not fully ... that all ... Lordship had received. It was quite clear that the French Government did not wish to secure ... concessions to Constantinople. There were 90,000 troops in Syria which would be available against Turkey in case of ... the earnest hope that instructions might be sent to the same effect ... his proposals. I hoped that I might receive an answer at the ... possible moment.

The substance of the French Government's reply, which I am happy to think ... satisfactory, has been transmitted to your Lordship by telegram this ... evening.

No. 42

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 7.)

No. 254.)
Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July 7, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 284 (Paris).

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris reports that he was only able to have ... short interview with the latter, who stated that, apart from Government, General Pelle ... and himself, there were only three persons who knew what ... with regard to each article, which was to be discussed, and ... who was to be present. Further instructions ... Ismet will ... Lausanne.

One of the chief points ... had still to be settled ... was the ... Turkish contention that the Turks ... points ... reach ... Allied ... whether reservation ... to the latter rights ... would have to be ... removed ... treaty ... would ... make it much more difficult for Turks ... swallow it.

As regards first ... General Pellé agrees that we ... have private meeting with Ismet before ... meeting at which ... are necessary or not. As regards ... Allied ... to be ... annexed ... treaty, ... have ... been ... inserted, ... final ... must be ... left ... the Government.

I ... urged ... to ... private meeting ... but ... draft ... in order ... as much as ... could ... in ... discussion. ... We ... take ... risk ... in ... that ... we are discussing ... them ... since ... I ... report ... step ... first ... to ... them.

Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.

No. 43

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 8.)

No. 255.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July 7, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 254.

Meeting took place this afternoon and lasted from 3.30 P.M. to 9.15 P.M. Full report goes by bag to-night but following is summary of results:

Debt. Ismet insisted that other suppressions of alimentation of confirmation of Decree of Muharrem and payment of coupons whether by article in treaty or made ... Committee or otherwise by Turkey or Allies should be complete and Allies insisted ... Allied ... declaration regarding their part of view. Turkish delegation ... to ... by ... making counter-declaration of their point of view. If they passed over Allied declaration in silence it might be interpreted as acceptance. Matter was left there.

Concessions. We asked Ismet for agreement in principle on each paragraph of concessions protocol and declaration. He refused to accept paragraph 2 regarding judicially incomplete pre-war concessions, although General Pelle and I made it clear that only Allied interests when article was intended to protect were Vickers-Armstrong, Turkish Petroleum Company, French 1914 loan and railway agreement. It was finally agreed that experts should examine paragraph again on basis that Allies might suppress proviso if before could sign of peace Turks could offer a satisfactory settlement with companies or other satisfactory guarantees for protection of their interests—at any rate in case of the first and third. Turkish Petroleum Company is less important. As to treatment will almost certainly not be regulated by provisions of protocol governing concessions in territory remaining Turkish.

Ismet ... Allies ... on ... points, including declaration ... to protocol in so far as second paragraph. Baghdad and Anatolian Railways ... concerned.

Apart from above-mentioned points ... two or three others. Ismet accepted ... protocol and declaration in principle subject to examination to-morrow by experts, when I will ... then make another effort to ... agreement on outstanding points of disagreement.

Evacuation. Ismet refused nearly every paragraph of protocol, even saying that six weeks was too long and asking for further assurances regarding returns ... Allies including those taken on Urfa. He also objected to modified or proposed ... protocol to date from ... letter of ... months for Irak frontier ... to run.

I refused to accept any change of substance on any single point, but agreed that experts should discuss with Turks to-morrow small changes of form.

Experts are to meet to-morrow morning to discuss both concessions and ... from ... meeting with Ismet will be resumed at 3 o'clock to-morrow afternoon.

I regret to report that Turkish attitude on all points was most unsatisfactory. Generals Pellé and Harington, Ismet were violently ... there is ... possibility that ... Government have set on Turkish ... by to-morrow afternoon.

Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.

F 7532 21 44

No. 44

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 9.)

(No. 381.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July 3, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Ministry of National Economy at Angora stated to the press a few days ago that a law whereby all ... streets ... revealed as shops, ... garages as shops in the ... in accordance with the ... most ... the Grand National Assembly will be engaged ... during the present session. It was ... that ... for ... and ... are already being taken at Chankiri to ... this law in operation there. A Turkish establishment ... already ... Ankara ... Angora at any rate in the Turkish ... the town ... bring ... element to ... subject.

2. A number of ... and Anatolian instructions have also been ... which ... published recently in the Official Gazette, ... the various Chambers of Commerce were ... to draw the attention of their members to ... since ... the ... introduction of the new ... Turkish ... some British firms have ... application ... so far as to ... a Free ... afternoon.

3. If it were possible to restrict the Friday ... to a half-holiday ... as ... for ... Saturday, I would record ... as ... being a ... day ... the interest of British firms here have ... relations with Turkish ... It is most ... to say, however, that the Turks, when ... their ... from ... make ... Sunday ... but Turks will be ... to agree to the ... of rest ... limited to ... by ... I have ... to refer ... to ... as ... promulgated ... after ... has been signed, we ... into ... Turkey ... throughout the country.

4. Two whole ... in the week cannot fail either to increase the cost of living ... lead to a reduction of wages. Whether ... be possible in these circumstances

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ification of the decrees which are likely to take the form which in due course after the conclusion of peace the committee may agree best represents real power in the Turkish State.

4. The anticipation in my despatch No. 252 of the 31st ultimo that the Grand National Assembly would not meet again before the 30th ultimo, with the steps which would have to be taken to secure a quorum, could not be fulfilled, and a further postponement until the 1st August was therefore decided upon by which time it is expected that the new deputies will be present in sufficient numbers to constitute a quorum. As soon as Deputies have already been elected there is every reason to suppose that in the absence of unforeseen events, this expectation will be realised.

2. It is not expected that the new Assembly will meet for very many days in any case, but it is not expected that it will exercise its functions as the mouthpiece of the Turkish Government. It has been decided that the Assembly at Mosul will elect Deputies for the new Assembly when the present Deputy for Yozgat has also petitioned to be relieved of his duties. It is since then understood that the Assembly will probably in pursuance of the present decree adjourn sine die, and that the Government will subsequently be carried on by Ministers responsible to the Grand National Assembly, which will be summoned to meet at Angora on the 1st November next, when the Assembly will be called upon to elect a President of the Republic, who will then form a Ministry. It is anticipated that the Assembly will probably remain in session for about three months, and that it will then adjourn for the winter, to meet again in the spring.

3. Apart from the eastern provinces of Thrace, the city of Angora and Anatolia, there has been a partial mobilisation of late in case of a forward movement of the Greek forces, but the mobilisation has been carried out with little enthusiasm, and the Turkish Government have found great difficulty in getting the reservists to join the colours. It is said that in the district of Eskishehir, which is the headquarters of the Second Army, only 30 per cent. of the reservists who were called up have actually joined the colours, and that in the district of Afiun Karahissar the percentage is even smaller. Desertions are numerous, and it is reported that the Turkish Government have found it necessary to withdraw the Second Army from the front in order to allow the men to return to their homes for the harvest. Many of the deserters have taken refuge in the mountains, and it is said that bands of them have been formed for the purpose of plundering villages. Reports have also been received of a mutiny among the troops at Kirk Kilisse, which was suppressed with the loss of 200 men. The Turkish Government have also found it necessary to withdraw the Second Army from the front in order to allow the men to return to their homes for the harvest. Many of the deserters have taken refuge in the mountains, and it is said that bands of them have been formed for the purpose of plundering villages. Reports have also been received of a mutiny among the troops at Kirk Kilisse, which was suppressed with the loss of 200 men.

4. As regards the Greek prisoners, to which I referred in my telegram No. 252 of the 31st ultimo, I am informed that the Turkish Government have decided to release all the Greek prisoners of war, numbering about 1,500, who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

5. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

6. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

7. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

8. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

9. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

10. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

11. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

12. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

13. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

14. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

15. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

16. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

17. The Turkish Government have also decided to release all the Greek civilians who are now in Anatolia, and to hand them over to the Greek authorities at Smyrna. It is hoped that the first batch will be released in the course of the present week, and that the whole number will be released within a fortnight.

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No. 47

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — *Received July 9.)*

No. 256 [By bag.]

Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 7, 1923.*

My immediate preceding telegram.

The first meeting this afternoon between the Allied delegates and the Turkish delegates, assisted by experts, lasted for six hours with two intervals for separate consultation among Turkish and Allied respectively. The attitude of the Turks was exasperating to the last degree. They were openly shameless in their demands and ungenerous in their lack of appreciation of any concessions offered by the Allies. They tried the patience of my French colleague and myself to an extent unparalleled during the present phase of the conference. Nevertheless, I think they were seven times shaken and the day's events will do this impression was unsatisfactory and disheartening. I am not entirely without hope that we may see the reaction in a better attitude when we resume the conversation again to-morrow afternoon.

I opened the meeting with an explanation of the object in the course of which I made it clear that the three questions of the Russian money, the debt, concessions and the evacuation of the Straits were a single whole. I emphasised the spirit of conciliation shown by the Allies and expressed the hope that this might be our last private meeting, but I avoided final sittings of the three committees at which the work of the conference could be completed. After my French and Italian colleagues had spoken in the same general sense, Ismet Pasha read a note, asserting the Turkish delegation's readiness to accept, in principle, the Allied proposals for the Straits, the Paris formula for the debt, (*b*) the abandonment of the attempt at a settlement of the capitulations by the Allied delegates, after stating that Decree of Moharrem had entirely annulled their validity, and (*c*) Mudros Governments' claim for compensation for the Armistice. I was surprised at the moderation of the Turkish statement and the latter's interest in the bondholders' rights.

Mr. Lloyd George and I had agreed that we would leave the Turkish delegation to explain their views regarding the question of concessions with which all were necessarily concerned in the interests of the ultimate large number of cases of the bondholders at Angora. The experts' report declared that the experts were [illegible] the assessment of the Turkish contributions to the Ottoman Debt, and that the Allied Governments' claim for compensation for the Armistice was [illegible].

Further discussion of the Allied proposals was postponed until the afternoon.

Ismet Pasha then read a note, which I will telegraph to you, in which he stated that the Turkish Government were prepared to accept the Allied proposals for the Straits, but that they could not accept the Paris formula for the debt, which they considered to be unjust and unacceptable. They proposed that the Ottoman Debt Commission should be reconstituted on a basis of equality between Turkey and the Allies, and that the Turkish contribution should be fixed by the Commission. They also proposed that the Allies should withdraw their claim for compensation for the Armistice. They also proposed that the Allies should withdraw their claim for compensation for the Armistice. They also proposed that the Allies should withdraw their claim for compensation for the Armistice

were regularly in force before the war, to the exclusion of companies whose concessions had not been completed at that date. In the case of companies whose concessions were fully completed before the war (i.e. companies which had existing contracts (2) production (3) settlement of claims as regards taxation on the scale then in force) no agreement was to be required. He said that this would affect the case of all companies with completed agreements. Subject to discussion of the details, he had no objection to these two sections.

The protocol which dealt with concessions in detached portions of Turkey had already resulted in agreements. It would suffice to omit the effect of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the protocol relative to transfers effected under the Constantinople Convention of 1913 to territories no longer under the effective authority of that Government in the exclusion of territories occupied by the Greeks.

Ismet Pasha then handed to Mr. Lindley a draft protocol in seven distinct paragraphs as follows:—

1. The period of six weeks was to be reckoned from the date of the signature of the Treaty.

2. It was agreed that the withdrawal should be carried out in successive stages, a period of not more than one week being allowed for the withdrawal of the forces in each of the three zones.

3. He observed that the provisions regarding evacuation had been entirely omitted from the draft Treaty. He thought it desirable that the evacuation of the Straits should be dealt with in the Treaty and not left to be dealt with by a protocol.

4. The draft protocol made no reference to the restoration of material removed from Turkish stores or transported abroad by the Greeks since the Armistice.

5. The restoration of ships was also a matter which should be dealt with between the Turkish Government and the Allied Powers.

6. He did not believe that any advantage would be gained by the proposal to bring up to date the statistics of the Ottoman Debt mentioned in the Annex. What would be the object of bringing the statistics up to date? Who had asked for such a thing? Moreover, would not the bringing up to date of the statistics involve the consent of the Turkish Government?

7. He did not like the use of the words "negotiations regarding" in the first paragraph of the Annex. He suggested that the words "in the ground that this was in accordance with Article 3 of the relevant article of the Treaty" should be added, as this would be the only case in which the general conditions of the Treaty were already known.

Ismet Pasha then said that he did not wish to discuss regarding the Greek evacuation of Eastern Thrace, which had to be carried out before the Treaty of Peace came into force. He would, however, call attention to the fact that this was not in accordance with the Armistice, which provided for the evacuation of Thrace within fifteen days from the signature of the Armistice. He would, however, not insist on this point, but would merely point out that the Turkish Government had been put to great expense in connection with the Greek evacuation, and that the Turkish Government would be glad to receive compensation for this.

Ismet Pasha then said that he would like to make a statement regarding the Turkish proposals for the Straits. He would first of all like to say that the Turkish Government had been very much surprised at the attitude adopted by the Allied Powers at the Conference. They had expected that the Allied Powers would have accepted the Turkish proposals as a basis of discussion, and that they would have made counter-proposals. Instead of this, however, the Allied Powers had merely made a few minor modifications in the Turkish proposals, and had not made any counter-proposals. The Turkish Government had therefore been obliged to make a number of concessions in order to meet the views of the Allied Powers. The Turkish Government had made these concessions in the hope that the Allied Powers would meet them in a similar spirit. The Turkish Government had, however, been disappointed in this hope. The Turkish Government had made these concessions in the hope that the Allied Powers would meet them in a similar spirit. The Turkish Government had, however, been disappointed in this hope. The Turkish Government had made these concessions in the hope that the Allied Powers would meet them in a similar spirit. The Turkish Government had, however, been disappointed in this hope.

their point of view in order that both statements might stand on record. Personally, I should have liked to acquiesce in this view, but we were debarred from doing so by the fact that the instructions of the French Government still require that the Allied reservations or rights should take the form of a declaration annexed to the treaty. We therefore passed after a short separate discussion between ourselves and myself to the next item of the agenda.

After some preliminary discussion we went through the first portion of the concessions protocol paragraph by paragraph. Ismet Pasha suggested that paragraph 1 should be omitted, as it merely contained the words "those who have represented Allied and Associated Governments with regard to the Petroleum Companies". We could not agree to this suggestion.

As had been stated, Ismet Pasha took the strongest exception to paragraph 2 relating to the maintenance of pre-war concessions. He could not accept the general principle embodied in the paragraph. We explained that it was meant to cover those specific cases (viz. the Mosul Petroleum Company) which had been granted before the War of 1914 and the Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth Company, which had been granted in 1914 but had not been completed owing to the War. It was pointed out that the cases of these companies would be dealt with by paragraph 2, owing to the fact that they had been granted before the War, and that the Mosul Petroleum Company was the only one which had been granted during the War. We said that we were willing to accept the paragraph, but that we would prefer to omit it. Ismet Pasha would give us a definite answer on the following day. He himself was very much in favour of the proposal.

After some further discussion it was decided that the Turkish Government should be asked to submit a list of the companies in which Allied interests were concerned in 1914, this excluding the Anglo-Persian Company, the Turkish Petroleum Company, and the Mosul Petroleum Company. It was pointed out that the Turkish Government would be asked to give an undertaking that no concessions would be granted to companies in which Allied interests were concerned in 1914, this excluding the Anglo-Persian Company, the Turkish Petroleum Company, and the Mosul Petroleum Company. It was pointed out that the Turkish Government would be asked to give an undertaking that no concessions would be granted to companies in which Allied interests were concerned in 1914, this excluding the Anglo-Persian Company, the Turkish Petroleum Company, and the Mosul Petroleum Company.

No. 48

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury. (Received July 9.)

No. 257.)

Rome, July 8, 1920.

In discussion of the extra protocol to-day with experts this morning, I have queried whether withdrawal of Allied troops was not too vague a phrase. I pointed out that as Greeks were to withdraw operations of evacuation could be carried out in many years. Allied experts pointed out that Greeks must withdraw their naval and military forces except for a few gendarmes, and that Greek reservists on their return to Asia Minor could be asked to withdraw. Allied forces could not withdraw without leaving a vacuum, and prevent Allies having free run of Smyrna until evacuation effected. Greeks have done this in their withdrawal in 1914 and Italians will probably do so in Adalia. Greeks will then withdraw to their own territory. Allied experts will consult with their colleagues in Paris and let me know to-morrow. I have also pointed out that Greeks have been in occupation of Smyrna for two years, and that Allies have been in occupation of Constantinople for more than two years. I have also pointed out that Greeks have been in occupation of Smyrna for two years, and that Allies have been in occupation of Constantinople for more than two years.

I have also pointed out that Greeks have been in occupation of Smyrna for two years, and that Allies have been in occupation of Constantinople for more than two years.

Clause 2 of the protocol provides for the withdrawal of Allied troops within fifteen days from the signature of the Armistice. This clause is to be carried out in three zones, and the withdrawal is to be completed within one week. The withdrawal is to be carried out in three zones, and the withdrawal is to be completed within one week.

Turkish expert insisted that presence of large Allied naval forces in Turkish territorial waters was certainly regarded by Turkish as part of Allied occupation While he said he would make it clear that Angora will certainly insist on Ismet pressing this point he intimated that Turks would be content with some reduction and not complete withdrawal with entry into force Straits Convention Ismet appears really to have made his main weight yesterday in not raising point incredible though it may seem

Repeated to Constantinople

No 49

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 9)

No 258
Telegraphic
Lausanne July 8 1923

MY immediately preceding telegram

Ismet at last night's meeting made concession regarding evacuation by Turkey, to force of which I do not consider Turkish Government will, we can rely on Turkish territorial waters and I do not suppose Admiralty require publication to maintain large units in those waters

I don't whether we should force immediate evacuation by all Allied troops of first or second importance, there will be interval between ratification by Turkey and date by which Allied troops must leave Constantinople and Straits zone I shall therefore suggest to Admiralty that question of withdrawal of Allied warships should be dealt with in connection with that of the Armistice the exception of a maximum number of British light cruisers destroyers and auxiliaries necessary for the present time In fixing this number account must be taken of presence of Italian and Italian warships representatives are being instructed to support Turkish contention that Allied warships should be limited to the right to maintain numbers at present in waters, which certainly will not be more, some valid reason must be given why Allied warships should remain in excess of peace time rights

I hope that very great advantage may be gained by the offer of 9 months evacuation by Allied troops provided Straits Convention is successfully signed and ratified

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No 50

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received July 9)

No 259
Telegraphic R
Lausanne July 8 1923

MY telegrams Nos 255 and 256

After long Turkish delegates with their experts met at 5 this evening

Discussion was on basis of draft as revised which Ismet stated that he accepted as second alternative but reserved to himself the right to make further declarations or reservations especially in regard to Allied warships and in regard to the attitude which the Turkish delegation would take up in the event of Allied refusal to accept Turkish proposals Every delegate was free to raise what point he wished on condition that he should be prepared to refer back to his Government (see my telegram No 261)

Evacuation Verbal agreement was reached on text subject to question of final examination (see my telegram No 257 re) date for commencement of the making of this which I do not further regard as between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government are to be concluded Ismet finally would accept the three Allied months' postponement and Ismet also accepted this text to be referred to his Government

Repeated to Constantinople

No 51

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 9)

(No 260)
Telegraphic *Lausanne, July 8, 1923*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Meeting rose at two o'clock as second text was only ready for discussion at 7 30 after working all the morning and afternoon Turks, who were thoroughly shaken by the shock they received yesterday showed themselves much more moderate and reasonable as I had ventured to hope In order to make the most of the better atmosphere at once I am trying to clinch matters we are meeting again at 11 A M to-night to discuss experts' work on concessions

Further details of this afternoon's meeting and a report as to-night's will be telegraphed to-morrow

We are still reforming new Cabinet this morning

No 52

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 9)

No 261
(Telegraphic) *Lausanne July 8, 1923*

MY immediately preceding telegram

Before meeting this afternoon General Pelle told Ismet Chicherin and myself that his Government had instructed him that Allied declarations regarding Straits were not to be attached to treaty He added that in conversation with Ismet this morning M Poincaré had suggested personally that, in order to avoid any difficulties Turkish Angora representatives might be invited to Paris after signature of treaty to discuss declarations Ismet said nothing and after lasting all night Conference broke up at 4 A M to-day without any agreement being arrived at Turkish delegation will probably leave to-night

Ismet's object in suggesting Paris conference was to get Allied warships withdrawn from Constantinople before Conference met Ismet also wished to avoid signature of treaty before Turkish elections

Both Ismet and Chicherin are very angry with Allies and Ismet declared that Turkish Government would not sign treaty unless Allied warships withdrawn from Constantinople and Straits before Conference met Ismet also said that Turkish Government would not sign treaty unless Allies withdrew their declaration regarding Straits

Ismet's attitude is very unreasonable and I am afraid that Conference will break down

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No 53

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 9)

(No 263)
(Telegraphic) R *Lausanne July 9, 1923*

MY telegram No 259

Session was resumed at 11 P M and continued for two and a half hours We went through new draft concessions prepared by experts but have not yet discussed it I reserved right to raise later points which may have arisen during course of time which we had not covered

Main difference between this draft and earlier one is that article 2, relative to private pre-war concessions is replaced by clauses expressly referring to each of three companies which Turkish Government are to take over viz Ottoman Anatolian Railway Company and French Railway Concession of 1914 as first amended

[illegible] proposed settlement that the new concessions are contained in [illegible] from Turkey to continue to be replaced by [illegible] concessions [illegible] agreement [illegible] concessions [illegible] compromise will also be [illegible] Petroleum Company [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] previous concessions [illegible] Black Sea [illegible] other questions

I hope [illegible] and I [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Turkey they reply that they suppose the will have to take steps to prevent but will take action in conjunction with all powers including Turkey so as to give assurances. They think that desirable to inform Allied Embassies of contents of Turkish Note.

Sir E. Grey agrees.

Meeting of Allied delegates to be held at 12 o'clock to report deadlock to telegraph to governments. Hubert French interpreter to be interested to see telegram to Belgrade. Young Turk still trying to instruct Sir E. Young to urge Goshen to remove to be or take

Sir E. Grey thinks that we could intercept telegraph and stop it but he reserves a copy of what was sent to Belgrade. We never hinted as we could not have consented to represent us in

(Repeated to Belgrade)

No. 6

Note Report from Mr. Morgenthau to Mr. Lansing — Received June 12

No. 208.

Embassy of the United States,
Telegraphic. Constantinople, June 11, 1915.

Following are Nos. 30 to 208.

I have the honour to submit a report of yesterday's proceedings with a request that it be laid before the King's Messenger.

The Ambassadors three days ago decided to appoint a committee to consider the best means to assess the damages suffered by Armenians during the recent disturbances and to report to the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government was then informed that the Allied delegates were prepared to enter the Turkish Note with the understanding that it should be a preliminary to the collection of information and that the Allied delegates should be given an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Turkish delegates before any decision was arrived at. The Turkish Government replied that it was necessary to explain the Note before the meeting of the Allied delegates should take place. The Allied delegates met on the 10th July. A report was presented by the committee appointed for the purpose, but the result arrived at the meeting was unsatisfactory.

A report was submitted by the Turkish delegates which was not considered satisfactory by the Allied delegates. The Turkish delegates stated that they were prepared to enter into discussion with the Allied delegates on the basis of the report presented by the committee appointed for the purpose, but the result arrived at the meeting was unsatisfactory.

The Allied delegates intended to submit a report to their governments, but the Turkish delegates requested that they should be allowed to submit their report to the Allied delegates before the latter submitted their report to their governments. The Allied delegates agreed to this request, and the Turkish delegates submitted their report to the Allied delegates on the 11th July. The report was considered by the Allied delegates, and

the Seegrar watch I was wont to send to Constantinople I would say that I had proposed that none of the objects covered by the [illegible] treaty provided it was Turkish territory between now and the remainder of the treaty should be left at the end of the present phase of the conference. I fulfilled the promises given at the opening meeting to which my present and [illegible] ment [illegible] and I have the honour to refer you to my telegram No. 82 of 9th July to Constantinople repeat it you under No. 20.

We were unable to dispose of the point raised in paragraph 6 regarding the Commercial Convention attached to Article 16 but we do not anticipate any difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Turkish delegates themselves. We agreed that this question should be dealt with by the experts on the draft of the Capitulations.

Article 7. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the general provision regarding reciprocity would not apply to the concessions specially dealt with in Article 7. It was agreed that the question was only one of drafting and should be left to the experts to settle. Subject to this and to a reservation regarding the letter asked for in order to cover the case of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, Article 7 was agreed to in principle. [illegible] his market or important advance was made up to 7th July. Ismet Pasha has objected to the [illegible] of a Liquidator being appointed and suggested settlement of accounts.

Article 8. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the Ottoman Government should not cancel the rights of the Government in those concessions which might upon the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire revert to the Turkish Government themselves. We agreed that this question should be dealt with by the experts on the draft of the Capitulations.

Article 9. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 10. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 11. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 12. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 13. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 14. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 15. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 16. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 17. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 18. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 19. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

Article 20. Ismet Pasha was asked to make clear that the provisions with regard to the [illegible] of the Ottoman Government in regard to concessions and to transfers across territory of the [illegible] of the Constantinople Government and the Constantinople Port and Railway Board and the existing treaty with Bulgaria respectively [illegible] Ismet Pasha was not very clear about this but was ready to discuss the matter with the experts.

No. 59

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 10.*)

No. 369.
Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 9, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 4[illegible]
I hear confidentially that Greek Government regard the retention of Aphelidonisi as a matter of great importance. While they would welcome the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Thrace, they would strongly object to the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Straits without the simultaneous withdrawal of Greek troops from the islands in the Straits waters between the end of the Dardanelles and the entrance to the Gulf of Smyrna. Greek Government would be prepared to consider the withdrawal of Greek troops from Imbros and Tenedos, subject to the following conditions:—

(1) Greek troops withdrawn from Imbros and Tenedos should not be replaced by Turkish troops.

(2) Greek troops withdrawn from Imbros and Tenedos should not be replaced by Turkish troops.

(3) Greek troops withdrawn from Imbros and Tenedos should not be replaced by Turkish troops.

E 7158/7158 44'

No 66

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received* July 11)

(No 854)
My Lord
Constantinople June 27, 1923

AS I was leaving Lord Cromer's room this morning after paying the customary farewell visits, he drew me aside to ask a question which he said he could not discuss with anyone else, as it was one which had been referred to the Ambassadorial Conference of Lausanne.

He is very anxious to ascertain from your Lordship whether you would be disposed to instruct the British Delegate to sound privately the representatives of the French Government with regard to the suggestion that the representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople should be withdrawn from this city on the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Turkey. His Excellency was struck by the fact that the French Government, while instructing their Ambassador to the Holy See to maintain relations with the Papal Court, had withdrawn their Ambassadors upon the occupation of Rome by the Italian troops in 1870, and he thought that the withdrawal of the Allied Ambassadors from Constantinople would be a step in the same direction.

I told him that I was not aware that any such suggestion had been made by the French Government, but that I would bring his proposal to your Lordship's notice.

His Excellency then went on to say that he had been informed that the Turkish Government intended to ask for the withdrawal of the Allied Fleets from Constantinople waters, and that he thought that this request would probably be granted. He was of opinion that the presence of the Allied Fleets in the Sea of Marmora was a source of danger to the Turkish Government, and that the withdrawal of the Fleets would be a step in the direction of the pacification of Turkey.

I have &c
G. RUSSELL

No 67

Lord Curzon to Sir H Rumbold (*Received July* 11)

No 884
Telegraphic
Constantinople July 10, 1923

ENFLAMBERING GOSSIP has been current here for the last few days that Allied Ambassadors are about to leave Constantinople. We do not think that this gossip has any foundation in fact, but we should be glad to receive from you a telegram stating whether you have any reason to believe that the Allied Governments contemplate withdrawing their Ambassadors from Constantinople, and whether you have any information which would lead you to suppose that the Turkish Government intend to ask for the withdrawal of the Allied Fleets from Constantinople waters.

Should there be any truth in the rumour, we think that it would be desirable that we should be prepared with a reply to the Turkish request, and that we should be in agreement with our Allies as to the course which we propose to adopt.

See Lausanne No 212

No 68

Mr Heath Robinson to Sir H Rumbold (*Lausanne*). *Repeated to Foreign Office. Received July* 11)

No 385
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople July 10, 1923

YOUR Despatch No 80

My German colleague has referred to the question of Belgian claims against Turkey. I shall be grateful for information as to the present position of the Belgian claims against Turkey, and as to whether His Majesty's Government have any objection to my informing the German Ambassador that I am prepared to support the claims of the Belgian Government.

No 69

Mr Heath Robinson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received July* 11)

No 886
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople July 10, 1923

HAVING learnt that the Turkish Government intended to ask for the withdrawal of the Allied Fleets from Constantinople waters, I have been interested to hear from the French Ambassador that the French Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

2. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

3. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

4. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

5. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

6. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

7. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

8. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

9. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

10. I also learnt that the Italian Government had no intention of withdrawing their Fleet from Constantinople, and were to be represented in Angora solely by a military mission. I shall be grateful for information as to the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

No 70

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received July* 11)

No 272
(Telegraphic)
Lausanne July 11, 1923

YOUR Telegram No 11.

Yesterday evening we agreed with Ismet to the following terms:

1. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

2. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

3. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

4. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

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7. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

8. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

9. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

10. The Turkish Government undertake to grant an amnesty to all persons who have been condemned by the Courts-Martial established by the Turkish Government during the war, and to restore to them their civil rights.

No 71

Sir H Rumbold to Mr Heath Robinson (*Lausanne*)

No 118
(Telegraphic)
Foreign Office July 11, 1923

WAR OFFICE telegraphic [illegible] to reassemble every effort only begins on [illegible] August and the [illegible] six weeks may cause [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Allied military authorities [illegible] suggest [illegible]

Ismet should be induced to issue a proclamation to that effect stating the situation and expressing tranquillity

You may urge this course of action on Ismet unless you see any objections

Can you learn from Ismet when Angora is likely to ratify?

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 223.)

No. 72

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)

(No. 219.)

Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, July 11, 1923*

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 266 of 9th July. Greek Minorities Treaty.

1. M. Venizelos's request, reported in your despatch No. 229, seems reasonable and you should assent to it.

2. As regards question of guarantee our main anxiety is not to jeopardise the fate of the Minorities Treaty. We have conflicting reports as to the value attached by the Greek Government to the clause in the preamble. Please therefore on the first instance secure M. Venizelos's co-operation with your French colleague and ascertain what are his views. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

3. Personally I see no objection to surrendering the rights and re-advantage in returning them. But if M. Venizelos agrees with the French and we do not jeopardise the treaty I am willing to concur in French view.

No. 73

The Marquess of Curzon to the Ambassador of Kedleston (Received July 12.)

(No. 272.)

Telegraphic. *Paris, July 11, 1923*

DISCUSSING the question of Peace Conditions that have arisen since the victory of 1918 France is interested with complete frustration in the Levant. England has successfully protected her interests as regards concessionaires. Why has France suffered so complete a reverse? It is because since last September France has always refused to use force. It would have been better to put off the conference. The English and even the Greeks are realising the limits of their firmness while France is seen floated. Soon or later with Syria on their hands France will have to show force but a new will dispute with M. Barrère the privilege of signing the treaty.

The interesting information enclosed observes that it is supposed that Turkey will not have recourse to foreign capital and that this will be the reason why it may be possible to secure from her what it was impossible to get by means of the Lausanne negotiations. I mention this as it seems to suggest the possibility of the French trying to use Turkish financial needs as a means of pressure to get better terms.

One or two papers also express considerable dissatisfaction with the results at Lausanne from the French point of view.

No. 74

Mr. Kennard to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne). Repeated to Foreign Office, Received July 12.)

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, July 11, 1923*

YOUR telegram No. 7.

Official reply not yet received but Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me privately that Italian delegate was instructed by telegraph on evening of 8th July to take part in negotiation of draft agreement on condition that signature of peace is not delayed for conclusion of that agreement.

No. 75

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 12.)

No. 273.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July 11, 1923*

MY telegram No. 268.

Things are going more slowly than I expected.

My colleagues and I agreed last evening after reviewing points still to be settled before final meetings of committees can be held that further private meeting with Ismet must be held this afternoon.

Before this meeting Ismet came to see me privately and seemed somewhat nervous. He expressed doubt whether meetings of committees would take place tomorrow as he needed instructions from Angora on various points. He said he was willing and desirous to agree to my last proposal regarding Irak frontier negotiations. He also handed me a memorandum preamble of delegates regarding protection of ships in Turkish waters after evacuation subject to my initialling it for passage. He promised to consider it and pointed out that it does not cover expressions protocol. His object apparently was to avoid mention of French word 1914 concession and to fight ten years with legacy of Allied opposition. I gave him no encouragement.

At meeting of delegates Ismet was evidently playing for delay. Ismet was much more uncompromising but I suspect this was simply to cover up his withdrawal from his previously expressed intention to sign treaty. It was necessary to refer to Angora on various points. Ismet's reply was received this morning. He said he was prepared to sign treaty subject to certain modifications. He also wished to discuss with me in private conversation as follows. He doubted whether Allies would agree to Turkey's request for immediate withdrawal of Allied troops on signature of treaty. He suggested that arrangements should be made between the two authorities on the spot. Allied delegates could then express their opinion as to when arrangements should be carried out. He also wished to discuss question of Turkish Red Crescent. Where concessions [illegible]

These were principal matters dealt with. Long and tedious discussion. We left remainder of outstanding points with delegates and I invited Ismet to meet me this morning. The second discussions dealt with the points which Ismet again took. I hope to report more fully about the evening's proceedings and what is to come tomorrow.

At present it is difficult to see whether Turks are playing for time in hope that Anglo-French relations may deteriorate owing to Ruhr crisis or merely testing Allied resolution in order to see what they can screw out of us before finally coming to terms.

No. 76

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received July 12.)

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July 11, 1923*

MY immediate telegram.

I proposed at private meeting of delegates this afternoon a proviso providing for transit of [illegible] number of Allied warships passing through Turkish waters to Black Sea [illegible] Straits as to be merely expeditionary, pending with your telegram No. 217, [illegible] the article authorising temporary passage of warships through Straits. Subject to [illegible] passage of warships [illegible] Ismet replied that he was merely making personal suggestion and that he would [illegible] instructions from His Majesty's Government.

Ismet said he would report my proposal to his Government as well as to Angora but was pessimistic as to the result. He said that he could not accept [illegible] proposal which [illegible] provides for withdrawal of Allied warships from Turkish waters. It is [illegible] understood [illegible] to that [illegible] as regards signature of peace was to bring into force until 2 et seq. Straits Convention as soon as Turkey had ratified treaty. I commented [illegible] second

text of a stereotyped reasoning same arguments as in previous discussions, and I pressed generosity with which we had tried to give Turkey great measure of satisfaction without sacrificing our own principles.

Discussion was quite inconclusive. Ismet may [illegible] simply to get us to be as strong as we could at present. This is just the point at which Turks may [illegible] to point of refusing to sign. Messages are [illegible] and Ali Fuad's [illegible] from Turkish writers. I have [illegible] giving way on [illegible] but should be glad to learn for my guidance whether [illegible] the last resort His Majesty's Government would agree to leave [illegible] Straits. I do not see why [illegible] can secure unlimited right of passage. I do not [illegible] but would very much desire [illegible] Italian colleague is to [illegible] position. Having French and I agree amongst ourselves and then get what we can from Turks.

No. 77

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 12.)

(No. 277.)
Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July 11, 1923.*

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 12, 8.30 a.m.)

Lausanne, July 11, 1923.
(July 12, 3.20 a.m.)

(No. 275.)
MY telegram No. 273.

French circles here [illegible] get the impression that Russia [illegible] matters in the hope that statement which Prime Minister [illegible] would [illegible] make [illegible] produce serious disagreement between Great Britain and France which would react to [illegible] solidarity of Allies [illegible].

No. 78

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 12.)

(No. 276.)
Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July 12, 1923.*

AMERICAN observer came to me last night to speak about [illegible] which has been in discussion between Turks and themselves to [illegible] Turkish Petroleum Company. This [illegible] is given in my immediately following telegram.

Mr. Grew dwelt on importance which his government attached to this matter and said that they would not be able to approve a valuation of an agreement which, [illegible] at the time of [illegible] all the legal requirements. He said that if we had [illegible] our position he would be [illegible] compelled to make a protest in due course. He reminded me that intervention of American army in the western [illegible] had enabled Allies to defeat Germany and that if Turks [illegible] to Turkish Petroleum Company's rights it would be [illegible] to Turks. He asked me what was my attitude in this matter and suggested that I should [illegible] case of company.

I did not discuss with him question whether American intervention in the war had really enabled us to defeat Turks. I reminded Mr. Grew that on two occasions on which he had objected on behalf of his Government to article 2 of concessions protocol he had expressly stated that neither his Government nor he himself had any particular Allied company in view. The Americans had now obtained satisfaction in that article 2 had been dropped but I told him frankly that I was convinced at the time he had made two above-mentioned *démarches* his Government had certainly had in view Persian [illegible] Concession and Turkish Petroleum Company. He demurred to this statement.

With [illegible] attitude which was that as long as I was in charge of this delegation I should continue in discussions with Turks to defend British interests to the last of my ability and that I entirely declined to drop case of Turkish Petroleum Company. If he were obliged to make protest in committee we would state [illegible] but I then enquired in what manner he proposed that this case should be settled if it were dropped now.

Mr. Grew replied that, as this case had formed subject of correspondence between us and my Government during last three years, it seemed an eminently suitable subject for arbitration. I told him that I would report his *démarche* to you whereupon he asked whether I would not delay a settlement of this question so as to enable you to consider matter and if necessary give me fresh instructions. I said that I was not anxious to hurry conclusion of treaty as much as I could. He then pointed out that there might not be time for me to receive fresh instructions. I observed that it is assumed that I should receive fresh instructions and I have no reason to anticipate that this would be the case. If Mr. Grew makes protests I shall reply.

No. 79

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 12.)

(No. 277.)
Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July 12, 1923.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Les droits acquis par la Compagnie pétrole de Turquie en vertu des arrangements intervenus en 1914 ainsi que les obligations découlant pour elle de société [illegible] arrangements sont valables et maintenus.

No. 80

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 12.)

No. 287.
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 12, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 138 (Lausanne).

It is generally accepted that at Great Nation's Assembly [illegible] about 2nd August. Adnan objected that [illegible] city, if signed on 20th July would be only 10th August.

(Sent to Lausanne No. 215.)

No. 81

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Howe (Belgrade).

No. 95.
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 12, 1923.*

LAUSANNE telegram No. 267. [illegible] repeated to you. Signature of treaty by delegates Government.

Please urge [illegible] assurance [illegible] determined to [illegible] and do not [illegible] instructions unless consent [illegible].

You should impress on them that [illegible] with reservations and omission of reference to [illegible] debt.

(Repeated to Lausanne No. 123.)

No. 82

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 13.)

No. 278.
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne.*

MY telegram No. 273.

Private meeting with Ismet was resumed today. We discussed outstanding questions [illegible] in the morning and for about two hours at [illegible] afternoon. As regards minor questions Turks were absolutely adamant and though the [illegible] somewhat tiresome and protracted [illegible] of these questions, they

allowed us slowly to extract satisfaction upon item with the result that we were able to settle following points

Article 46 is to be revised by agreed declaration which Ismet will read in committee

Article 71 is to be replaced by letter which Turkish Government will address to Secretariat

Article 78 Decision postponed for report of the representatives amongst successor States

Navigation, pilotage and port services Existing state of affairs to be maintained until 1st December when question is to be given further consideration by Conference of Commercial Experts with a view to unification

Right of passage to be secured in war to vessels named British French and Italian Ismet after 1st January 1924 in the understanding that Turkish Government would consider question of negotiating with them agreements for continuance of passage but if negotiations unsuccessful by 30th June 1924 provisions of Article 3 of present Convention will terminate two years after that date

Belgium to once more accede to Straits Concessions protocol

Duration Commercial Conventions other than those specified for three years to be Rome rules of Congress

This seems likely to be settled except as regards Article 3 of Concessions protocol and question of Capitulations regarding which General Pershing at outset of this morning's meeting stated his Government's views as to elimination

We issued bulletin 2 of which I am sending you special consignment for Messrs Vickers Armstrong Ltd by next steamer sailing 30th July with result expected to reach you on or before 1st August

Ismet's attitude throughout has been extremely reasonable and conciliatory

Question of Turkish Ottoman Debt was raised by Mr Rendel and Mr Richmond Brown

Ismet's attitude on Monday was somewhat truculent but was soon smoothed over by Rustem Bey and Turkish delegation have since been most friendly

Mr Rendel asked Reza Nur to ask Ismet whether he personally would be prepared to sign final Convention at once but latter evaded question and replied that he would first have to consult his colleagues

Question of Mosul not yet touched upon but Ismet also proposed early conference of Locarno Powers and Soviet Russia to discuss Straits question

When I began to enumerate above questions which I should like to see settled Ismet replied that he was looking and seemed ready to discuss Article 2 and Concessions protocol but I left him under impression that he would not avoid discussion of other points

We had all moments of agreeable intercourse including that at which he was informed of Polish and Rumanian adhesion to Straits Convention

Ismet repeated many times in strong language that he would not sign Treaty unless all questions mentioned above were settled to his satisfaction

I have no doubt that he will now be round trying to patch matters up and I hope that he may realise by to-morrow that he has gone too far If not we shall have to reconsider our whole position and *mise en demeure* may be necessary but Turks are uncomfortable and I do not despair of saving situation

Proceedings to-day were so protracted that I fear that I cannot send full report by bag as I had intended but present telegram gives everything that is essential

(Repeated to Constantinople No 87

No 83

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*Received July 14*)

(No 279)

(Telegraphic) R *Lausanne July 13 1923*

YOUR telegram No 118 and Constantinople telegram No 384, my telegram No 275

You will have seen by my telegram No 273 that question of maintenance of Mudania Convention and the end of evacuation period was raised with Ismet at private meeting of delegates on 11th July and that he admitted that it should remain in force during that period subject to arrangements of detail between military authorities on the spot What he meant by this was that case might arise at different stages of departure of Allied troops from particular areas whereby entry of Turkish troops into such areas would be a matter of military arrangement though evacuation as a whole might not have been completed This seems reasonable especially as wording of article 3 (2) of convention in terms provides only for respect of restrictions imposed by Allied forces until decision of Peace Conference

I also mentioned danger of incidents during vacation period and necessity to restrict large political demonstrations by Ismet or other high authority He assured me that necessary measures would be taken

I asked Ismet to confirm these assurances at meeting of my committee at which hope we may find a way out of our present difficulties

Mr Ryan asked Reza Nur yesterday whether Angora Government would be expected to ratify treaty He replied the Grand National Assembly would meet on 2nd August and ratification might be expected about 7th August which agrees generally with Constantinople telegram No 387 to me Reza Nur asked similar question about ratification Mr Ryan said that owing to prolongation of proceedings ratification could hardly be expected before re-opening of Parliament at the end of the autumn

Repeated to Constantinople

No 84

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (*Received July 13*)

(No 280)

(Telegraphic) R *Lausanne July 13, 1923.*

It was reported to me that at private meeting of delegates on 11th July Ismet on one occasion addressed violent protest to Ismet and said that apart from anything else action of Turks and Albanians stated to be entirely contrary to spirit of amnesty declaration Turkish delegates were much embarrassed and tried to make out that Albanian could not have stated correct terms of law We told them that Albanian was not a bicycle and must have known what he was talking about Ismet promised to enquire into the matter at once

I feel that if six or seven more cases occur General Harington would be justified in taking very strong measures as he had in mind case of reprisals would of course have to be considered locally

(Repeated to Constantinople)

I have no doubt that he will now be round trying to patch matters up and I hope that he may realise by to-morrow that he has gone too far If not we shall have to reconsider our whole position and *mise en demeure* may be necessary but Turks are uncomfortable and I do not despair of saving situation

Proceedings to-day were so protracted that I fear that I cannot send full report by bag as I had intended but present telegram gives everything that is essential

(Repeated to Constantinople No 87

No. 85

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 13.*)

(No. 284.)
Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 13, 1923.*
CONSTANTINOPLE Telegram No. 210.
Greek delegation informed us on 10th July that Ismet Pasha's secretary had by order of delegation's chief come to ask to see Greek letters to Greek delegation which were to be known nothing of else but had telegraphed regarding Vagenheim letters. Greek secretary went to Ismet's private meeting on 11th July.
Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

No. 86

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold, Lausanne.

(No. 124.)
Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, July 13, 1923.*
No. 121 R. *Foreign Office, July 13, 1923, 7.20 p.m.*
Mr. HENDERSON's telegram No. 214 refers.
You should on no account take any step that might lead Ismet to ascertain that the instructions regarding Vagenheim will be revoked or nullified later by an addition to the evidence required in some other way that may be possible.
Repeated to Constantinople (No. 226).

No. 87

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 14.*)

(No. 282.)
Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 13, 1923.*
Your telegram No. 119.
Greek Delegation now Mr. Venizelos's instructions. We urged that Greek Delegation should not precipitate Greek Minorities Treaty at moment when Ismet was pressing for immediate peace. But Mr. Venizelos was resolved that Greek signature was both necessary and must take place before Ismet's departure. Greek Government would be blamed if Greek people before Ismet's departure should be left in belief that Greek Government had refused. My fear that Greek Government would be accused of Venizelos' crime proved groundless. Ismet's departure was followed by Greek Government's announcement that Greek Government had not yet signed but intended to do so. Greek Government had not yet signed because they wished to be able to state that Greek signature was dependent on Turkish signature. Greek Government's phrase provided a face-saving expression for Greek Government's change of attitude.

No. 88

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received July 14.*)

(No. 283.)
Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 13, 1923.*
My immediate preceding telegram.
Mr. Venizelos's wish to have letter to Ismet on question of Greek property in Turkey was due to fear that Greek Government might be accused of having given away Greek property in Turkey without having received any quid pro quo. Greek Government's attitude was dictated by fear of incurring reproach of having sacrificed Greek interests without receiving any quid pro quo. Greek Government's attitude was dictated by fear of incurring reproach of having sacrificed Greek interests without receiving any quid pro quo.

...erstanding that Greece would never consent to any bondholders' claims being ...ferred to arbitration but would settle directly with Turkey.
General Pellé then asked me what attitude I would assume if bondholders and Greece now submitted Peace Treaty to deal with Mr. Venizelos's contention that with that might be ... as regards Turkey and bondholders, I was not sure as regards Greece, as by the Treaty Greece was bound by League Council's decision, whereas Turkey was bound by League Council's decision only in respect of Greece's consent to the signature of Greece and as to Greece was finally while Turkey was not bound. He would therefore ... hold Greek bondholders such as natural classes of creditors which ... not be ... unless it was clearly understood beforehand that Greece's ... was to be ... as settled. Mr. Venizelos appeared to be very much ... by this ... and ... that Greece would ... Mr. Venizelos's ... Greek ... which ... Turkey and bondholders ... I ... rejecting any ... Mr. Venizelos ... that ... Greek ... that we shall ... without ... Mr. Venizelos ... Mr. Venizelos ... Greek ... Turkey ... Mr. Venizelos ... Mr. Venizelos ... Mr. Venizelos

to send to so our ir Straits waters I am also advised that if protocol merely provided for complete withdrawal of naval units in connection with operations of the evacuation nothing in the law would prevent warships visiting vessels in to sojourn in Turkish waters for grave emergency affecting the safety of British lives in Constantinople or elsewhere but treaty entered into force Possibly Turks would accept a committee of Allies attached to protocol to provide with agreement with them in committee express safeguarding point

More serious difficulty arises over *entire* right of passage Clearly an excellent juridical case exists for maintaining that in view of risk of a break out of hostilities mainly on this point it is necessary to consider whether of all recognized treaty Powers is absolutely essential His Majesty's Government As its recognition by France is also absolutely essential His Majesty's Government examined above Turks are ready to accept right of passage in limited manner by Straits Convention Treaty and three Straits Convention could probably be brought into force within three months after date of armistice

There seems no serious risk of any hostile assault during these three months which would require assistance of allied fleet Black Sea ports are safe as I am informed Admiralty would be very reluctant to send any large force at all as long as hostilities in Straits zone with Turkish hards In the circumstance it is very difficult to justify refusal by Allies during this short interval of some limited right of passage even if not subsequently accepted by Straits Convention which could be applied as soon as it came into force

Neither the Dardanelles Italian support nor anything latter likewise affect the point

If possible of course I will wait for His Majesty's Government's observations but I regret that unfortunately Admiralty would be very reluctant to send any large force to Straits zone with Turkish hards In the circumstance it is very difficult to justify refusal by Allies during this short interval of some limited right of passage even if not subsequently accepted If however it is content I propose to limit to right of passage for single vessel at a time in the course of the next two days I find that in order finally to adjust matters and to prepare for signature of treaty it is necessary to enter into formal negotiations with Turks I propose to accept a limited right of passage for ships of war into the Straits pending conclusion of treaty I am sure that Your Lordship will appreciate that I am unable to submit to you any definite proposal in this matter at present but will keep you informed of progress of negotiations

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No 90

Mr Henderson to the Marquess of Kedleston (*Received July 15*)

(No 390)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople July 15 1923*

SIR H RUMBOLD'S telegram No 280

Case does not appear to me to be one for precautionary action which would recommend itself to His Majesty's Government in some form or other as part of treaty

Nevertheless the twenty-one persons who were released on bail yesterday, stated that they were to be deported if they did not go to their homes in Turkish waters and that they had chosen to remain in Constantinople rather than return to Turkish rule They were of course sent down to Constantinople without Turkish escort

In this connection I do not think that the despatch of British ship

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(E 7346 52 44) No 91

Mr Henderson to the Marquess of Kedleston (*Received July 16*)

(No 404) *Constantinople July 6, 1923*

My Lord

I HAVE the honour to inform your lordship that I sent you a telegram No 83 (E) of the 4th July reporting that Patriarch had left Constantinople the afternoon aboard the Greek warship Kilkis for Mytilene on a visit to be followed by a destroyer which is being placed at his disposal by the Greek Government to Mount Athos

As your Lordship is aware steps had already been taken to ensure Mgr Maximos his safety after the abrogation of the arrangements made

fact been completed for his departure by the steamer on the 8th instant Late on the 6th instant however the Patriarch sent his chargé to the High Commission to deliver the note of which a copy is enclosed herein, and to state verbally that as his presence was required a few days longer for ecclesiastical reasons, he was obliged to postpone his departure On receipt of this communication I immediately caused a message to be sent to the Patriarch expressing my regret that the carefully considered arrangements already made should thus upset and adding that as all British warships in Turkish waters had departed, the only practicable way of giving effect to His Holiness's wishes would be for him to adhere to the original plan

3 This was a very unfortunate incident, and from the facts, as detailed in the enclosures to my despatch, the observations of the Turkish Delegates would appear to be fully justified The Patriarch proceeded to the quay shortly after the same hour as that originally fixed for the departure of his motor car, and it is difficult to understand how the impression can have arisen that His Holiness regretted that a ship had been sent to take him away

4 Yesterday morning Ismet Pasha the Turkish Foreign Minister and his colleague Adnan Bey called at the Italian Embassy to bid farewell to the Patriarch, who had been staying at the Embassy since the 4th instant Ismet Pasha and Adnan Bey expressed their regret that the Patriarch should have left Constantinople in the circumstances which had arisen, and assured His Holiness that the Turkish Government would do everything in their power to prevent the occurrence of any such incident in the future

5 I am informed by the Italian Ambassador that during the course of the conversation which took place between the Patriarch and the Turkish Delegates, His Holiness stated that he had left Constantinople in order to avoid the embarrassment which would be caused to the Turkish Government by the presence of a Greek Patriarch in Constantinople during the Peace Conference, and that he had no intention of taking any part in political matters

6 I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens for information

I have, &c
(For the High Commissioner)
HORACE RUMBOLD

No 92

Mr Henderson to the Marquess of Kedleston (*Received July 16*)

(No 405) *Constantinople July 6, 1923*

My Lord

I HAVE the honour to inform your lordship that I sent you a telegram No 83 (E) of the 4th July reporting that Patriarch had left Constantinople the afternoon aboard the Greek warship Kilkis for Mytilene on a visit to be followed by a destroyer which is being placed at his disposal by the Greek Government to Mount Athos

As your Lordship is aware steps had already been taken to ensure Mgr Maximos his safety after the abrogation of the arrangements made

short distance. Rowing boats containing a number of Turkish peasants were in evidence close to the gangway, but these took no part in the proceedings.

3. The instructions of your Lordship's telegram No. 46 were communicated to the Patriarch, and to Mr. Heyking, who expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would do all in their power to support the Patriarch.

Mr. Heyking subsequently called upon me, and I had a conversation with him for about twenty minutes, during which he expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would do all in their power to support the Patriarch. Mr. Heyking remarked that he had been informed by the Patriarch that he had received a telegram from your Lordship's predecessor during the last year of office, stating that His Majesty's Government would take the Greek Church under their protection, and that he (the Patriarch) was much disappointed that no action had been taken in the matter. I replied that I was not aware that any such telegram had been sent, but that I would inquire into the matter. Mr. Heyking then left me.

I have, &c.

NATHANIEL HENDERSON,

Acting Her Majesty's Consul-General.

Enclosure in No. 31

Memorandum by Mr. Henderson.

Patriarch's complaint of Constantinople Government.

Monday, October 9, 1893.

Mr. Heyking called upon me at the Consulate-General, and I had a conversation with him for about twenty minutes, during which he expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would do all in their power to support the Patriarch. Mr. Heyking remarked that he had been informed by the Patriarch that he had received a telegram from your Lordship's predecessor during the last year of office, stating that His Majesty's Government would take the Greek Church under their protection, and that he (the Patriarch) was much disappointed that no action had been taken in the matter. I replied that I was not aware that any such telegram had been sent, but that I would inquire into the matter. Mr. Heyking then left me.

(E 7347 199,44) No. 32

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received (Dec. 1, 1893)

No. 46.

My Lord, *Constantinople, Nov. 1, 1893.*

DURING the last week of October I received reports of a proposed attack on the Greek villages in the Vilayet of Aidin, and I addressed a letter to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, requesting him to proceed to Aidin and to take such steps as might be necessary to prevent the threatened disturbances.

At the same time I had an interview with the Patriarch, who expressed to me his fears that a massacre of Christians would take place, and requested me to use my influence with the Porte to prevent it. I assured His Beatitude that every effort would be made to secure the safety of the Christian population, and that I had already addressed a note to the Porte on the subject.

Subsequently I received a telegram from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, stating that he had received information that a massacre of Christians was intended to take place at Aidin on the 29th October, and requesting me to obtain the immediate dismissal of Mustafa Kemal Bey, the Kaimakam of Aidin, who was reported to be the instigator of the massacre.

I at once addressed a note to the Porte, requesting the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal Bey, and I received a reply from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Mustafa Kemal Bey had been dismissed from his post, and that he had been ordered to proceed to Constantinople. I also received a telegram from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, stating that Mustafa Kemal Bey had been dismissed, and that he had been ordered to proceed to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

NATHANIEL HENDERSON,

Acting Her Majesty's Consul-General.

[E 7314 6316 44]

No 93

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 17)

No 279
My Lord *Lausanne, July 12*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter and enclosure from the head of the French delegation relative to our views in regard to the Turkish courts against American subjects I have discussed this question with my French and Italian colleagues We are of opinion that it would be premature to attempt to insert in the peace treaty clauses dealing further with the matter as suggested in the telegram from the Acting High Commissioner in Constantinople I am however of opinion that the Allied Governments should be informed of the views which we hold and I therefore propose with your approval to address a despatch to them in the sense of the enclosed draft

I have &c
For Sir H Rumbold
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No 93

General Pellé to Sir H Rumbold

Lausanne, July 11, 1923

MON CHER AMBASSADEUR J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint la traduction d'un télégramme que M Jusserand vient de recevoir de M Millerand relativement aux tribunaux consulaires

Veuillez agréer &c
PELLÉ

Enclosure 2 in No 93

Legal Adviser, Foreign Office, to Private Secretary, Lausanne

Foreign Office, [illegible] July 1923

[illegible] tribunaux turcs [illegible] arrêter [illegible] Mais [illegible] admettre [illegible] Nous [illegible] Pour [illegible]

No 94

Mr Howe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 16)

No 92
Telegraphic *Belgrade, July 15, 1923*

YOUR telegram No 98

Minister for Foreign Affairs constructively maintains attitude adopted by Serbian delegates at Lausanne regarding that article of treaty of London still in force Suggests that article should be replaced by new provisions to effect that Albanian frontiers shall not be altered without consent of League of Nations Council For this reason and in order to facilitate acceptance of Albanian proposals For this reason and in order to facilitate discussions on economic questions Serbian delegates think it would be manifestly unfair to require them to sign treaty parts of which they had not negotiated They could therefore only sign with reservations already mentioned

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I made it quite clear that there could be no question of such a signature and he replied that in that case they would not sign He added that once treaty had been signed (Turkish share of debt being thus disposed of) he would willingly agree to discuss at conference of other interested parties disputed questions This tends to show that Serbs are bogging over amount of debt for which they are to be held responsible For laziness of Minister for Foreign Affairs argument only confirms weakness of Government considerable pressure will be needed to bring them round

French Minister who has also been pressing this Government, has just received instructions to make joint *démarche* with me to Serb Croat Slovene Government, while Italian Minister has been instructed to support our representations I presume I shall receive instructions similar to my French colleague

(Repeated to Lausanne)

No 95

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 16)

No 280
Telegraphic R
MY Telegram No 284 *Lausanne July 15 1923*

My French and Italian colleagues and I are sending a joint despatch covering [illegible] Straits Convention [illegible] July Ankara [illegible] Turkish [illegible] interruption in private conversations on 12th July We believe ourselves however instructed our experts and jurists agree that [illegible] We suggest that [illegible] Straits Convention in order [illegible] French agreement to [illegible] Straits [illegible] unless we are sure [illegible] Text follows by bag

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No 96

Sir H Rumbold to Sir Kennedy Rom (Repeated to Foreign Office) Received July 16)

No 287
Telegraphic R *Lausanne July 16, 1923*

YOUR telegram No 116 of July and my telegram No 7

I have [illegible] Straits Convention which agrees with Rome text [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Text follows by bag

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No 97

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 16)

No 288
Telegraphic R *Lausanne, July 16 1923*

BELGRADE telegram No 92

Serbian [illegible] Albanian frontiers [illegible] Text follows by bag

Separate representations are being made to Serbian and Bulgarian Governments [illegible] Straits Convention It is [illegible] as regards [illegible] Straits Convention [illegible] Text follows by bag

Absence of Serbian representatives from some meetings of financial and economic experts was of course entirely voluntary and it is ridiculous to address it as an aggravation of the case.

So far as this correspondence is concerned only persons with a bee in their bonnet could object to signature of the Convention of this difference it may well lead to a treaty. They would do it, like signing the Covenant or the Kellogg Pact, because signature of an international convention on the part of a State is interpreted as a gesture of prestige.

Repeated to Belgrade.

No. 98

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)

No. 127 *Foreign Office July 16, 1923*

Telegraphic

YOUR telegrams Nos. 274 and 276 July. Note exchanged.

Provided that no opposition is taken by the Council of the League of Nations to the right of access to the Baltic of Poland and other States, His Majesty's Government have no objection to the proposed declaration.

No. 99

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)

No. 128 *Foreign Office July 16, 1923*

Despatch R.

YOUR telegram No. 284 of 14th June.

I. M. Venizelos seems to have read into my statement to the representatives of the Powers at the Conference on July 6th more than I intended. The Powers concerned have signed treaties with the Greek Government which, in the case of Great Britain, France and Italy, are to be ratified by the end of July. It is hoped that Greece will ratify the treaty with Turkey before the end of July, and that the Greek Government will then ask the Powers concerned to exchange ratifications of the treaties with Greece. It is to be presumed that the Greek Government will not ask for the exchange of ratifications before the end of July, and that they will not delay the exchange of ratifications beyond the end of July. It would be open to the Powers concerned to refuse to exchange ratifications if they were not satisfied that Greece had carried out her obligations under the treaties.

If, however, I am asked in the House of Commons whether I should be prepared to support a request by M. Venizelos that the Powers concerned should agree to postpone the exchange of ratifications, I shall reply that I am not prepared to do so. Greece has undertaken to sign the Peace Treaty with Turkey and to ratify it before the end of July. She has undertaken to carry out the provisions of the Treaty with Turkey. She has undertaken to ratify the Treaty with Turkey

for by unilateral declaration of the part of Turkey to be attached to evacuation protocol

This agreement was carried unexpectedly short of the opening of meeting at 5 P M but then lapsed into a sterile discussion of the three points refusing to submit even basis for experts agreement on the ground that it would prejudice Turkey's reservations to Turkish capital After private conversations and adjournment from 9 to 11 P M Ismet finally agreed to a slight recasting of sections 2 and 3 of text on point 2 and Allied proposal on point 2, modified to permit for five years most favoured Ismet's point regarding Turkish capital, modified to meet Ismet's letter to Lausanne Delegation of 16th July and to be embodied in letters to two delegations Joint wrangle ensued on Turkish Petroleum concession I had with me numerous telegrams from Angora and to the Standard Oil Company tending to show that most interested from Angora point of view Chester Concession was not to be sold and I had foreseen that encouragement to rest of his delegation that he would I had, therefore, left behind with my experts this instruction, which I read to Ismet, to the effect that we could not withdraw strong reservation of His Majesty's Government's position and expressly permitted this afternoon rather than attempt to reach agreement on this point involving and almost entirely British interests without full consultation with Angora and somewhat undesirable controversy At 2 A M I hoped to fall back on this solution and meeting ended

Full session of three committees this afternoon will sanction agreements reached and finish off remaining minor points and it is hoped to sign treaty on 24th July

Full report of yesterday's meeting follows by bag

Repeated to Constantinople

No 103

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Received July 17)

No 129
Telegraphic
IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL Your No 990 Expenditure of Ottoman's also be served with by [illegible] reference your No 2

I am glad to see you are taking a firm attitude towards Ismet's claim to date of expiration of evacuation and also to arrangements to be made for ratification of the treaty by Angora Parliament and point to be dealt with in supplemental evacuation protocol

(Repeated to Constantinople No 228)

No 104

Mr Kennedy to Sir H Rumbold (Repeated to Foreign Office Received July 18)

No 85
Telegraphic
YOUR telegram No 8

Ministry for Foreign Affairs are expecting M Negrotto's return to Rome and hope to be able to send definite instructions to Italian delegate after discussion with him

Please however agreed that question should be discussed and settled at Lausanne but point out that while there are only a few important British claims there are large numbers of Italian claims which while unimportant in themselves require careful consideration

Repeated to Foreign Office)

No 105

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 18)

No 291
(Telegraphic) R
Lausanne, July 17 1923

AT final meetings of three committees held this afternoon agreements on all outstanding questions were officially recorded It only remains to collate texts and prepare treaty and other instruments for signature which has been fixed for 24th July

Fuller report will follow

(Repeated to Constantinople and Athens)

No 106

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 19)

No 292
Telegraphic
[By bag]
Lausanne July 17 1923

My telegram No 289

Meetings of technical experts and experts dealing with evacuation Protocol were held from 10 o'clock yesterday morning ended in recommendation of position except that Turkish experts agreed to an All I proposal that last paragraph of section 3 should be omitted and that 2 concessions protocol should be limited so as not to include question of rights of preference in the case of Mosul Vilayet, but the Regie tobacco It was agreed that no other points to be raised should be brought before delegates meeting in the afternoon

Meeting took place at 5 o'clock About 4 o'clock Mr Ryan was asked by Ismet Pasha to go and see him, had succeeded in extracting with great skill and cleverness from Ismet Pasha points of principle upon which naval evacuation was based These were as already reported telegram [illegible] Ismet stated that he could not agree to Turkey, who also expressed hope that ratifications by the different Parliaments should take place as soon as possible with a view to the early entry into force of the treaty

Mr Grew and Allied and Turkish delegates joined shortly I briefly recapitulating the points of naval evacuation and explaining the agreement which Mr Ryan and Ismet Pasha had provisionally accepted As soon as emphasising Turkey's sacrifices and the further proof which he was thus giving of his desire to bring about, Ismet formally accepted as settlement of my proposals while emphasising matters of interest to his particular delegation Mr Grew then said that while agreement had been reached on the principles involved there were points, such as Concessions Protocol should be satisfactorily settled It was agreed that these points should be discussed by the experts and Mr Grew expressed the hope that the Committee this afternoon in the event of Protocol only referring to naval evacuation will be a statement that the withdrawal of military forces comprises Allied naval units

Discussion then passed to the three outstanding points of the Concessions Protocol General Pelle explained that he was quite unable to understand why the Turks should oppose the suppression of the last paragraph section (c) of No 2 and the whole of first regarding maintenance of the first paragraph of section 3 the status quo Both paragraphs clearly showed that the Allies intended the spirit and not the old concessions but required this settlement existing and hence could not be assisted in cases in which expenditure on plant had been incurred but not completed In particular, General Pelle said he had been at pains to draw up the document the question of the Chester concession and that he had clearly shown the draft to Mr Grew, who raised no objection to its content

As regards Ismet's objections to the last paragraphs of sections (a) and (c) the rights of preference question General Pelle stressed the fact that the Allied experts had referred the Turkish experts that morning to the agreement between the Allies and Angora Government with all its implications

Ismet should clearly that as regards maintenance he was frightened by the

[illegible]

attitude of the Angora Government and the Angora Assembly, who would see in the phrase giving Chanak a free port a pretext to challenge their right to give the Chester Concession, and the possibility of future claims for indemnification by Chester to the United States Government. He apparently understood Mr. Lloyd George's proposals as regards the right to compensation to gradually lose its force, the one objection that I had to it under the clause as now drafted, being the reservation to Chester of these concessions to Turkish, as opposed to foreign capitalists.

General Pelle pointed out that whatever the Angora Government might do, the Treaty of 1923 and its rights were created in 1914 in favour of the Regie generale. An arrangement had been assented to, a legal concession had been given and the matter was finished as far as the French point of view went. He had no instructions to discuss the Chester Concession, but General Pelle also pointed out that Hamid Bey, who had been elected representative of the Angora Government at Constantinople, had intimated to the Ottoman Government that his Government regarded the 1914 concessions as void. Details of the discussion at Sunday's meeting were quoted to show that Ismet had accepted the principle asking only for the suppression of the word "present" which had been accepted.

Ismet Pasha pointed out that the Treaty of Lausanne had given Turkey full control over her own finances, and that no Turkish right was to be infringed by the Lausanne Capitulations Commission. Ismet was also challenged to say why the Angora Government had not come to an arrangement with the Regie concessionaires, but Ismet Pasha replied that the Angora Assembly could hardly be expected to discuss the economic rights of Turkish citizens, however valuable, while the Allies monopolised all the railways, destroyed the Turkish export trade, and kept Anatolia in a state of financial stringency. Ismet Pasha then began to argue the usual phrase regarding sovereignty, but Lord Curzon cut him short by saying that these questions were not on the Agenda.

Arrangements for the next meeting were then settled, the Allies undertaking to put down on paper their views on the Allied proposals, and Ismet undertaking to do the same. The whole meeting was described as friendly and businesslike throughout, and Ismet Pasha and Ismet Bey were invited to dine with the Allied delegates on the following evening.

Ismet Pasha then left the room, and Lord Curzon read to the Allied delegates a telegram from the Government at Angora, which stated that Ismet had been instructed to inform the Allies that he was prepared to sign the Straits Convention, but that he could not sign at present the Mudania Convention, as Mr. Ryan, the representative of the Standard Oil Company, had been in Angora and had expressed strong views on behalf of the American Government. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Greece, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Italy, as Italy had not yet evacuated Adalia. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Rumania, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, as Bulgaria had not yet paid the indemnity. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Albania, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Yugoslavia, as Yugoslavia had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Albanian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Czechoslovakia, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, as Austria had not yet paid the indemnity. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Hungary, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Roumania, as Roumania had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Hungarian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Poland, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Russia, as Russia had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Polish frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Finland, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Sweden, as Sweden had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Finnish frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Norway, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Denmark, as Denmark had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Norwegian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Holland, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Belgium, as Belgium had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Dutch frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Switzerland, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with France, as France had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Swiss frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Spain, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Portugal, as Portugal had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Spanish frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Italy, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Greece, as Greece had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Italian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Turkey, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Armenia, as Armenia had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Turkish frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Persia, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Afghanistan, as Afghanistan had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Persian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Egypt, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with India, as India had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Egyptian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Arabia, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Mesopotamia, as Mesopotamia had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Arabian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Syria, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Palestine, as Palestine had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Syrian frontier. Ismet Pasha had also stated that he was prepared to sign the Peace Treaty with Mesopotamia, but that he could not sign the Peace Treaty with Persia, as Persia had not yet withdrawn her troops from the Mesopotamian frontier. 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mpany's rights were affected by the war He also rejected a further formula which I proposed as follows

> Les droits qui existaient au profit de la Turkish Petroleum Company en 1914 existent aujourd'hui, nonobstant la guerre qui a éclaté depuis cette date

Ismet mentioned that the question was one which could not be referred to experts, and it was to some extent a matter for a tribunal to decide whether or not the Turkish Petroleum Company had acquired rights in 1914

We did not pursue this point further, as it was only in so far as the concessions might be affected by the new Turkey that any question between us and the Turkish Government of those days arose

Equally inconclusive was a short conversation I had with Ismet Pasha on the Mosul question Though General Pelle had drawn my attention to the matter, I was not very interested and Sir Horace Rumbold was going to the front I therefore left the question as well as Kirkuk to be discussed by the experts, and the oil side of the final settlement was left to Sir Horace Rumbold to deal with when I should have returned to Angora I was, however, able to report to my Allied colleagues that Ismet Pasha, though he did not like the idea of the expatriation of Armenians and Greeks, was not pressing for the immediate exchange of populations

Ismet Pasha was anxious to get rid of all these matters, but he was evidently afraid of the Turkish Government being criticised in the Assembly for any concessions they might make to the Allies He seemed to think, as regards Mosul, that we had been very unreasonable in asking Turkey to accept a greater tolerance than any other State Nevertheless, on the whole, I was glad to see that the Turkish Government had not been encouraged by the Armenian complaints and representations on the question of the capitulations to put forward any claim to abrogate them

I had a long conversation with Ismet Pasha to find out whether the Turkish Government would be likely to ratify the Amnesty Declaration and the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne, but could not get much further than I had been able to get with Rustu Bey Ismet Pasha, however, did not conceal the fact that the Turkish Government objected to the Amnesty Declaration as it stood, and that they would like to see it modified in certain respects He said that the Turkish Government would be prepared to ratify the Straits Convention if the Allied Governments would satisfy them on the question of the Greek Patriarch and the Orphanages, which they had agreed to discuss, and that even if legislative action on the part of the Grand National Assembly were necessary, nevertheless the Turkish Government would push on with the ratification as quickly as possible, though they could not be bound by the latter in any way, as they would have to submit it to the Assembly for ratification

Ismet Pasha finally replied that Turkey would be unable to sign the Straits Convention in the sense which had been indicated

M Venizelos said that he thought that most of the Asia Minor Greeks would return to their homes, as assured by the Declaration of Principles, since from the latter he was entitled to expect that the Turkish Government would not say in the authority of the Assembly representative of Islam in principle regarding the law applicable to persons who had entered as slaves the enemy armies He would, however, speak direct to Ismet Pasha on this question He would further point out to him that on this question, as on other occasions, he would have to suffer in reaching an agreement with Ismet Pasha on the present conversation Ismet Pasha concurred in this hope

I reminded Ismet Pasha that the Turkish delegation was to go to Geneva to press to the British, French and Italian delegations a letter embodying the understanding arrived at some weeks ago about schools and other establishments Ismet promised that the letter would be forthcoming

It was agreed to issue an invitation to the Russian Government to send representatives to Lausanne to confer with the Turkish Government with a view to signing the Straits Convention within a period of three weeks from the date of signature of the Convention

Having thus disposed of the work they were entitled to do, the experts, among whom I especially include M Trannoy and M Max Boy, and the secretariat generals, I also should like to say a few words regarding the dependence of nations on each other the moral element in the greatness of these Powers who are called great and the value to the world of a country like Switzerland where people of different races, language and religion form in spite of these distinctions a whole animated by a mutual spirit of tolerance and a common spirit of solidarity

Accession of Belgium and Portugal We adopted the texts enclosed in my despatch No 260 of 17th July

Article 101 of the Draft Treaty of January 31 We formally adopted an addition to this article providing for the re-establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey and the bringing into force of the Treaties relative to the Greco-Turkish frontiers as soon as both Powers shall have ratified the treaty

Amnesty Declaration The text of this was originally adopted some time ago subject to the question of entering it I took the opportunity on this occasion of reading a prepared statement once more urging upon the Turks the importance of issuing this declaration both in the letter and in the spirit and urging the Allied view that it would become operative as from the date of signature I also stressed in the recent case of the arrest in Constantinople of seven Greeks who had served in the Greek battalion and on the whole attitude of the Turks towards the Allied Armies General Pelle supported me strongly and made special reference to the case of persons formally resident in Asia Minor, who, under the Greco-Turkish Agreement and even previously, were amnestied The Italian Delegation and Allied representatives followed Mr Grew made a prepared statement, which I had read in my name, and we were followed by Signor Montagna, Ismet Pasha, throughout the discussion, was aware that the question of the expatriation of Armenians and Greeks was not pressed, but preferred not to raise this Although some of the Turkish Delegates, including Ismet Pasha, were evidently desirous of a reply, it was at the latter's request that the Allied Governments should be given a chance to study the Turkish reply, as he said would be done with all possible generosity with a view to finding a basis for agreement

Ismet Pasha then proceeded to read out the Turkish reply, which was to the effect that the Turkish Government had agreed to sign the Declaration of Amnesty on the understanding that the reciprocal obligations imposed by it were reciprocal, but it was the intention of the Allied Governments to satisfy themselves as to the conditions in which they had agreed to the Declaration, and that even if legislative action on the part of the Grand National Assembly were necessary, nevertheless the Turkish Government would push on with the ratification as quickly as possible, though they could not be bound by the latter in any way, as they would have to submit it to the Assembly for ratification

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No 107

Sir H Rumbold to Mr Grant-Duff (Received July 19)

No 283 By Bag
Telegraphic *Lausanne July 17 1923*

Very Urgent No 291

I have submitted seriatim my reports of the meetings of the three days but as shorthand notes were used they were not ready in time for the text to be treated and the articles amended The following is substantially record of the proceedings at the

First Committee

Revision of Protocol We adopted the text of the protocol and the attached declaration except in respect of No 291 to Ismet Pasha's request that the Mudania Convention should remain in force until the conclusion of the conference and of arrangements for the exchange between the two countries on the spot The United States Delegate, however, stated that he could not accept this declaration unless Article 3 of the Treaty of Sèvres was left in force Ismet Pasha then agreed to the retention of Article 3 of the Treaty of Sèvres (see text in my despatch No 289 of to-day's date)

Kars-Ardahan Protocol The text of this had been sent home in my despatch No 262 of 17th July Ismet Pasha had not had time to consult with M Venizelos but said he thought he had no objection to the Kars and Ardahan Treaties and Protocol with the exception of those articles regarding the dependence of nations on each other, to which M Venizelos had objected, but subject to this reservation M Venizelos said he would not object to the ratification of the Kars and Ardahan Treaties and Protocol He said he would like to discuss this question with Ismet Pasha, with whom he hoped to come to an agreement without difficulty

Second Committee

The letter to the Grand Vizier at the Public Debt regarding article 70 of the draft was [illegible] and it was agreed to issue [illegible] agreement subject to which the answers were to be [illegible]

We then discussed the next paragraph of the memorandum relating to the Decree of March 1914 and the Public Debt Commission's decision thereon. The object was to [illegible] the Ottoman Government which [illegible] Turkish Ambassador in London [illegible] Commission [illegible] Public Debt Commissioners [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Commissioners [illegible] Ottoman Government [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Ottoman Government [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Ottoman Government [illegible] Turkish Government

remember with feelings of honour and respect collaboration of all delegations present at this conference

The meeting terminated with a series of farewell speeches by the heads of the different delegations most of which can justifiably be described as "flapdoodle" The only notable features of this display of oratory were firstly that the Roumanian and Serbian delegates professed ignorance of the fact that these were the last real sittings of the conference, and that M Stancioff helped him with a statement to the effect that he was most grateful to the president of the Political Commission for the opportunity which had been given to the Bulgarian delegation to state their views and aspirations This somewhat discomfited M Montagna who had intended to close the discussion and had already delivered an eloquent if somewhat lengthy speech Both M Tzamandos and M Yovanovitch said that they would have statements to make at the closing session of the conference So far as the Serbian delegate was concerned, this created some amusement as it is more than doubtful whether he will be admitted officially to that session in view of the avowed intention of his Government not to allow him to sign the treaty

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No 108

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 18)

(No 295
Telegraphic)

Lausanne July 18 1923

MY telegram No 282

French delegation have apparently received telegram this morning from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs showing that French Government have not yet accepted text of proposed protocol with regard to ratification of Western Thrace and Greek Minorities Treaties It seems that they have not yet abandoned their desire to suppress secret and to retain paragraph 1 of the preamble It is quite clear that M Venizelos is willing to agree to make certain changes provided most if strong pressure were put upon him by Entente Governments Britain has not as yet given any sign that His Majesty's Government do not wish to exercise such pressure Moreover Italian delegation appears to be unwilling as M Venizelos to make any modification in preamble It would be most unfortunate if owing to attitude of French Government Protocol cannot be signed with other documents on 24th July We are all anxious to put Western Thrace and Greek Minorities Treaties into execution as soon as possible now that we have received Turks that protection afforded by Minorities Treaty to Moslems in Greece would be a potent factor in securing best possible settlement

Unless therefore you see objection I should be grateful if representations could be made to Paris on this point

(Confidential)
French delegation here appears to be in entire agreement with our views
(Repeated to Paris)

No 109

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Grant Watson Belgrade

(No 60)
(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office July 18 1923

YOUR telegram No 92 of 9th July Serbian signature of the treaty and also your telegram No 288 repeated to you

You should point out to your French and Italian colleagues on exerting further pressure on Government to which you are accredited

Clearly they cannot be allowed by signature of the treaty to obtain the advantages which it confers on them while evading by a reservation the obligations which it imposes

(Repeated to Lausanne No 130)

No 110

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Lausanne)

(No 132)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office July 18 1923

YOUR telegram No 289 of 17th July

I am most uneasy at learning that you intend to recognise case of Turkish Petroleum Company as I have frequently emphasised in discussion when at Lausanne regard to Mosul

Apart from fact that secret information which you will have received last evening shows that at Ismet might have pleaded it appears to me that mere unilateral reservation however strongly couched by you cannot in any prejudice materially your position in forthcoming negotiations about Mosul and will also weaken most seriously arguments and claims and rights under 1914 concession

Unless you are very sure that my apprehensions are not fully justified you should insist on putting back the Turkish Petroleum Company into the protocol

I object very strongly to additional valuable given to Chester Concession by our surrender

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E 7469 1 44)

No 111

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 18)

(No 1
Very Secret)

Lausanne July 17 1923

WITH reference to my despatch No 17 Secret of the 12th I have the honour to submit herewith a copy of the text of the Straits Convention which was agreed to by the Secretary General this afternoon

The draft was initialled by my despatch under reference was submitted with a view to leaving so far as possible any opportunity for the Straits Committee of a free hand

I have &c
HORACE RUMBOLD

Enclosure No 1

Convention relative au Régime des Détroits

(Original Text)

Lausanne le 17 juillet 1923

LES Puissances signataires du traité d'établissement de la paix Considérant qu'il est désirable, à l'occasion de la Paix entre les Puissances Alliées d'une part et la Turquie d'autre part signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 de régler les questions relatives au Régime des Détroits Ont décidé de conclure à cet effet une Convention et ont désigné comme leurs Plénipotentiaires à savoir

Les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances réunies en Conférence à Lausanne ont échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme qui sont transcrits à la suite du présent Traité

Les Plénipotentiaires de la Turquie Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie Son Excellence le Président de la République Française Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des mers Empereur des Indes Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume des Hellènes Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie Sa Majesté le Roi des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes

Lesquels après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme ont arrêté les dispositions suivantes

(Translation)

Lausanne, 17th July 1923

THE Representatives of the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace Considering that it is desirable on the occasion of the Peace between the Allied Powers on the one part and Turkey on the other part signed at Lausanne on the 24th July 1923 to regulate the questions relating to the Régime of the Straits Have decided to conclude a Convention to this effect and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries

The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers assembled in Conference at Lausanne have communicated their full powers found in good and due form which are transcribed at the end of the present Treaty

The Plenipotentiaries of Turkey His Majesty the King of Italy His Excellency the President of the French Republic His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas Emperor of India His Majesty the King of the Hellenes His Majesty the King of Roumania His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

Who after having communicated their full powers found in good and due form have agreed upon the following provisions

E absence d'un réponse, nous ne devrons ne pas y attacher d'importance
parce qu'il 20 juillet la conférence considérera que Russie persiste dans [illegible]
[illegible] représentants sont autorisés à [illegible]

Si nous devons [illegible] points de la nôtre sont [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] Russie pourrait alors [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No. 112

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 19.)

(No. 689.) By Bag

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 18, 1923*

M. HERBETTE expressed himself in very urgent terms in the sense of the telegram under reference. He observed that Turkish signature had been obtained only after the most strenuous efforts, and the Government would be exposed to the severest criticism and the gravest risk of a Ministerial crisis if they were now to be confronted with a fresh demand. He could not believe that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to take the responsibility of breaking off the Conference on such a question, and he appealed to me to do my utmost to induce you to withdraw your proposal.

I replied that I could not undertake to do this, as I was convinced that the proposal was a reasonable one, and that I was sure that His Majesty's Government would not be prepared to abandon it. I could only repeat that the Turkish Government had, as I understood, already agreed to the principle of the proposal, and that the only question was as to the method of its application. I could not believe that the Turkish Government would refuse to carry out an undertaking which they had already given, and I could not imagine that the Conference would break down on a question of this kind.

M. Herbette then proceeded to say that he thought that although the Turkish Government might not refuse to carry out the undertaking, they would certainly ask for a long delay before doing so. I replied that I could not agree to any delay, and that I must insist upon the matter being settled at once. M. Herbette then said that he would report to his Government what I had said, but that he thought that the Turkish Government would refuse to accept the proposal.

No. 113

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Earl of Crewe. (Received July 20.)

(No. 297.) *Lausanne, July 19, 1923*

(Telegraphic.)

VOIR telegram No. 151.

Your Lordship's telegram under reference. After interview with Ismet, I thought it advisable to communicate with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and I have since had a conference with him.

Ismet's telegram to which you refer was sent before Ismet had received my telegram No. 282 and before he had received any instructions. I submit that in that case Mr. Ismet could not be expected to withdraw a proposal which His Majesty's Government had strongly urged upon the Turkish Government, and which, in the interests of peace, they were bound to support.

I am sure that Ismet's proposal was made in good faith, and that he was genuinely anxious to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, who has had a long conversation with Ismet, is also convinced that Ismet's proposal was made in good faith, and that he was genuinely anxious to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government.

Ismet's proposal was made in good faith, and that he was genuinely anxious to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, who has had a long conversation with Ismet, is also convinced that Ismet's proposal was made in good faith, and that he was genuinely anxious to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government.

[illegible] consideration connected with latter question. I took view that the more strongly I insisted on such alternation the more Turks would have believed His Majesty's Government to be apprehensive lest settlement of question should be unfavourable to them. In any case, past experience has shown that in any negotiations groups omitted by [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

For the rest I can only hope that further explanations contained in my telegram No. 282 may account of my final action given in my telegram No. 293 will satisfy you that as stated above course which I took was the only one open to me if rupture was to be avoided. Secondly, that I have left question Turkish Petroleum Company intact as between Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government and thirdly, that my action has in no way embarrassed City of Chester concession.

As regards first consideration, I felt nothing could be farther from my wishes than that anywhere should take place on an exclusively British question, which however important is of secondary importance as which I am certain Mosul will question between us and Turkey, however that second important question relates to oil.

I have [illegible] only to [illegible] statement which I made to Sir Eyre Crowe [illegible] see Blue Books, p. 360 and 361 [illegible] your telegram No. 1. I stated that I considered that I might [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Moreover, I gave [illegible] [illegible] of American delegation, I could not [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No 114

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 19)

(No 298)
(Telegraphic) R
Lausanne, July 19, 1923

MY telegram No. 297 paragraph 6

This refers not only to verbal statements by Ismet at private meetings, but also to three passages in his note of 16th July (see my despatch No 255 Passages referred to are as follows Principles which we had laid down on the morning of 'Saturday were the following to recognise acquired rights of Turkish Petroleum Company based on acquired rights subject to finding a suitable formula"

I quoted these statements textually in my declaration in committee

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No 115

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 20)

No 299)
Telegraphic
Lausanne, July 19, 1923

ROME telegram unnumbered of 17th July

Nogara returned to day to Lausanne after short visit to Milan

Italian experts have received text with French and British experts they have raised no alternative points referring everything to Rome and saying that they were awaiting instructions It is clear that they are trying to force question unsettled here

From discussions however it is evident that Italian representatives desire to secure exemption from necessary obligations of course for good reason that they have none Unfortunately French expert feels it is confidentially that his Government's instructions are to extract from Italy as price of agreement to which

So far he has only succeeded in getting Italians to agree to exclude compensation any companies, territories detached from Turkey In itself this proposition is quite unsatisfactory part of compensation would fall on French

Nogara has now finally put forward Italians have softened my experts finally agreed to put forward final proposal that Article should include a provision that payments to Ottoman companies should in no case exceed 500 000*l*, construction that this offer would be withdrawn if convention was not signed here French expert supported this but stated that he considered maximum 1 100 000*l* amply sufficient

We realise proposal is the result of an arbitrary character but in reality the Italians argued that they wished to secure that their interests are not entirely swamped by those of Turkish shareholders and it seems better to make some sacrifice of form to secure signature here Otherwise Italians will find time to play while the Turks relying upon the matters of stepping this question right for bargaining purposes and our claims would suffer

Could you telegraph urgently if Treasury agree and if in last resort, we could safely accept 1 000 000*l* as the maximum?

Repeated to Rome

No 116

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 20)

No 300)
(Telegraphic) R
Lausanne July 20, 1923

MY despatch No 264

Chicherin has replied at length on behalf of the Soviet Government recapitulating their objections to Straits Convention and manner in which it was drafted He says however their essential intentions and will not withdraw objections to convention or to its submission to League of Nations they have decided to make attempt to collaborate with the *Entente* Powers In view of the

impossibility of sending Soviet representative to Switzerland owing to conduct of that country in connection with the murder of Vorovsky, in whose person the rights of the three Soviet States were violated by the conference, they are sending their representative at Rome, M Jordansky to Constantinople to sign the Straits Convention there before 14th August

In their passage note states that, Turks having agreed to Allied proposals, no responsibility attaches to the Soviet Republic for violation of rights and interests of Turkish people for observance of which those republics strive and will go on striving

Copy of Russian reply follows by bag

No 117

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Phipps (Paris

No 289)
(Telegraphic)
(By Bag)
Foreign Office, July 20, 1923

LAUSANNE telegram No 295 of 18th July Greek Minorities Treaty

French Ambassador recently approached me with a view to suppression of clauses of the treaty parallel to the Greek Minorities Treaty which secure the rights of guarantee Personally, I saw no objection to surrendering these rights and no great value but the Government among them but in the present crisis was not to jeopardise the date of the Minorities Treaty Accordingly I instructed Sir H Rumbold to sound M Venizelos after consultation with his French colleague M Venizelos was interested but the ratification of the guarantees was both unnecessary and dangerous Since then the Italian Government have declared their intention of their acceptance and presumably their ratification of the Greek Treaty was dependent on the maintenance of the rest of the five agreed peace Treaties

On the other hand if Turkey as if the French Government now refuse to accept the Minorities Treaty and the Western Thrace Treaty unless these clauses in the recent Greek treaty for the protection of the French and British guarantee are suppressed

Please approach French Government without delay and urge them to waive their objection to the retention of these clauses which if suppressed may endanger the whole of treaty

(Repeated to Lausanne No 133 by W)

No 118

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Lausanne)

No 134)
Telegraphic
Foreign Office July 20 1923

YOUR telegrams Nos 297 and 298

I accept your explanation and agree that matter must be left as it stands

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No 119

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

No 230)
Telegraphic R
Foreign Office, July 20 1923

YOUR telegram No 385 of 10th June Condemnation by Turks of Ottoman Christians at Constantinople

Press report that numerous Armenians have also been condemned in connection with alleged incendiary plots.

Can you confirm

(Repeated to Lausanne No 136)

No 120

Mr Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received July 21)

(No 94)
Telegraphic
Belgrade July 20, 1923

YOUR telegram No 60

Mr Lenard's agent has shown redraft of Italian-Yugoslav agreement to French Minister who has communicated it to his colleagues Minister of Public Works has also seen it

Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet had time to study it but he will do so at once and will then communicate with French Government

French Minister has also been asked by his colleagues to inform them whether he has received any instructions from his Government

Repeated to Sir H Rumbold

No 121

Mr Hodgson to the Marquess of Kedleston — Received July 21

No 93
Confidential
Belgrade July 20, 1923

MY telegram No 92

Opposition group

Agreement is now known to have been initialled by the representatives of Italy and Yugoslavia but it is not known whether it has been signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries

French Minister has confidentially suggested that it is desirable that the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France should be instructed to discuss the agreement

Repeated to Paris

No 122

Mr Hodgson (Belgrade) to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 21)

No 1083)
Confidential
Belgrade July 20, 1923

SOVIET Government have informed Yugoslav Government that they are willing to enter into negotiations for conclusion of Russian-Yugoslav commercial treaty and have proposed that it should be concluded at Constantinople

Repeated to Angora

No 123

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received July 21)

No 380)
Telegraphic R
Constantinople July 21, 1923

YOUR Telegram No 280

Mixed Turco-Armenian commission has not yet completed its work

Armenian Patriarch has been informed that Angora Government are willing to enter into negotiations with Armenian Government for conclusion of treaty of friendship and commerce

Repeated to Tiflis No 221)

No 124

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received July 23)

(No 301)
Telegraphic
Lausanne July 21, 1923

MY telegram No 300 of 20th July

Your Lordship will understand that before the Conference can discuss with M Bompard question of entry of Russia into the Straits Convention it will be possible for the Soviet Government to take some other regularization with regard to the treaty of which the acceptance of the Russian signature was made to depend, whether by a further recognition of the present Russian Government or by some new definite decision was reached

Pressure by the Russian representatives at Conference to have this question decided before the Conference rises is explained by the desire of the Soviet Government to withdraw from the Straits Convention as soon as possible

Repeated to Paris, Rome, Belgrade, Athens, Bucharest, Sofia, Angora, Constantinople, Tiflis, Erivan, Berne, Moscow

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No 125

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received July 21)

No 302
Telegraphic
Lausanne July 21, 1923

BELGIAN Dutch and Norwegian Chargés d'Affaires

Signature of Russia to be accepted as between states will create no difficulty as regards Belgium, Holland and Norway, but Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs will not be able to sign treaty himself without consulting Belgian Government

Repeated to Paris

No 126

Mr Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received July 21)

No 695)
Telegraphic R
Paris July 21, 1923

YOUR Telegram No 289

I saw M Poincaré today and strongly urged on him to give his instructions to resident Ambassador here. He stated that Mr Bristol already received instructions to examine the question in the light of your despatches. My address has had all correct views suggested

Repeated to Lausanne

E 7592 7120 44 — No 127

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received July 23

(No 416)
My Lord
Constantinople, July 13, 1923

I HAVE the honour to report that the Russian Ambassador gave a dinner party on the 21st June at which Mr Ataturk was present, and the Russian guests included Admiral Kolchak, General Wrangel, and other well-known Russian refugees

2 The event has served as a text for extravagant press attacks on the Constantinople Agents of the Soviet Government, while a certain political significance is attributed to the fact that the leader of the Nationalist Party, Ismet Pasha, is the guest of honour

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president of the Greco-Armenian Republic to the formation of which was reported in my despatch No. 33 of the 16th January last.

3. Doubtless in the hope of further influencing the negotiations between the Turkish and Christian elements certain organs of the press have insinuated that the primary object of the Angora Government is the destruction of the Mussulman patriarchate. This view has no foundation whatever, but the contrary has been constantly asserted. These tendencies show that the chief if not the only aim of the Nationalists was to cause more by arranging beforehand what the ownerless Christian properties for the destruction of the latter by fire, subject of course to the payment to the guardians of a considerable share of the proceeds of the insurance policies. This has already been done in the Bolshevik countries, which have likewise established the practice of paying a number of recent fires at most of which the damage was limited thanks to the assistance of the Public Auxiliary Fire Brigade.

4. The agreement is nevertheless unfortunate at the present time, as it comes as a relief to those who are already striving to bring about a real improvement in the relations between the Turkish Government and Christian subjects.

I have &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

Acting Chief Commissioner

E 7603/52/44] No. 28

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 17.)

(No. 7.) *Pera, June 12, 1923.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that during the absence of Mgr. Maximos, the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchate has begun to study the question of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's relations with the Turkish Government, and Mgr. Nicolas, Archbishop of Chalcedon, has been appointed to act as Locum Tenens during the absence of Mgr. Maximos.

2. The Turkish Government's attitude towards the Patriarchate with regard to the Turkish nationalist movement has been referred to in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 1 of the 3rd January last, and in Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 1 of the 4th January last. Mgr. Nicolas has since called at the Embassy and has given me a brief account of his interview with Mgr. Maximos, which took place on the 9th instant. Mgr. Maximos, who is a Greek by birth, is said to have expressed to Mgr. Nicolas his fear that the Turkish Government intended to interfere in the election of the Patriarch, owing to the fact that the Metropolitan of Smyrna, who is a Turkish subject, is one of the candidates. Mgr. Maximos is also reported to have said that he had received a telegram from Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, to the effect that the Turkish Government would not interfere in the election of the Patriarch, provided that the candidate elected was a Turkish subject.

3. H. Holy Synod of the Mussulman community has also protested against the Turkish authorities' attempt to exploit for their own political purposes the Patriarchate, to proceed to the election of a successor to Mgr. Nicolas, who died on the 19th instant. It is stated that the Greeks, who have had to put up with the Turks for the last two years, are now determined to forget the favours which they have received from the Turks in the past, and to take their revenge for the sufferings which they have undergone at the hands of the Turks during the last few years.

4. Meanwhile the Patriarchate is anxious to know what the future relations of the Greek community with the Turkish Government will be, and I propose, with your Lordship's approval, to inform Mgr. Nicolas that His Majesty's Government, while recognising the privileges of the clergy which are consistent with the new democratic régime, are opposed to the exercise by them of political functions or the interference in matters of a purely religious organisation.

5. The question of the Patriarchate has also aroused considerable interest in the Turkish Press, and I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of an article which appeared in the Turkish newspaper *Vakit* on the 7th instant, and which is typical of the tone of the articles which have appeared in the Turkish Press on the subject of the Patriarchate. I have also the honour to enclose herewith a translation of an article which appeared in the Turkish newspaper *Tevhid-i-Efkiar* on the 9th instant, and which is typical of the tone of the articles which have appeared in the Turkish Press on the subject of the Patriarchate. This article, which is signed by Ahmed Emin, a well-known Turkish publicist, is entitled "The Question of the Patriarchate."

I have &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

Acting Chief Commissioner.

Enclosure No. 1

Translation of Article from "Vakit" of June 7, 1923.

THE question of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has again come to the front. The Mgr. Maximos, patriarchal locum tenens, has sought to regulate pro memoria with Mgr. Nicolas, Archbishop of Chalcedon, the question of the election of the new Patriarch. It is said that the Turkish Government has intervened in this question.

It is stated that the Government will not interfere in the election of the Patriarch, provided that the candidate elected is a Turkish subject. It is also stated that the Government will not interfere in the election of the Patriarch, provided that the candidate elected is a Turkish subject.

I have &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

Acting Chief Commissioner.

No. 129

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received July 28, 1923.)

(No. 303.) (By Bag.)

Telegraphic. *Lausanne, July 21, 1923.*

Your telegram No. 129.

I acted when protesting against the arrest of the Greeks for the charges that the Greeks had engaged the Turks last autumn at the Armistice Conference, but the Turks had granted an amnesty to all the Greeks at the Armistice Conference, but the Turks had granted an amnesty to all the Greeks at the Armistice Conference.

We had ourselves, moreover insisted on this latter the case of Turkish subjects arrested or condemned by our authorities

At the meeting of the committee on 17th July however I made a fresh protest against action being taken by the Turks against Turkish subjects who had served the British army under combatant conditions and I will before leaving Lausanne endeavour to obtain from Ismet Pasha a promise that Turkish subjects so employed by the British military authorities on 20th November last will not be molested on that account I will take the line that this is not a case really requiring urgent action as all the conditions of the occupation were determined some time before that date by the Mudania Convention and it was not until that the occupying forces should evacuate Constantinople

As regards the second point raised in your telegram under reference I stated in committee on 17th July the view of His Majesty's Government that the Amnesty Declaration would come into force as from the date fixed for the evacuation and I made a statement to Ismet that the Turkish Government would act in accordance with this principle

The issue of the individuals mentioned in Mr Ryan's despatch No 180 of 13th June, presents a certain difficulty and M Venizelos has mentioned Ismet Pasha to agree to an addition to the protocol relative to the evacuation of Karaagatch and those two names providing that in the case of these three places no action shall be taken against the inhabitants in respect of any offences prior to date

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No 130

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 23)

(No 305
Telegraphic) R *Lausanne July 23, 1923*

MY telegram No 303

Mr Ryan has discussed 21st with a member of Turkish delegation who has been in charge of last week's protest of Turkish subjects employed by British army since 20th November 1922 Turkish delegation maintain that it would be unfortunate to prosecute such persons but, as I anticipated suggested that matter be left until next meeting with Allies Mr Ryan has also reported that natural question of responsibility for losses subsequent to 20th November when we on our side had resisted by evading from amenity, were imperial acts which was in contradiction to service rendered troops whose position had been enforced by evacuation of Mudania whether in this respect right line was taken by Ismet is not for me to say In view of this I should be obliged if you would let me know whether I am to state I should be satisfied if Ismet gave me written assurance that he shared my view of principle that Turkish subjects in question ought not to be molested or would promise to discuss details with General Harington or his passage through Constantinople

Ismet has this morning sent me a verbal message on this subject I think I must state to the Turkish delegates that I wish to refer matter to General Harington to see if matter is satisfactorily settled before I receive letters of recall and I shall get me a new if strong line which we ourselves took regarding Greek property Turks against Allied forces subsequent to 20th November

(Repeated to Constantinople)

No 131

The Marquess Curzon Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold Lausanne

No 140)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office July 23, 1923*

YOUR telegram No 299 of 20th Reparations
arrears of deliveries and that we should [illegible] payments of
cheques and coupons

(Repeated to Paris No 207)

No 132

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 24)

No 308,
Telegraphic, R *Lausanne, July 24 1923*

PEACE Treaty and seventeen other instruments forming final act were signed this afternoon at plenary session which began at 3 P M

Swiss President presided Ismet Government having maintained their attitude that delegates could sign only as witnesses American observer was present, but refrained from signing final act as being not entitled to do so

French withdrew yesterday but in proposed suppression of preamble of Straits Convention Italy pledging to arbitrate guarantee of Greek Constitutional rights signed today together with declaration providing for ratification Russian with Peace Treaty of 1921 Greek Minorities Treaty and Western Thrace Treaty signature may be expressed in terms of second paragraph, Article 15 of latter and abandonment of interests ceded by retrocession of Karagatch to Turkey

Please Lausanne Courier by Simplon Express and will arrive in London tomorrow afternoon addressed by Ryan Payne Mackinnon Cotesworth

(Repeated to Constantinople Athens and Sofia)

No 133

Mr Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 25)

(No 70
Telegraphic) By Bag
Paris July 24, 1923

M ANDRE TARDIEU writes in Echo National and Petit Journal and Westminster Gazette article entitled England Mistress of the Straits M Tardieu quotes letter received from one of the most distinguished members of the French community at Constantinople declaring that French influence in Turkey is entirely passed away to the British who in fact, have become the protectors Christians in the East Only Jews foreigners assist whenever an Armenian or Greek is molested by Turks or they are employed to insult by the cause the British will remain at Chanak and will possess the gates of the Mediterranean

M Tardieu continues I was attentive to the French policy which sent out Turkey and which England now allows a new chance in the Straits He exclaims to exhaust England will make two weeks, consent to abandon that position French troops that had given England preponderance in the East and made her mistress of the Straits

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E 7722 1 44

No 134

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July)

(No 275 Confidential)
My Lord *Lausanne July 24, 1923*

It may be useful if I place on record as succinctly as possible my impression of the course of the conference which has just ended one of the various factors which contributed to shape the course of our proceedings I think I noted that this was always my view right from the commencement of our proceedings or that the conference was not destined to succeed from the beginning

I will be remembered that French policy was largely responsible for the suspension of the proceedings at the first phase of the conference M Poincaré stood pledged to the policy of M Franklin Boullon a policy bitterly opposed by every Turk, without regard to the inevitable effect on the future financial and economic interests of France in Turkey The Italians were in the same predicament their interests at stake, were insignificant to enable them to play a really useful part in the proceedings Italy was thereby frustrated by their unfortunate recent intervention in connection with the declaration providing for the safeguards for foreigners

[E 7815 7158 44] No 135.

Mr Dormer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (received July 31)

(No 94) *Papal Palace, Rome, July 21, 1923*

My Lord

ON receipt of your Lordship's despatch No 1 of the 11th instant I informed Cardinal Gasparri this morning of the position with regard to the French claim to the protectorate of Catholics in the East a question which had also been raised through the proposed appointment of Mgr Fumasoni Biondi as Apostolic Delegate at Constantinople

His Eminence told me that the French Embassy had already proposed that the French Ambassador at Constantinople should go to receive Mgr Filippi on his arrival accompany him to the cathedral and there receive his credentials as at a *Te Deum* Mgr Filippi would afterwards call on the French Ambassador and otherwise the other members of the Diplomatic Corps His Eminence added that it seemed to him that to avoid difficulties which might arise a Hanna representative should be present at the *Te Deum* The Vatican would then confine itself to what was decided on Sir Rennell Rodd would be informed by the Vatican Secretariat of State and the Holy See would reserve to itself the right to withdraw its request if the ceremony should assume a political character

I then suggested that the example of Great Britain Germany and Italy who have all of late years received Papal Nuncios as ambassadors should be followed by France and that the Holy See should give up the privileges which France has been previously granted by the Holy See and which France herself has always refused to accept by that concession to Papal claims as France stands to-day she is on the same footing as Great Britain Germany and Italy and therefore has no grounds for complaint whereas by the present arrangement she enjoys certain privileges which are denied to the other Powers mentioned I pointed out that the Holy See would be in a position to withdraw from the present arrangement without any loss of prestige and that the Holy See would thereby gain the goodwill of the Angora Government which would be of great importance to the Holy See in the future

His Eminence replied that the question of the treaty of Lausanne and the Capitulations would be taken up when the French claim to the protectorate would automatically lapse I then drew Mgr Filippi's name out of my waistcoat pocket to which he replied that he was a Neapolitan

My conversation has already caused the Osservatore Romano that Mgr Filippi would go to Constantinople

I have, &c
(for H. DORMER)

E 8317 199 44, No 136

Acting Consul General Lybaert to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (received August 2)

(No 72) *Smyrna, July 21, 1923*

My Lord

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the 1st instant of Foreign Office Circular No 2 respecting the return of refugees from Malta to Smyrna and to submit the following sketch of the situation in Smyrna and its influence on foreigners —

2 In September 1920 the Turks were not yet in a spirit of Turkish nationality to pay new taxes of any kind of the most punitive type who expressed itself in sort to the rich and the neglect of the exclusive There was a real desire at that time to avoid all of the extravagant excesses of the past and to foster foreign trade and foreigners were denounced as the parties who were responsible for many past abominations the past which were to be relegated away to permit of a genuine future for Turkey in purely Turkish lines No public credit was claimed for the existence of foreigners, even immovable who ever possessed or whenever trained Turkish capitalists and the necessity to encourage the replacing of foreign by Turkish enterprises and the overcrowding of Angora as it happened that Constantinople has been exposed to all sorts of obstacles of every sort have been placed in the way of foreign traders

3 This attitude has moderated greatly since last September in proportion as the excitement of victory is gradually subsiding in Turkey's internal problems and as the proprietors have realized that the most important thing for the future of trade is "goods" to assert itself for trading purposes at the Turks of the coast see that Turkey's finances are still flowing but the Anatolian proprietors of cotton see the Anatolian peasant at present getting as strong as its ever has The foreign postal war remains unsettled until Constantinople at the Turks to submit a decent report on position from Angora and the Allied proposal of 1st August Recognized that Turkey has not made political stability in the long run how does two contradict one

4 Mustapha Kemal is convinced the extreme weakness of all power in Angora has resulted in the reserve with which the offers of peace have been met Angora was supposed to have accepted the Allied terms as a basis for negotiations but it is now clear that they regarded the terms as a basis for discussion and not as an ultimatum which they were to accept without alteration Mustapha Kemal's object is to protect Turkey from foreign influence and to secure the full benefits of the Turkish victory over the Greeks and to obtain from the Powers the abolition of the Capitulations and the recognition of Turkey as a fully sovereign state

5 Mustapha Kemal has always been opposed to the Capitulations and has declared that they must be abolished before Turkey can enter the League of Nations Angora has also declared that it will not recognize any Consular Jurisdiction over Turkish subjects and that it will not allow foreign Consuls to exercise any control over the Turkish police or Turkish courts Angora has also declared that it will not recognize any foreign Consular Jurisdiction over Turkish subjects and that it will not allow foreign Consuls to exercise any control over the Turkish police or Turkish courts

6 Mustapha Kemal has always been opposed to the Capitulations and has declared that they must be abolished before Turkey can enter the League of Nations Angora has also declared that it will not recognize any Consular Jurisdiction over Turkish subjects and that it will not allow foreign Consuls to exercise any control over the Turkish police or Turkish courts

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9 As for those persons who do not fall within any of the above classes, the Legislature is only willing to extend to Malta where there is no prospect of their being employed at Smyrna until they have given security in case unlicensed traffic possibly to be carried on. I am to add that I am to return to Smyrna the Petition which you transmitted to me with your Despatch No. 1 of the 1st instant, and to request that you will inform the Petitioners that the Legislature is not disposed to grant the relief which they solicit, as it is considered that the Act of 1837 affords sufficient protection to the Inhabitants of Malta against the introduction of persons of suspicious character from the Levant.

I have &c.
(signed) W. FITZROY

E 7801 199 44] No. 57

Mr. Hunter to the Marquess of Normanby (Received July 21)

No. 44
My Lord

Constantinople, July 21, 1839

IT is generally believed that the new Ministry will not long remain in office. The Turkish Government is in a very unsettled state, and the post, after a temporary rise, has fallen to its lowest point. The Sultan is said to be very ill, and the Assembly will be called upon, first, to deal with the question of the succession to the throne, and, secondly, to discuss the Commercial Treaty.

I have not the slightest doubt of the ratification of the Treaty by the Sultan, but I feel less confidence in the Assembly. The Ministers, who are the Deputies for Egypt, Syria, and the Provinces, are opposed to the Treaty, and will probably be supported by a majority of the Assembly. The Sultan is very much pleased with the Treaty, and has expressed his intention of sending a Turkish Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, but I am not aware that any steps have been taken towards the appointment.

2 Nevertheless, I am happy to say that the Commercial Convention will be presented to the Assembly, and I have no doubt that it will be ratified by a large majority.

3 The Sultan is very much pleased with the Treaty, and has expressed his intention of sending a Turkish Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, but I am not aware that any steps have been taken towards the appointment.

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I have &c.
(signed) H. G. BULWER

E 7807 199 44 No. 58

Mr. Hunter to the Marquess of Normanby (Received July 21)

No. 44
My Lord

Constantinople, July 21, 1839

THE new Assembly is to assemble in the month of September, when it will receive from the Government of Smyrna a report of the proceedings of the Commission appointed to inquire into the complaints reported against the Governor of Smyrna, by the Greek Deputies of the Kerasut Province, in the Assembly of 1837.

2 Nevertheless, I am happy to say that the Commercial Convention will be presented to the Assembly, and I have no doubt that it will be ratified by a large majority.

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I have &c.
(signed) H. G. BULWER

[illegible] last week a translation of [illegible] Constantinople Konakst [illegible] has been sent [illegible] Augustus [illegible] to give [illegible] difficulty

[illegible] from [illegible] the [illegible] The [illegible] was [illegible] about [illegible] would [illegible] Malta [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] Asia [illegible] assess [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] knowledge [illegible]

I have &c.
(For) W. ERQUHART

[E 7808 199 44 No. 45

[illegible]

No. 442)
My Lord,

[illegible]

I have &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON

[illegible]

I have &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON
[illegible]

No 140

Mr Bentinck (No 139) to Mr Henderson (Constantinople) *Repeated to Foreign Office Received July 30)*

No 275)
Telegraphic) R

Athens July 30, 1923

BRITISH consul-general at Smyrna telegraphs that he has obtained at Brousa where Turkish troops are demanding immediate evacuation

Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs confirms that orders have been given for the same immediate evacuation and that precise details of withdrawal of troops will be communicated to Allied Powers

Nothing will happen to prejudice the rights of Greek minority in Asia Minor

Greek Government only attempting to bring pressure to bear on Turkish Government [illegible] In spite of their efforts Greek authorities do not think that it will be possible to persuade inhabitants to remain on island

Have you any information?

No 141

Mr Henderson to the Marquess of Kedleston (Received August 1)

(No 401)
Telegraphic)

Constantinople August 1, 1923

Your Telegram No 230

Interests involved largely explain attitude with regard to claims and Angora

Chief difficulties with Allies regard claims are not quite claims and Smyrna Turks would probably accept reduction but Kemalists demand abolition of Capitulations Turkish subjects benefit by some American treaties Policy of Angora appears to be to obtain American recognition generally assume treaties will be renewed Allies would have been willing to resume negotiations elsewhere but Angora insisted that this would be regarded as surrender Latest proposal to discuss outstanding matters in connection with Lausanne Treaty at Geneva Allies would be willing to resume necessary to go away I had already telegraphed to Angora

Upon the whole I am inclined to think that the best course at present is to wait and see what effect the Turkish attack upon Smyrna will have upon Angora Government Should Angora not accept Lord Curzon's proposal to defer negotiations

[illegible] the meantime it seems advisable that Grand National Assembly will meet on the 11th August and that Elections should be completed by August 15th August sitting of Assembly would be necessary to ratify Treaty and proceedings opened on 24th August which was therefore originally fixed

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E 7948 7734 44]

No 142

The Marquess of Kedleston to Mr Phillips (Lausanne) (No 151) (for Mr Phillips' information)

Foreign Office August 2, 1923

Sir

Now that the treaty negotiations between the Allies and Turkey are suspended until the National Assembly at Angora has expressed its views I think it necessary to decide what is to be done with the Turkish delegation at Lausanne

I should be glad to receive your views on this question at your earliest convenience, but in the meantime His Majesty's Government desire that the Japanese Government cease the supply of munitions of war to Turkey

[illegible] each [illegible] will be regarded by all the other Powers as a breach of the [illegible] and will be treated accordingly

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

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the Turkish area of the present Turkish State appears no longer to mean such concessions which would hardly be carried to any other state on a similar footing On the other hand the importance of the point which the Angora representatives will certainly raise Turkey must be thought to outweigh the above-mentioned objections and to justify to retain on the Turkish delegation

His Majesty's Government therefore desire to know whether the Italian Government propose to do the same and the conclusion of peace with a belligerent is only that of paving the way for the establishment through the intermediary of a Charge d'Affaires with a view to [illegible] whatever scale of the diplomatic agents may be decided upon by the Great Powers It will probably be thought desirable that a Charge d'Affaires should remain at Constantinople but it is important that Angora should not be able to represent that Allies are [illegible] to recognise Turkey [illegible] Should this view be shared by the Allied Governments His Majesty's Government would propose to have a confidential representative at Angora with instructions to [illegible] the object merely of [illegible] the [illegible] of Turkish Government with a view to [illegible] Turkish Government with the understanding that [illegible] Turkish Government with a view to [illegible] Angora Government

I shall be glad if you will [illegible] to the Government to which you are accredited the foregoing proposals and to ascertain the views of their early convenience

A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Paris on the matter of the foregoing for communication to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tokio

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No 143

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

No 238)
Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office August 2, 1923

My Despatches Nos 156 and 445 of 24th and 27th July [illegible] British reports in Smyrna

You should point out strongly to the Turkish authorities that it is highly improper for the Turkish Government to refuse to carry out any of the obligations which the Turkish Government have undertaken under the treaty which I have particularly in mind Articles 72 and 73 of the Treaty of Sèvres Moreover this against the [illegible] rests the whole [illegible] treaties [illegible] treaties and [illegible] Europe [illegible] all the interests [illegible] such [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No. 145

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Rendel. (Athens)

(No. 1253.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 9, 1923.*
YOUR Telegrams Nos. 275 to 277 of 30th July: Inhabitants of Imbros and Tenedos.

A total of about 400 Greeks have settled on the island during the last few months, and it is feared that these people are in a state of great destitution, for the crops have been practically a failure this year.

As the Greeks in Imbros and Tenedos are Greek subjects, they are entitled to the protection of the Greek Government, and His Majesty's Government do not propose to take any action in the matter.

E 8007 52 44 No. 146

Mr. Rendel to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received August 7.

No. 586.)
My Lord, *Athens, July 26, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I received from M. Venizelos a communication of which the following is a translation:

"Mr. President,

"I have the honour to inform you that the Greek Government have decided to send a delegation to Lausanne to represent Greece at the Conference which is to meet there on the 31st July, 1923, for the purpose of concluding peace with Turkey.

"The Greek Government have appointed as members of the delegation MM. Rhallis, Politis, Caclamanos, Maximos, Papadakis, Kaphandaris, Rentis, Diomedes, Kyrou, Kalfoff, Kalogeropoulos, Kanellopoulos, Kyriakides

pro ort sh d all Greek ewspapers also t peace a great defeat or the A nes "even t afe zeros"

7 Politi cal Ve sest nt Mr exas t ne of the most nobrated of the Greek ne spapers says t e ect t e of ussia e w rma n t s ory as the sec st of all ur es Ful a e ected pe ce proc edings have ommenced a F ce th ele tions e will a fort t e th t A ra ca ers will b F ce th ele tions e will a fort t e th t A ra ca ers will n Fo ce th ele tions e will a fort t e th t A ra ca ers will b F ce th ele tions e will a fort t e th t A ra ca ers will

E 8004 199 44]

No 148

Mr H derson to the Marquess o Kedeston Rece ved August 7

No 45"
M Lord

I HAVE the h nour to for your rdship that the g ve ment s Irish Assembl s ed for the 1st August appears w l ha to definitely ostpo ed I gard to the st s pressi w s and nat re ceived in ch se s ge t s ssible t w f r ass t t ha s to a fair t ar a ge ments

2 ssess t sol a ew t the ex sted and fr pe tly ex ssed ncer t he ass t be ssible t e ss f Ir sh A ce s f ce t he ass t be ssible t e ss f Ir sh A ce s f ce t he ass t be ssible t e ss f Ir sh A ce s f ce

E 8081 7734 44

No 150

Mr Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received August

(No 1864)
My Lord *Paris, August 7, 1923*

WITH reference to my despatch No 1851 of the 31st instant I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a letter from M de Peretti de la Rocca suggesting that steps should be taken to ensure that the Allied representatives in Turkey vacate the seat of the present Nationalist Government

The French Government consider that in view of the importance of the dollars with which the Allied representatives will have to deal it would be highly desirable that they should have the use of Assistants

The French Government trust that in the interests of peace and of the assistance which Constantinople is to afford to local representatives of the Allied Powers at Angora, or wherever the seat of the Nationalist Government may be, they will agree that by one route or another the Allied Staff should be withdrawn from Constantinople within a period of a few weeks which should however be agreed by the Allies as soon as the interval of a few weeks will permit, the French Government to do the same upon the return of General Pellé to Constantinople after the departure of General Harington

I have, &c
EMILE DARU

Enclosure in No 150

Monsieur de Peretti de la Rocca to Mr Phipps

Paris, August 6, 1923

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

M POINCARÉ a pris connaissance de votre lettre du 31 juillet dernier et de la note qui y était annexée relative aux garanties de sécurité à donner aux Puissances Alliées actuellement représentées à Constantinople

Tout en admettant que la présence de ces représentants auprès du Gouvernement Turc ne puisse plus être considérée comme nécessaire, le Président du Conseil estime qu'il serait préférable de ne pas brusquer les choses et de laisser à l'Amirauté Britannique le soin de régler avec le Commissaire Général Harington les questions d'ordre technique que soulève l'évacuation de Constantinople par les troupes alliées

Veuillez &
LE PERETTI DE LA ROCCA

No 151

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received August 8

No 196
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople August 7, 1923*

My telegram No 195
Ismet Pasha has agreed to receive with Allied representatives on 12th August at Ismid, but not at Angora His letter is dated 12th August
Ismet's letter to me No 2 of 7th August is being posted to-day This will be discussed with Harington

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No 152

Sir H Rumbold (No 89) to Mr Bentinck (Athens) (Repeated to Foreign Office Received August 8)

No 197 *Constantinople August 8, 1923*
(Telegraphic) R

My telegram No 196 to Foreign Office
I raised, pursuant to these Greek refugees with Admiral yesterday He agreed with me that we were not to be deterred by fear that other obligations might be incurred but that we were to be guided by the question whether the Turkish authorities have done their utmost to assist us I fear that this is a fact which must be faced and which it is useless to try and get round The best course would therefore be for Greek Government to do its utmost to persuade Near East Relief to continue feeding these refugees for further period of say three months with the Greek Government might guarantee to arrange for their accommodation in Greece

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No 153

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Child (Washington)

(No 256)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office, August 8, 1923*

My telegram No 76 of 3rd August to Turkey: Status of diplomatic representatives at Angora

Please make similar communication to United States Government mutatis mutandis omitting paragraph 3 where reference is made to conclusion of peace

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No 154

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

No 210
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office, August 8, 1923*

YOUR despatch No 1 of 30th July: Withdrawal of Allied warships from Smyrna

I agree with your views in paragraph 4

As soon as your Allied colleagues are instructed by their Governments to withdraw their warships from Smyrna you will be authorised to inform Turkish authorities that His Majesty's Government propose to withdraw their warships as well

(Repeated to Paris No 298 and Rome No 211)

No 155

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No 299) and Rome (No 212)

(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office, August 8, 1923*

My telegram No 212 to Constantinople of 8th August: Withdrawal of Allied warships from Smyrna

Please ascertain Government to which you are accredited whether they agree with views expressed to Mr Henderson and inform us as soon as possible of result of their representations at Constantinople

(Repeated to Constantinople No 213)

No 156

Mr Beaumont to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 9)

(No 284)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, August 8, 1923*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 405

Ministry of Refugees informs me that Greek Government have just arranged to transport 7,000 refugees from Constantinople to Greece on 15th August on understanding that remaining refugees will number about 20,000 shall be allowed to remain where they are at present and continue to be maintained by Near East Relief

(Repeated to Constantinople, No 148)

No 157

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

No 245)
Telegraphic , R *Foreign Office August 9 1923*

YOUR telegram No 405 of 7th August Refugees

In view of inability of His Majesty's Government to make any further financial contribution to Near East Relief it would be impossible for them to make any effective appeal to American Near East Relief or even to suggest to League of Nations desirability of guaranteeing any further expenditure which Near East Relief might be induced to make Possibly an appeal by yourself to the Near East Relief might be more likely to be effective than appeal by His Majesty's Government

(Repeated to Athens, No 130

No 158

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

(No 246)
Telegraphic , *Foreign Office August 9 1923*

YOUR telegram No 406 of 7th August Ismet Pasha

If suitable opportunity presents itself it would be well that you should mention incidentally and without laying undue emphasis on the matter our intention of withdrawing cruiser from Smyrna on ratification by Angora This is on the supposition that the Allies will have agreed see my telegram No 242 of 8th August) before you see Ismet

You should also impress upon the Turkish responsibilities in respect of the refugees in Constantinople and the Black Sea ports Local matters, of which Admiral Gueydon Haroington can furnish the particulars might also be raised

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No 159

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 11)

No 409 ,
Telegraphic , *Constantinople August 11, 1923*

YOUR telegram No 246

My Allied colleagues being without instructions I was unable to refer to Smyrna question

(R) I raised with Ismet the question of Ottoman Greek refugees, and though he would not commit himself he promised to see what could be done with a view to alleviating the evil

Ismet seemed generally anxious that evacuation should take place without incident in order that a impression might be good I told him that we all shared this desire that the last phase of satisfactory might have decisive effect on future relations and that the Turks would therefore be well advised to refrain from any excessive demands

He told me that he would submit treaty to Assembly within a few days of his return to Angora and gave me the impression that the Assembly would ratify by 25th August at the latest He expressed the hope that the Powers especially Great Britain would also ratify as soon as possible and hinted that Turkey would judge of her own friends by their readiness in this respect

Ismet left Smyrna particularly after noon to-day I gave him a friendly message from you and he begged me to thank you and to convey to you expression of his sincere regret [illegible] R)

No 160

Mr Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (Received August 12)

(No 346)
(Telegraphic) R *Washington, August 11, 1923*

YOUR telegram No 256

Secretary of State of whom I enquired to-day said that nomination of representative rests with President, whom he must consult Meanwhile, he could not express definite opinion but he thought that there should be no difficulty in connection with Allied Governments on both points He would be glad to learn confidentially views of His Majesty's Government as to status and what State or States they had in mind for possible inclusion with Turkish territory under the same diplomatic representative He saw no objection to the resumption of diplomatic relations by Chargés d'Affaires

As regards place of residence he presumed that Constantinople would be the ultimate seat of the Turkish Government but thought that while it was still at Angora idea of local representative there should relate to representative at Constantinople would be feasible unless character of questions to be discussed rendered presence of high diplomatic officials at Angora essential

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No 161

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received August 12)

No 412
Telegraphic , D *Constantinople, August 12 1923*

FOLLOWING is identic telegram from three High Commissioners

Enemy banks at Constantinople were occupied and controlled by Allied military authorities in January 1919 Later control passed to High Commissioners It has continued in accordance with instructions given by Allied Governments in October 1919 Under which decision regarding retention and liquidation of enemy banks was deferred but conclusion of treaty with Turkey Only Brussa and Adrianople branches were closed

We are doubtful whether article 72 of treaty gives Allied Governments power to proceed to-day to closing down and liquidation of Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Orient Bank the only enemy establishments at Constantinople of which we hold duplicate keys for purposes of control But in view of importance which application of this measure before entry into force of treaty would have from point of view of Allied banks we feel bound to draw attention to this question and request instructions

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E 8246 343 44] No 162

Mr Clerk to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 13)

(No 260 Confidential)
My Lord *Tangier, August 2 1923*

IN accordance with your Lordship's telegram No 4 of the 26th ultimo I have the honour to report that I met Mr Kerr-Cross at whom news from the interior filters through [illegible] consequent on the Sultan of Turkey and the pretender to the throne having been ordered to stay at Regulars and with the consent of France

I asked Mr Kerr-Cross who spoke to me in the most unfriendly manner as to what he was doing there and why he had not reported himself to me as usually the case when Britishers were in the district Mr Kerr-Cross declined to give any reason for his visit to Qsar el Kebir but said that he had been sent by the Sultan to [illegible] the Caid to be present at the ceremony of the Sultan's visit to the Qsar el Kebir Mosque and to [illegible] to the Caid the Sultan's thanks for the part he had taken in the Ouezzane dynasty to that title pretender, it having been originally conferred, but as a part of the sorcery of his subjugation those Sultans had not attempted to confer it with Morocco

3 I do understand that the few isolated attempts made in the past by various Sultans of Turkey to bring Morocco more closely into relations with Constantinople were invariably repulsed

4 Prayers are consequently not offered up in any mosques in Morocco on behalf of any Caliph

5 In the subjoined instructions of the Foreign Office the name of the Sultan of Morocco is mentioned in the Friday prayers as a reasonable sign that the establishment of the French protectorate is purely nominal in character and in form

6 In connection with this matter it may be of interest to report to your Lordship the substance of a short conversation recently held between Mr Irwin a high Moorish official, which I gave in his own words

During our conversation I referred to the recent changes in Turkey, and asked what their effect was in Mahommedan principles in this country

He replied that, although the Moors were naturally greatly interested in a Moslem Power regaining its independence, the action of the Angora Government in abolishing the Caliphate and other spiritual functions was entirely contrary to the principles of the Islamic faith and had caused great revulsion of feeling amongst them and the most orthodox elements in Morocco were prepared to go to any length rather than see their Sultan submit to the Angora Assembly

As regards the Caliphate, which is strongly held by the Moslems as a sign of the very first attribute of Islam, he informed me that a selection of names had been submitted to the Angora Government and that shortly a meeting would take place choosing Mecca, Algeria, Tunis and India with a view to their all agreeing at the Conference at Angora, would be made request. He also thought Abdul Aziz, the present Sultan of Morocco, would be made request. He also thought Abdul Aziz, the present Sultan of Morocco, would be among those two names would fall themselves or some other

When our conversation had proceeded thus far we were interrupted, but he asked me to call on him again shortly to continue further conversation on the subject and I gathered that his attitude would be equally conciliatory in this respect

I have &c
WILLIAM GODRINGTON

[E 8237 7158 44] N 163

Mr Bonar Law to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (received August 1)

No 1
My Lord *Downing Street, August 1, 1923*

THE Cabinet Secretary's Note attached to this meeting at M Jonnart on the restriction on the free movement between the French zone of Occupation in Essen and the unoccupied territory of the Rhineland. The Cardinal Note had been a preliminary to the Treaty, he could not express an opinion but that M Jonnart's action was all good in that neither the capture nor the threat were contrary to the Treaty and that the Allied Powers had no express agreement to the French proposals. However, there was no objection to the French action provided that when the capital sum was paid the whole of the Rhineland was restored to the German Government under the Law of Nations. This would not apply to British or Italian subjects in Essen as they would for instance, if any. The point was borne in mind and noted for reference to the Treaty

These observations the French Ambassador would be informed that he would inform his Government

I have &c
CECIL HARMER

[E 8229 199 44] No 1

Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (received August 31)

No 161)
My Lord *Constantinople, August 7, 1923*

I HAD the honour in my telegram No 156 of the 3rd August to inform your Lordship that the recent meeting of the Angora Assembly had been referred to the 11th instant

Only some sixty deputies attended the Assembly on the 2nd August, the date originally fixed for the opening, although the 100 of the new Deputies were already in Angora at the time. Of these sixty, seventy were new deputies who had not secured re-election. Mustafa Pasha, the Vice-President of the Assembly, acting in accordance with the terms of the Government, foreign intervention, the above postponement of the meeting was however said to be due to the fact that the Assembly would not be ready to start work before the 10th instant. It is possible, therefore, that the Assembly will be postponed for a few days after the 11th

Mustafa Kemal Pasha will return to Angora on the 12th instant from Smyrna on the occasion of the opening of the Assembly. He will be met at the railway station by a great crowd and a great ceremonial is attached by the press to all his movements. The programme of the first days of the session will be drawn up by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Chief Secretary of the Assembly, who will then submit it to the Government for approval. The first business will be the election of the President of the Assembly, and it is thought that Mustafa Kemal Pasha will be re-elected. The Government will then resign and Mustafa Kemal Pasha will form a new Ministry. It is possible, however, that the Assembly will be postponed for a few days after the 11th

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I have reason to believe that the Government will be faced by a difficult situation in the Assembly. Of the 100 new Deputies elected, 70 are said to be opposed to the policy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. By the terms of the first Article of the Constitution of the Assembly, the Government is responsible to the Assembly and the Assembly is responsible to the people. In this way the Assembly would be able to control the Government. The Assembly would be able to control the Government. The Assembly would be able to control the Government. The

high rank who remain opposition to Mustafa Kemal are said to have secret numbers of the division which is reported to have the support of other influential Opposition elements.

8. After so many years of almost continuous war there must be a great deal of matters requiring settlement in respect of which no exact statistical information is available, but I do not think that the state of affairs in this respect is such as to justify His Majesty's Government in withholding recognition of the Angora Government on this account. The Foreign Office instructions reported by the previous Government that the question of all other questions to be left to the reserved for negotiation between the representatives of the Allied Powers and the Angora Government should not be allowed to hold up the settlement of the Near East question as a whole is, I presume, still in force, and I do not see what steps will be taken by Mustafa Kemal which would justify His Majesty's Government in refusing to deal with the representatives of the Angora Government.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

No. 165

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 13.*)

No. 152
(Telegraphic) R
Rome, August 12, 1923

YOUR telegram No. 969.

Italian Government are in hands of a *point* Ambassador but will give me their official views later.

It is probable that Mr. Grigg will be the representative.

No. 166

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. *Received August 15.*

No. 153
(Telegraphic) R
Rome, August 14, 1923

YOUR telegram No. 213.

I spoke to Signor Schanzer on the 13th. Russia, the Straits question, Constantinople will be discussed at the Allied Turkish Conference at Lausanne and Italy would like to be represented. Mussolini will be Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of the Conference.

No. 167

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. *Received August 15.*

No. 174
Telegraphic R
Rome, August 15, 1923

MY telegram No. 153.

Jordan has signed note to-day after considerable hesitation, which I have seen this morning is original of which draft I forwarded in place left blank above reports signature of Mussolini and Jordan has signed in place left blank above reports signature of Mussolini and Jordan has signed in place left blank above reports signature of Mussolini and Jordan has signed

de biens mobiliers. En ce qui concerne l'acquisition, la possession et la disposition des biens immobiliers, les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront, à charge de réciprocité sur le territoire de l'autre partie, du traitement accordé ou éventuellement accordé aux étrangers par les lois de la situation des dits biens. En conséquence ils pourront librement disposer de leur propriété par vente, donation, échange, testament ou autrement, et leur héritier ou légataire, quelle que soit sa nationalité, sera admis à succéder à cette propriété et à en prendre possession, soit personnellement, soit par mandataire agissant pour son compte, dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants de la partie où les biens sont situés, sans avoir à payer dans l'un ou l'autre cas d'autres droits ou taxes que ceux auxquels seraient assujettis les ressortissants de cette dernière partie.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'ester en justice devant tous les tribunaux, tant pour défendre que pour poursuivre leurs droits, dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants du pays, aussi longtemps qu'ils se conformeront aux lois qui y sont établies.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit de louer des maisons, des manufactures et des magasins nécessaires à leurs résidences et à l'exercice légal de leur commerce, et ils seront traités à cet égard comme les ressortissants du pays, pourvu qu'ils se conforment aux lois et règlements qui y sont établis.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes ne seront soumis, sur le territoire de l'autre, à aucun service militaire quelconque, ni à aucune contribution en remplacement de service militaire.

Aucun impôt ou charge d'une nature quelconque ne sera imposé par l'une des hautes parties contractantes aux ressortissants de l'autre, sur le territoire de cette dernière, à des conditions plus onéreuses que celles qui sont ou pourront être imposées aux ressortissants du pays ou à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'association pour tous les objets qui ne sont pas contraires à l'ordre public ou aux bonnes mœurs, et ils jouiront, à cet égard, de la protection accordée par la loi aux nationaux, sous la réserve de se conformer aux lois qui leur sont imposées.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'exercer le commerce de gros et de détail, soit personnellement, soit par mandataire agissant pour leur compte, dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants du pays, aussi longtemps qu'ils se conformeront aux lois et règlements qui y sont établis.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'exercer toute profession, science ou industrie, sous la réserve de se conformer aux lois qui y sont établies

navires et aeronefs similaires de la nation la plus favorisée en se conformant aux règles relatives à cette navigation et établies par la Convention des Détroits signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923.

Article 11

Aucune prohibition ou restriction quelconque ne sera imposée à l'importation dans les territoires de l'une des hautes parties contractantes de quelque article que ce soit d'origine et de provenance de produit ou de fabrication du territoire de l'autre partie à un droit autre ou plus élevé que ceux qui sont ou seront à payer sur les mêmes articles de la nation la plus favorisée. De même, aucun droit autre ou plus élevé ne sera imposé sur le territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes à l'exportation de quelque article que ce soit à destination du territoire de l'autre partie que ceux qui seront payés sur la même exportation à destination de tout autre pays étranger. Aucune autre prohibition ou restriction quelconque ne sera non plus imposée sur l'importation ou l'exportation de quelque article que ce soit d'origine et de provenance de, ou à destination du territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes à cette date ou en provenance ou à destination de l'autre partie sans être également appliquée aux articles similaires de la nation la plus favorisée.

En ce qui concerne le contrôle et la perception des droits et formalités en douane ou d'exportation, et toute espèce d'impôts, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à faire bénéficier les navires et marchandises de l'une de la part de l'autre et de ceux qui en sortiront ou en seront extraits, en tout ce qui est de l'Etat en question, également et inconditionnellement, tout droit ou compensatoire. Chacune des dites parties contractantes aura le droit d'imposer sur les navires et marchandises de l'autre partie, exceptés dans les localités où les navires et marchandises de l'autre partie ne seront pas admis à entrer, des droits de tonnage, de douane et autres droits, qui ne seront pas plus élevés que ceux imposés sur les navires et marchandises de la nation la plus favorisée, et ces droits seront imposés et perçus dans les mêmes conditions, et de la même manière que ceux imposés sur les navires et marchandises de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas au traitement qui est accordé par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique au commerce de Cuba en vertu des dispositions de la Convention commerciale actuellement en vigueur entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et Cuba, ainsi qu'au commerce des Etats-Unis d'Amérique avec la Zone du Canal de Panama, d'après les lois existantes ou futures.

De même, les dispositions du présent traité ne s'appliquent pas aux avantages et faveurs spéciaux en matière de tarif douanier ou généralement en toute autre matière commerciale existant ou à établir dans l'avenir entre la Turquie et les pays qui se sont détachés de l'Empire ottoman à la suite de la guerre de 1914 ainsi qu'au trafic frontalier avec un Etat limitrophe de la Turquie.

Article 12

Les droits d'importation et la perception des droits de consommation ou d'accise ou d'autres droits perçus à l'intérieur sur les marchandises originaires et en provenance de, ou à destination des hautes parties contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre partie ne seront pas supérieurs à ceux qui sont ou seront payés sur les marchandises similaires originaires de la nation la plus favorisée et cet égard.

Article 13

Les marchandises originaires et en provenance de, ou à destination du territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes recevront sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante le traitement le plus favorable en ce qui concerne les droits de douane et autres droits, les charges d'emmagasinage et autres facilités et le montant des drawbacks. Le même traitement sera accordé aux marchandises originaires et en provenance de, ou à destination du territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre partie en ce qui concerne les formalités douanières, les droits de tonnage, de pilotage et de quarantaine ou autres droits ou charges perçus au nom ou au profit de fonctionnaires, corporations ou établissements publics, nationaux, locaux ou de toute autre espèce dans les ports maritimes.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas aux avantages qui sont ou seront accordés par l'une des hautes parties contractantes aux navires et marchandises de certains ports déterminés en vue de faciliter le commerce de frontière.

Les droits, taxes ou établissements de toute espèce ne seront imposés dans les ports des territoires de l'une des hautes parties contractantes aux navires de la nation la plus favorisée, à moins que des mêmes droits, taxes ou établissements ne soient également imposés dans les mêmes conditions aux navires nationaux. Une telle égalité de traitement s'appliquera réciproquement aux navires des deux pays, respectivement, de quelque lieu qu'ils puissent arriver, et quel que soit leur lieu de destination.

Article 15

Les navires marchands et autres navires qui sont propriété privée battant le pavillon de l'une des hautes parties contractantes et portant les papiers requis par ses lois pour prouver leur nationalité seront, tant dans les eaux territoriales de l'autre partie que sur la haute mer, traités comme navires de la nation dont ils battent le pavillon.

Article 16

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, de la protection accordée par la loi locale aux inventions, dessins, marques de fabrique, noms déposés, modèles et patrons.

Article 17

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes consent à admettre dans tous les ports, lieux et places de son territoire, ses agents consulaires, consuls généraux, consuls, vice-consuls et autres agents consulaires de l'autre partie, excepté dans les localités où l'admission ou le séjour de tels agents pourra être interdit par la législation générale applicable aux étrangers. Cette réserve toutefois ne sera pas appliquée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes sans être également à toute autre puissance.

Dans le présent traité, le mot consul ne s'applique pas au consul ressortissant de la partie qui l'envoie mais comprend le chef de chaque service consulaire par lequel la fonction consulaire est exercée.

Article 18

Les agents consulaires de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront, à tous égards, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, de tous les droits, privilèges, exemptions et immunités dont jouissent ou jouiront les agents du même rang de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les dits agents consulaires auront leur résidence dans le pays où ils reçoivent leur nomination et exerceront leurs fonctions consulaires dans les circonscriptions consulaires qui leur seront assignées par le chef de l'Etat du pays où ils résident. Toutefois, dans les cas où des circonstances spéciales le justifieront, l'autorité compétente pourra admettre la nomination d'un agent consulaire dans une partie du territoire où la résidence d'un agent consulaire ne sera pas admise. Les fonctionnaires consulaires pourront exercer leurs fonctions consulaires dans les circonscriptions consulaires qui leur seront assignées par le chef de l'Etat du pays où ils résident. Toutefois, dans les cas où des circonstances spéciales le justifieront, l'autorité compétente pourra admettre la nomination d'un agent consulaire dans une partie du territoire où la résidence d'un agent consulaire ne sera pas admise. Les fonctionnaires consulaires pourront exercer leurs fonctions et jouir des droits, privilèges et immunités accordés par le présent traité.

Il est entendu que chacune des hautes parties contractantes se réserve la faculté de refuser l'exequatur à un consul d'une nation avec laquelle elle n'entretient pas de relations diplomatiques, sans être obligée de communiquer le motif de sa décision.

Dans le cas d'empêchement, d'absence ou en cas d'absence d'un agent consulaire, un chancelier ou un agent subordonné dans son poste, les secrétaires ou chanceliers pourront gérer provisoirement les affaires consulaires de leur bureau. Le collège diplomatique de l'autre partie sera informé de la nomination de tels gérants par le Gouvernement du pays. Les dits gérants jouiront pendant leur gestion provisoire, de tous les droits, prérogatives et immunités accordés aux titulaires. Toutefois, les gérants qui ne sont pas ressortissants du pays où ils remplissent leurs fonctions ne jouiront des droits, prérogatives et immunités que dans la mesure nécessaire pour l'exercice de leurs fonctions consulaires.

Article 19

Les agents consulaires pourront apposer au dessus de la porte extérieure de leurs bureaux respectifs les armes de leurs pays avec une inscription appropriée indiquant le caractère officiel des dits bureaux. Ces agents pourront également hisser le drapeau national sur leurs bureaux y compris ceux qui sont situés dans les capitales des deux pays. Ils pourront également hisser ce drapeau sur tout bateau employé dans l'exercice des fonctions consulaires.

Les chancelleries, bureaux et archives consulaires seront en tout temps inviolables. Aucune des autorités du pays dans lequel sont situés ces chancelleries et bureaux ne pourra, en aucune circonstance, y pénétrer. Ces autorités ne pourront, non plus, sous aucun prétexte examiner ou saisir les papiers ou autres objets qui s'y trouvent. Les chancelleries et bureaux consulaires ne sauraient dans aucun cas servir de lieux d'asile. Aucun agent consulaire ne sera tenu de produire des archives officielles devant un tribunal ni de témoigner au sujet de leur contenu.

Si un agent consulaire a d'autres occupations que les fonctions consulaires, les papiers se rapportant à ces occupations seront tenus séparément.

Article 20

Les agents consulaires ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés ne pourront être arrêtés préventivement, sauf en cas de délits graves prévus par un code pénal. Ils ne pourront être cités devant un tribunal ni forcés de comparaître comme témoins. Si, pour une affaire pénale, le tribunal juge nécessaire la déposition d'un agent consulaire, il pourra le prier de venir déposer à son cabinet ou à sa résidence, ou bien il pourra accepter sa déposition écrite.

Cette comparution sera toujours faite avec tous les égards possibles et la dignité consulaire et aux fonctions que l'officier consulaire exerce actuellement.

Les agents consulaires ne seront pas tenus de comparaître comme témoins devant les tribunaux civils ou administratifs. Ils ne pourront être cités que devant les tribunaux du pays qui les a nommés et ne seront pas astreints à comparaître devant les tribunaux de première instance. Ils pourront déposer par écrit dans leur bureau ou à leur résidence, ou bien ils pourront accepter que le juge se rende auprès d'eux pour recueillir leur déposition orale. Cette comparution sera toujours faite avec tous les égards dus à la dignité consulaire.

Article 21

Les agents consulaires ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés ne seront pas astreints à des logements militaires, ni à tout service quelconque de caractère militaire, naval, administratif ou de police.

Les agents consulaires et les employés de leur consulat ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés et ne se trouvant pas à la tête d'une agence consulaire ou d'un poste consulaire dans le pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions, ne seront pas astreints à toutes impositions directes (nationales, d'État, de province ou de municipalité) sur les personnes ou les biens, à l'exception de celles établies sur la base de l'estimation, de la propriété de biens immobiliers situés sur le territoire du pays. Ils ne seront pas astreints à payer sur leurs traitements, émoluments ou revenus provenant de biens de toute espèce situés dans le pays. Les agents et employés consulaires ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés seront exempts du paiement de taxes sur les appointements, charges ou salaires reçus en rémunération de leurs fonctions consulaires.

Les terrains et immeubles situés sur le territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes et appartenant à l'autre partie et qui y sont affectés exclusivement dans un but diplomatique ou consulaire seront exempts de toutes impositions quelconques (nationales, d'État, de province ou de municipalité) autres que celles qui sont normalement requises pour des services d'une nature analogue et dans les mêmes conditions ainsi que les

biens et effets mobiliers qui seront la propriété de l'État ou du gouvernement de la haute partie contractante et qui seront affectés exclusivement à un but diplomatique ou consulaire seront exempts de toutes impositions quelconques (nationales, d'État, de province ou de municipalité) autres que celles qui sont normalement requises pour des services d'une nature analogue et dans les mêmes conditions.

Article 22

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à permettre l'entrée en franchise de droits de douane et autres droits connexes et à exempter de toutes impositions intérieures, autres que celles qui sont perçues à l'importation, les objets destinés à l'usage officiel des bureaux consulaires de l'autre partie et à faciliter à ces bureaux l'acquisition, à des conditions équitables, des locaux nécessaires à leur installation. Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliqueront pas à la vente de ces objets dans le pays où ils auront été importés en franchise, à moins que cette vente ne soit faite à des personnes qui auraient elles-mêmes droit à l'importation en franchise.

Il est entendu que les agents consulaires ne devront pas être propriétaires des immeubles qu'ils occupent dans le pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions, mais qu'ils pourront, s'ils le désirent, louer des immeubles pour leur résidence personnelle et pour leurs bureaux, ainsi que pour loger les employés de leur consulat

son décès survient tant que le ressortissant est dans le pays et en attendant qu'un fonctionnaire consulaire ait été nommé ou les intérêts aient été confiés à une personne qualifiée pour se charger des biens et défendre dans le but de les conserver et de les protéger. Cet agent consulaire pourra aussi être nommé administrateur provisoire, à moins d'une opposition de la part des héritiers majeurs présents, dans le cas où la succession comporterait un litige ou d'autres circonstances le permettent.

L'agent consulaire qui accepte de diriger l'administration des biens d'un ressortissant décédé est soumis à la juridiction des tribunaux du pays ou à celle de sa nomination pour toutes les questions nécessaires au même degré que le ressortissant du pays dans lequel la succession s'ouvre.

Article 26

Les agents consulaires connaîtront seuls les différends relatifs aux obligations internes des navires marchands et autres navires privés battant le pavillon de leur pays et seront seuls compétents pour les traiter, lorsque ces différends n'importeront ni à l'ordre ni à l'équipage et lorsque la discipline à bord, le service et les personnes placées sous leurs ordres ne seront pas entrés dans le port de leur circonscription. Les agents ne pourront également être compétents pour connaître des contestations relatives aux salaires de l'équipage et exécuter les contrats y relatifs, sauf dans les limites de leur pratique.

Lorsqu'un acte commis à bord d'un navire marchand autre que ceux portant le pavillon du pays que l'agent consulaire est chargé de représenter ou appartenant à des nationaux de ce pays aura troublé l'ordre ou la tranquillité du port ou de la rade, ou lorsque des personnes étrangères à l'équipage auront pris part à ces troubles, les autorités locales pourront monter à bord du navire dans le but de rétablir l'ordre et d'arrêter ou faire arrêter les personnes qui, ayant pris part à ces troubles, se trouveront encore à bord.

Les agents consulaires pourront faire appel à l'assistance des autorités locales pour faire arrêter, visiter, mettre aux fers et garder à bord ou à terre les marins qui leur sont déférés par les capitaines, officiers ou propriétaires des navires de leur pays. Ils pourront également faire arrêter et garder à bord ou à terre les marins qui auront déserté ou qui auront été

Lesquels après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes

Article 1er

Le Gouvernement des Etats Unis d'Amérique et le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord s'engagent à se livrer réciproquement, sur demande et dans les conditions prescrites par les règles et formes judiciaires de celle des hautes parties contractantes qui sera requise, les personnes poursuivies ou condamnées par les autorités judiciaires de l'une des hautes parties contractantes pour l'un des crimes ou délits énumérés à l'article 2 et qui, réfugiées ou trouvées sur le territoire soumis à la juridiction de cette partie contractante, seront réclamées par les autorités de l'autre partie contractante.

Néanmoins, l'extradition n'aura lieu que si les preuves de culpabilité sont telles que, d'après les lois du pays où la personne poursuivie ou condamnée aura fui ou se trouvera, elle justifierait son arrestation et sa mise en accusation devant le tribunal compétent, si le fait y avait été commis.

Article 2

L'extradition sera accordée pour les crimes et délits suivants, pourvu qu'ils soient punissables selon les lois des deux parties contractantes et d'après celle de l'Etat requérant sous le nom de

1. Homicide volontaire y compris le parricide, l'assassinat, l'empoisonnement et le blanticide
2. Incendie
3. Piraterie entendue aussi comme celle commise lorsque l'équipage ou le pouvoir de l'équipage d'autres personnes se trouvant à bord se soulèvent contre le navire, sont de connivence avec elles ou exercent des actes de piraterie
4. Vol ou entrée par effraction dans une habitation ou dépendance ou dans les bureaux, magasins ou entrepôts de nature à être spécifiée dans les lois de chacune des deux parties contractantes (ce qui comprend le vol avec effraction ou le vol commis de nuit, le vol à l'étalage, le vol à la tire, le vol de bestiaux, le vol de grand chemin, le vol à main armée, le vol avec violence contre les personnes, le vol de bateaux ou de marchandises, le vol de navires, le vol de bateaux à vapeur, le vol de marchandises ou d'argent dans les bateaux à vapeur, le vol de chevaux, le vol de bétail, le vol de moutons, le vol de bois, le vol de fruits, le vol de légumes, le vol de volaille, le vol de gibier, le vol de poissons, le vol de miel, le vol de cire, le vol de fourrures, le vol de peaux, le vol de laine, le vol de coton, le vol de tabac, le vol de céréales, le vol de farine, le vol de pain, le vol de viande, le vol de lait, le vol de fromage, le vol de beurre, le vol de sucre, le vol de café, le vol de thé, le vol de vin, le vol de bière, le vol de cidre, le vol de whisky, le vol de rhum, le vol de gin, le vol de brandy, le vol de liqueurs, le vol de médicaments, le vol de produits chimiques, le vol de matières premières, le vol de machines, le vol de pièces détachées, le vol de bijoux, le vol de montres, le vol de chaînes, le vol de bagues, le vol de boucles d'oreilles, le vol de colliers, le vol de bracelets, le vol de diamants, le vol de perles, le vol de pierres précieuses, le vol de métaux précieux, le vol de monnaies, le vol de billets de banque, le vol d'obligations ou d'autres titres ou instruments, le vol, l'achat, l'émission, la mise en circulation ou le trafic de faux billets de banque, de contrefaçon ou de fausse monnaie, le vol de sceaux officiels nationaux ou publics, le vol de passeports, le vol de permis de séjour, le vol de visas, le vol de documents officiels ou privés, l'usage frauduleux de documents officiels ou privés, la falsification de documents officiels ou privés, l'usage de documents officiels ou privés falsifiés)
5. Contrefaçon ou falsification de documents publics ou privés, usage frauduleux de documents publics ou privés contrefaits ou falsifiés
6. Falsification contrefaçon ou altération de billets de banque, de papier monnaie de titres publics ou privés, de billets de banque, d'obligations ou d'autres titres ou instruments, leur émission, leur mise en circulation ou leur usage frauduleux, contrefaçon ou falsification de sceaux officiels nationaux ou publics, usage frauduleux de sceaux officiels nationaux ou publics, contrefaçon ou falsification de passeports, de permis de séjour, de visas, de documents officiels ou privés, usage frauduleux de documents officiels ou privés contrefaits ou falsifiés
7. Détournement de fonds publics par les dépositaires ou par des employés publics, lorsque les faits entraîneront la peine d'emprisonnement pendant un an ou plus, et lorsque le montant détourné dépassera 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent fort
8. Détournement de fonds publics par les dépositaires ou par des employés publics, et détournement de fonds privés par des dépositaires ou par des employés, lorsque les faits entraîneront la peine d'emprisonnement pendant un an ou plus, et lorsque le montant détourné dépassera 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent fort
9. Destruction illégale et volontaire de chemins de fer mettant en danger un train ou plus
10. Avortement, à l'exception de celui provenant de mineurs ou d'adultes étant entendu par cette règle le détournement ou le séquestration d'une personne en vue de la contraindre ou de l'exploiter à des fins sexuelles
11. Vol commis avec violence ou intimidation (rooberi) ou vol commis avec effraction ou escalade dans la maison ou un magasin (housebreaking or shopbreaking)
12. Vol simple lorsque le montant ou la valeur des objets volés dépasse 25 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent fort
13. Escroquerie, recel d'argent ou de valeurs volés, détournements sachant qu'ils ont été obtenus par des moyens frauduleux, délits qui seront punis lorsque le montant en argent fort ou la valeur des objets dépasse 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent fort
14. Infractions aux sociétés commerciales, toutes personnes fortunières punissables par un dépositaire, mandataire, banquier, administrateur de la fortune d'autrui ou par le directeur, le fondé de pouvoir ou un fonctionnaire d'une société ou association, si la perte subie dépasse 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent fort
15. Parjure ou subornation de témoins
16. Crimes ou délits contre les lois des deux pays relatives à la suppression de l'esclavage et à la traite des esclaves
17. Banqueroute frauduleuse
18. Corruption
19. Coups et blessures graves dont la peine minimum n'est pas inférieure à un an d'emprisonnement
20. Tentative d'autres crimes, énumérées ci-dessus punie de peine criminelle
21. Complicité dans l'un quelconque des crimes ou délits mentionnés ci-dessus, si cette complicité est punissable d'emprisonnement ou d'une peine plus forte par les lois des deux hautes parties contractantes.

Article 3

L'extradition n'aura pas lieu si le crime ou délit pour lequel elle est demandée a un caractère politique ou pour les faits connexes à un semblable crime ou délit.

Si un individu réclamé en vertu du présent traité est poursuivi ou condamné dans le pays où il s'est réfugié pour un autre crime ou délit que celui pour lequel l'extradition a été accordée, il ne sera livré qu'après qu'il aura été acquitté ou qu'il aura subi sa peine.

Si la personne réclamée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes a été livrée par un autre Etat à la première partie contractante, elle ne pourra être poursuivie ou punie pour une infraction commise avant la demande d'extradition autre que celle pour laquelle l'extradition a été accordée à moins qu'elle n'ait quitté le territoire de l'Etat auquel elle a été livrée ou qu'elle n'y retourne de son plein gré, ou que l'Etat qui l'a livrée ne consente à ce qu'elle soit poursuivie, condamnée ou livrée à un Etat tiers, à moins que cet Etat ne consente à l'extradition.

Article 4

Lorsque la personne dont l'extradition est demandée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes sera poursuivie ou détenue dans l'un des Etats de cette partie contractante pour un crime ou délit commis dans le pays où elle s'est réfugiée, elle ne sera livrée qu'après qu'elle aura été acquittée ou qu'elle aura subi sa peine.

Article 5

Les hautes parties contractantes ne seront pas tenues d'accorder l'extradition de leurs ressortissants respectifs.

Article 6

Les demandes d'extradition seront présentées par la voie diplomatique.

Lorsque le prisonnier dont l'extradition est demandée sera arrêté et traduit devant un juge ou un magistrat pour être entendu, ce juge ou ce magistrat devra exiger la production des preuves qu'il jugera nécessaires pour justifier la demande d'extradition faite par l'autorité compétente de l'autre partie contractante, conformément aux dispositions du présent traité.

Les frais de l'extradition seront supportés par la partie requérante.

Les objets trouvés en la possession de la personne à extrader, qui pourront servir à prouver le crime ou le délit pour lequel l'extradition est demandée, seront saisis autant que le permettront les lois de l'Etat requis.

Si la personne réclamée ne peut être extradée, en raison de la loi de l'Etat auquel la demande est adressée, dans les cas prévus par le présent traité, elle sera remise en liberté après l'expiration d'un délai de deux mois à compter de la date de l'arrestation.

Si la demande n'est pas appuyée, dans un délai de deux mois à compter de la date de l'arrestation, des documents prescrits par le présent traité, la personne arrêtée sera mise en liberté.

Les dispositions du présent article ne feront pas obstacle à ce que l'individu réclamé soit arrêté et remis en liberté en vertu d'une nouvelle demande d'extradition présentée pour le même fait.

Article 7

Lorsque l'arrestation provisoire d'une personne sera requise avant que la demande d'extradition ait été présentée, la demande y afférente sera faite par la voie diplomatique ou adressée directement aux autorités compétentes de la partie requise par la poste ou par le télégraphe. Il sera donné suite à cette requête conformément aux dispositions prévues dans l'article précédent et dans les mêmes délais, à moins que la personne arrêtée ne soit mise en liberté avant l'expiration de ces délais.

La detention provisoire cessera d'exister et la personne arrêtée devra être mise en liberté s'il, dans ce délai, de trois mois à dater de l'arrestation, le jour de l'arrestation non compris, une demande formelle d'extradition, accompagnée des pièces nécessaires, n'est pas présentée de la manière prescrite dans l'article 6

ARTICLE 8

L'extradition ne sera pas accordée lorsque d'après la loi de la partie requise ou d'après celle de la partie requérante la peine pénale ou la peine prononcée est prescrite.

ARTICLE 9

Tous les objets saisis trouvés en la possession de la personne réclamée lors de son arrestation doivent être remis à la partie requérante au moment de l'extradition en même temps que cette personne. Cette remise ne s'étendra pas seulement aux objets acquis par l'infraction pour laquelle la personne est poursuivie, mais encore à tous autres objets pouvant servir à établir la preuve de l'infraction. Toutefois les droits des tiers sur les objets en question devront être dûment respectés

ARTICLE 10

Les frais de l'arrestation, de la détention et du transport des individus réclamés seront payés par la partie requérante

ARTICLE 11

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur deux mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura une durée de cinq ans

Si ce traité n'est pas dénoncé par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de la dite période de cinq ans il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'il soit dénoncé cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois

ARTICLE 12

Le présent traité, rédigé en français, en anglais et en turc, sera ratifié. En cas de divergence le texte français fera foi.

Les ratifications seront échangées à Constantinople aussitôt que possible

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux

Fait à Lausanne le 6 août 1923

(L.S.) JOSEPH C. CRLW (L.S.) ISMET
(L.S.) Dr. RIZA NOUR
(L.S.) HASSAN

No. 170

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 16.*)

No. 415.
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, August 15, 1923.*

GENERAL HARINGTON has received message from Ismet to the effect that Turkish Government will not molest persons who have been employed by Allied forces in occupation of territory since 20th November last but asking for guarantee for similar treatment for inhabitants of detached territories mentioned in article 2 of armistice declaration.

There seems no objection to giving required guarantee. Can concurrence of French and Italian Governments be obtained as early publication of Turkish Government's undertaking is desirable in order to reassure persons concerned?

Adnan Bey came to see me to-day to give me the same message. He added however on Ismet's behalf that Turkish Government asked that similar pardon should be extended to Turks condemned for offences committed since 20th November in occupied territories (Constantinople, &c.)

No. 171

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 305), *Rome* (No. 217). (*R.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 17, 1923.*

MR. HENDERSON'S telegram No. 415 of 15th August shows the result of General Harington's endeavours to obtain from the Turks a guarantee of non molestation of Turkish subjects who have worked for Allied armies of occupation.

Please urge Government to which you are accredited to notify at Constantinople their concurrence in proposed engagement favourable to inhabitants of detached territories.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 250.)

No. 172

Mr. Palairet to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received August 18.*)

No. 419.
(Telegraphic.) D. *Tokyo, August 18, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 76.

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that:—

1. Japanese Government following precedent established by Great Britain, France and Italy before 1914, have made preparations for accrediting Ambassador to Turkey and staff of principal Allied Powers as agreed upon and Minister there are writing to Turkish Government likewise.

2. Japanese Government express wish, however, that diplomatic status may be granted pro tempore to opening of diplomatic establishments, in order that representatives may assist as soon as possible in conferences.

3. Decision depends upon appointment of Turkish representative at Angora. Japanese Government desire to be furnished with suggestions as to practicability of such a course.

E 8390/199/44 No. 17

Mr. Heath to Sir Eyre Crowe. (*Received August 19th.*)

No. [illegible]
My dear [illegible]

[illegible] *Constantinople, August 19th.*

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

present occupier and generally navigating vessels for conveying their misfortunes
Ismet Pasha asked me for some indication of the various classes of refugees whom I was
able to grant and though I stressed the small number of such before his return to
Angora Anderson gave the written assurance necessary

I also referred to the question of Greek refugees in Turkey pointing out
that I understood from what he had said in the course of these conversations Turkey
could not be debarred on basis of numbers of Greek persons who had been
published on the Angora Declaration and could not be charged upon the
Greek Government as an act of hostility and I pressed upon him the extreme
anxiety His Majesty's Government would feel that this question should be
early resolved in favourable sense and that every effort should be made in this respect,
and that the Angora Government should be urged to do everything in their power
to carry out the provisions of the treaty by which they undertook to give effect to
it in advance of the legislature to that effect

Ismet Pasha then referred to the question of the future position of British
affairs in Constantinople and the Straits and the importance to the British Government
of some clear indication of the intentions of the Turkish Government in regard to
the status of foreigners and foreign interests in Turkey I pointed out to him
excessive taxation and charges which would have the effect of
extension of the capitulations and I also referred to the question of Mosul Work
of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Turkish Petroleum Company
owned entirely by British and French interests and the question of the Ottoman
Public Debt Ismet Pasha stated that he could not commit himself
to the British view which he felt would have the effect of
Straits Convention which he felt would have the effect of
Straits Convention which he felt would have the effect of
Straits Convention

n entraver les relations commerciales réciproques par aucune prohibition et restriction d importation d exportation ou de transit

Toutefois les parties contractantes se réservent le droit d établir ces prohibitions et restrictions pour les importations et exportations

1 Pour réserver des ressources indispensables à la vie alimentaire et à la sauvegarde de l activité économique essentielle du pays
2 Pour des raisons de sécurité de l État
3 Pour des motifs de police sanitaire ou vétérinaire de protection des animaux et des végétaux contre les maladies les insectes et parasites nuisibles et particulièrement dans l intérêt de la santé publique concurremment aux principes et dispositions internationaux à adopter à ce sujet
4 Pour des marchandises tirant leur origine des monopoles d État
5 Et sous réserve d application aux marchandises importées des prohibitions ou restrictions qui ont été ou seront établies par la législation intérieure en ce qui concerne la production la vente le transport ou la consommation à l intérieur ou par des mesures indigènes semblables
6 Pour empêcher l exportation de la monnaie or ou du métal or

Article 2

Les parties contractantes s engagent à assurer le respect effectif sur leurs territoires de tous les droits de douane et taxes à l importation ou à l exportation aux personnes, bagages, marchandises et objets de toute sorte transportés par voie d eau, de terre, de fer ou autres instruments de transport et s engagent à accorder à ce transport et traitement de la nation la plus favorisée

Les marchandises importées par le territoire douanier de l une des autres parties contractantes seront exemptées de tout droit de douane à l exception des droits de statistique et de surveillance

Après dédouanement et sous réserve de toutes formalités douanières les voyageurs d un pays auront le droit de circuler librement sur le territoire de l autre pays

Les transits seront autorisés par la voie la plus commode et la plus économique

a) Pour les motifs de sécurité publique et de sécurité de l État
b) Pour assurer l exécution des mesures prises pour combattre les maladies des animaux et des végétaux
c) Pour assurer l observation des lois et des règlements douaniers des parties contractantes et d'une manière générale de l'ordre public de l'État

Article 3

Les voyageurs fabricants et commerçants industriels de l une des parties contractantes auront, après présentation de la carte de légitimation industrielle délivrée par les autorités de leur pays et visée par les autorités consulaires de l autre pays, le droit d exercer leur profession et d'effectuer les transactions commerciales prévues par les lois et règlements qui leur seront applicables dans l autre partie contractante chez les négociants et producteurs dans les deux ordres de vente publique. Ils pourront également prendre des commandes sur échantillons chez les négociants ou autres personnes pour autant que ces échantillons soient exclusivement destinés à servir de modèles à la fabrication ultérieure et les marchandises correspondantes à ces échantillons

Les voyageurs de commerce des parties contractantes munis de la carte de légitimation délivrée par les autorités de leur pays respectif auront réciproquement le droit d exercer leurs fonctions, modèles et échantillons pour l importation. Cette carte devra être établie conformément au modèle de l Annexe (A)

Les parties contractantes se réservent toutefois d exiger des voyageurs le dépôt des cartes de légitimation ainsi que des dispositions qu elles jugeraient devoir prendre pour limiter la durée de leur commerce

Il est entendu toutefois que les voyageurs de commerce et industriels auront pas le droit de traiter les affaires pour les commerçants ou industriels autres que ceux désignés sur leur carte

A l exception des marchandises susvisées l importation des objets passibles de droits de douane ou de taxe équivalente qui seront importés comme échantillons par les voyageurs de commerce seront de part et d autre admis en franchise des droits d entrée et de sortie à la condition que ces objets soient

réexportés dans le délai réglementaire et que l'identité des objets importés et réexportés soit bien établie quel que soit le bureau de douane par lequel ils passent à leur sortie

La réexportation des échantillons ou modèles devra être garantie au bureau de douane d entrée, soit par un dépôt en espèces, soit par une caution valable

En ce qui concerne les formalités auxquelles les voyageurs et commerciels industriels (voyageurs de commerce) sont soumis dans les territoires des parties contractantes, les deux pays se garantissent réciproquement le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

Article 4

Les ressortissants de l une des parties contractantes se rendant aux foires et marchés à l effet d y exercer leur commerce ne seront pas, sur le territoire de l autre, traités d une manière moins favorable que les nationaux en tant qu ils peuvent présenter la carte d identité d après le modèle annexé (Annexe B), délivrée par les autorités du pays dont ils sont ressortissants

Les parties contractantes se donneront réciproquement connaissance des autorités chargées de délivrer les cartes d identité prévues à l alinéa précédent

Les dispositions ci-dessus ne sont pas applicables aux commerciels ambulants non plus qu au colportage et à la recherche des commandes chez les personnes n exerçant ni industrie ni commerce chacune des parties contractantes se réservant à cet égard l entière liberté de la législation

Article 5

Sous réserve de formalités d exportation et de réexportation dans le délai fixé et de présentation d identité et éventuellement sous réserve du dépôt de cautionnement ou de signature des droits de douane et d une manière générale à charge d observer les règlements en vigueur dans la matière l État bénéficiaire de tous droits d entrée et de sortie est stipulé réciproquement

a) Pour les échantillons passibles de droits de douane y compris ceux des voyageurs de commerce
b) Pour les objets destinés aux expositions et aux concours

Article 6

Les navires et bateaux portant le pavillon de l une des parties contractantes entreront sur pied d égalité dans tous les ports et ports dépendant de l autre partie et auront sur pied d égalité le droit de leur départ ou de leur déclaration ne seront assujettis à aucune prime ou taxe de tonnage ou de passage ou à aucune taxe sous quelque dénomination que ce soit perçus au profit de l État des provinces des communes ou d un organisme quelconque autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont actuellement ou pourront par la suite être imposés aux bâtiments nationaux leurs cargaisons et leurs passagers quelle que soit la provenance ou la destination d autres droits ou taxes et ne seront assujettis à d autres charges que si elles étaient imposées sous pavillon national. Les passagers et leurs bagages de ceux-ci seront pareillement traités comme s ils voyageaient sous pavillon national

En ce qui concerne le placement des navires leur chargement et leur déchargement dans les ports, rades, havres et bassins il ne sera accordé par l une des parties contractantes à aucune nation aucun privilège ni aucune faculté qui ne soient également accordés par les mêmes navires de l autre partie

Les dispositions qui précèdent ne font pas obstacle à ce que chacune des parties contractantes réserve à son pavillon national le cabotage la pêche côtière ainsi que le remorquage et les services de port

Les navires et bateaux naviguant sous pavillon de l une des parties contractantes et porteurs de papiers de bord et documents exigés par les lois et règlements de leur pavillon, seront reconnus de plein droit comme ayant la nationalité dudit pays dans les eaux territoriales eaux intérieures et ports de l autre partie contractante sans qu ils soient tenus à fournir d autres justifications

Les certificats de jaugeage délivrés aux bâtiments de chacune des parties contractantes suivant la méthode Moorsom seront respectivement reconnus sous les modalités qui seront précisées ultérieurement après le rétablissement des relations régulières de la matière

Article 7

Tous les produits du sol ou de l industrie originaires et en provenance du territoire douanier de l une des parties contractantes qui sont importés sur le territoire

douanier de l'autre et qui sont destinés soit à la consommation soit à la réexpédition soit en transit seront soumis pendant la durée de la présente Convention au traitement le plus favorisé Notamment il ne pourront être établis des droits autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui frappent les produits similaires originaires d'un pays tiers bénéficiant du traitement le plus favorisé

Les exportations à destination d'une des parties contractantes ne seront pas grevées par l'autre de droits autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus à l'exportation des mêmes produits vers le pays le plus favorisé à cet égard

Article 8

Chacune des parties contractantes pourra exiger pour établir le pays d'origine des produits importés la présentation d'un certificat d'origine constatant celui-ci et délivré par l'autorité compétente du pays exportateur Elle pourra également exiger le transport direct du pays d'origine à travers le territoire de l'autre partie contractante

Les certificats d'origine établis conformément aux dispositions ci-dessus seront dispensés de toutes formalités consulaires

Article 9

Les dispositions de l'article 7 ne s'appliqueront pas

1 Aux privilèges accordés ou qui pourront être accordés ultérieurement à certains États limitrophes en vue de faciliter le trafic avec les pays limitrophes
2 Aux faveurs qui sont ou seront accordées à l'exportation
3 Au régime préférentiel établi entre les parties contractantes et celui de la Haute Silésie
4 Aux avantages et concessions qui existent ou seront accordés à l'avenir en faveur de tiers États par suite de traités d'union douanière ou de toute autre nature ayant pour but de faciliter le commerce frontalier Les parties contractantes se sont déclarées prêtes à entrer en négociations au sujet de ces questions avant l'expiration de la présente convention

Article 10

Aussi longtemps que l'importation des produits naturels ou fabriqués originaires de l'un des États contractants sera soumise à des restrictions quantitatives ou à des prohibitions, ces restrictions ou prohibitions seront appliquées de manière à ne pas gêner indûment le commerce entre les deux pays et à ne pas porter atteinte aux dispositions de la présente convention

Article 11

Les parties contractantes se réservent le droit de prendre toutes les mesures qu'elles jugeront nécessaires pour empêcher l'importation, l'exportation ou le transit de tous articles de quelque nature que ce soit lorsque ces mesures seront nécessaires pour la protection de la santé publique ou pour des raisons de sécurité publique ou pour la protection des animaux et des végétaux contre les maladies et les parasites

Article 12

Les droits et taxes de toute nature perçus pour le compte de l'État ou des collectivités d'intérêt public ou privé autres que ceux qui seront spécifiés par la présente convention ne pourront être établis sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes à l'importation des marchandises originaires de l'autre partie contractante à un taux plus élevé que celui auquel sont imposés les produits similaires originaires de tout autre pays étranger

Article 13

Le trafic des marchandises par transit entre les parties contractantes s'effectuera sous le régime le plus favorable existant ou à établir

de Fer du 14 octobre 1890, avec toutes les conditions et suppléments intervenus d'un commun accord par tous les États faisant partie de cette convention

Les parties contractantes auront soin en tant que le change le permettra, d'établir le plus tôt possible des taxes directes réduites pour le trafic des voyageurs et pour celui des marchandises les plus importantes dans les relations les plus usitées

Les administrations des chemins de fer des parties contractantes devront prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour garantir l'exécution rapide et sûre du trafic des chemins de fer entre les deux pays.

Les wagons, voitures et les autres moyens servant pour le transport des marchandises utilisés dans la communication entre les parties contractantes et dans le transit, sont soumis aux dispositions de la Convention internationale sur l'utilisation réciproque des wagons (R I V) et à ses prescriptions et conventions supplémentaires cependant les voitures sont soumises aux prescriptions techniques de la convention sur l'utilisation réciproque des voitures et wagons dans la communication internationale (R I C) et à ses prescriptions et conventions supplémentaires

Il est entendu que toutes les dispositions prévues à l'alinéa précédent ne seront appliquées au trafic avec un État tiers que dans la mesure où un accord convenant la communication directe par chemins de fer aura été conclu avec cet État

Les personnes, bagages et marchandises, remis à un transport sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et devant être expédiés pour ou à travers le territoire de l'autre à destination d'un territoire d'une tierce Puissance ne seront pas traités moins favorablement ni sous le rapport de l'expédition ni sous celui des prix de transport et des impôts publics grevant les envois par chemins de fer que les personnes, bagages et marchandises du pays ou d'un autre pays quelconque transportés dans les mêmes conditions sur le même parcours et pour la même direction

Article 14

La présente convention entrera en vigueur trente jours après l'échange des ratifications et aura une durée de cinq années Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période de cinq années elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois

Article 15

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berne aussitôt que faire se pourra

Protocole final

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention entre le Danemark et la Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie en matière de chemins de fer les plénipotentiaires soussignés ont fait la déclaration suivante

Id Article 1er

Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage à appliquer les principes sans discrimination à l'importation ou à l'exportation et de n'accorder des exceptions ou facilités sur l'importation ou l'exportation des produits prohibés à ne point user de mesures contre une Puissance qui pourrait contrevenir aux mêmes règles à l'autre partie contractante

Id Article 7

Vu que l'article 7 de la présente Convention de Commerce accorde aux produits du sol et de l'industrie des parties contractantes le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée les parties contractantes constatent que l'établissement par cause de dépréciation du change des restrictions ou des majorations des droits d'entrée frappant les produits du sol et de l'industrie de l'autre partie contractante supprimera aussitôt les droits les plus sérieux sont grevés à cette fin la présente convention

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et ont apposé leurs sceaux

ANNEXE V

Carte de légitimation pour voyageurs de Commerce

Modèle.

Carte de légitimation
pour
Voyageurs de Commerce

atteste par la présente que le porteur de cette carte voyage
pour
Les marchandises
ci-après désignées

1	à
2	à
3	à

pendant
la durée de la carte
Années

et exempte en conséquence toute
personne quelconque de les taxes légales.

Valable
en Europe et en Perse

Signalement du porteur

Âge
Taille
Cheveux
Signes particuliers

Signature du porteur

Les Autorités civiles et
militaires

Signature

ANNEXE B

Carte d'identité

Le soussigné [illegible] certifie que M [illegible] porteur de la présente carte, lesdrart
se rendra avec ses [illegible] pour exercer [illegible]
pour les ressortissants [illegible]

pour les ressortissants [illegible] et pour exercer [illegible]
et [illegible] pour exercer [illegible]
ou industrie.

Le susdit recevra [illegible] pour [illegible] nom, etc.
signature du [illegible]

Protocole No. 4

Concernant l'Etablissement définitif entre Perse et Turquie conclu à Lausanne le 23 Juillet 1923

Les Représentants: Ismet Pasha Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Hassan Bey
Polish représentatives: M. Jan Modzelewski Minister at Berne, M. A. Lados, M. H. [illegible]

ARTICLE 1er

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de s'établir et de séjourner sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront, en conséquence, aller, entrer et circuler librement, en se conformant aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans le pays.

ARTICLE 2.

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention, n'ayant pas pour objet la question d'immigration, ne portent pas atteinte au droit de chacune des parties contractantes d'autoriser ou d'interdire librement l'immigration dans son pays.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, l'égal des nationaux le droit d'exercer toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce et de se vouer à tous métiers et professions quelconques, excepté ceux réservés aux seuls nationaux en vertu des lois et règlements respectifs, et, en Turquie, en vertu d'un long usage (débardeurs, mahonniers, &c.).

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes n'auront à payer pour séjourner et s'établir sur le territoire de l'autre, ainsi que pour l'exercice, sur ce territoire, de tous genres de commerce, d'industrie, métier ou profession, aucun impôt, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne seront soumis sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne, leurs biens, droits ou intérêts, et quant à l'acquisition, possession et jouissance desdits biens, ainsi qu'à leur transfert par cession, mutation ou héritage, à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui auront été imposés aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans le cas où l'une des parties contractantes, soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit d'après les lois et règlements sur la police générale, sur la moralité, sur la sécurité intérieure ou extérieure de l'Etat, expulserait par mesures administratives les ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, elle s'engage à les recevoir. Le transport, jusqu'à la frontière, des personnes expulsées sera à la charge de la partie qui expulse.

ARTICLE 5.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sous condition de réciprocité sur le territoire de l'autre le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner toutes sortes de biens mobiliers et immobiliers, à l'exception de ceux immeubles se trouvant aux lieux réglementés dans le pays. Ils pourront en disposer par acte de vente, échange, donation, testament ou autrement, dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux, sans être astreints à payer de taxes plus élevées que celles qui sont ou seront perçues sur les nationaux.

Ils ne seront assujettis dans aucun des cas susmentionnés à des charges, taxes ou impôts sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront perçus sur les nationaux.

ARTICLE 6.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne seront astreints sur le territoire de l'autre à aucun service militaire soit dans les armées de terre ou de mer, soit dans les garnisons ou milices, ni à aucune obligation à charge réciproque du service militaire.

Ils seront exempts de tout emprunt forcé. Ils seront également exempts de toute autre prestation personnelle pour cause de faits de guerre et qui ne serait pas imposée également aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 7.

Les sociétés industrielles, commerciales et financières, quelles que soient leur siège social, sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et qui sont constituées conformément aux lois de cette partie, seront reconnues également comme ayant existence légale sur le territoire de l'autre partie et leur donnera le droit d'ester en justice devant les tribunaux de ces pays, soit comme demanderesses, soit comme défenderesses, sous les mêmes conditions que celles exigées des sociétés nationales, et sous réserve de se soumettre aux lois du pays. Elles auront le droit d'exercer sur le territoire de l'autre partie toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce et d'y acquérir toute sorte de biens mobiliers ainsi que les actes immobiliers nécessaires au fonctionnement de la société, étant entendu dans ce cas que l'acquisition n'est pas l'objet même de la société.

Il est entendu que la Pologne aura le droit d'interdire l'établissement des sociétés exerçant certaines branches d'industrie et de commerce qui en seront de leur caractère. Toutefois les gérants de ces sociétés seront soumises à des restrictions spéciales qui seront applicables à tous les pays. Dans ce cas la Pologne aura en vertu de la présente convention le droit de retirer à l'intéressé sur son territoire les sociétés ainsi visées exerçant ces mêmes branches d'industrie et de commerce.

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres commerciales et industrielles de chacune des parties contractantes se pourront dans tous les cas être admises pour l'exercice du commerce et de l'industrie dans le territoire de l'autre à des droits, taxes ou impôts ou charges sous quelque dénomination que ce soit autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront exigés des sociétés nationales.

ARTICLE 8

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront sur le territoire de l'autre être exproprié[s] que pour cause légale d'utilité publique reconnue et constatée et moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable.

ARTICLE 9

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes pourront sur le territoire de l'autre en tout ce qui concerne la protection légale et judiciaire de leur personne et de leurs biens ester en justice devant les tribunaux.

En ce qui concerne les droits de succession ab intestat ou testamentaire ils jouiront pour eux et leurs héritiers, légataires et ayants cause, quelle que soit leur nationalité, des mêmes droits que les nationaux et ne pourront être assujettis dans l'exercice de ces droits à aucun impôt ou taxe plus élevés que ceux auxquels sont ou seront assujettis les nationaux eux-mêmes.

Les successions ab intestat ou testamentaires ouvertes au profit de ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes et comprenant des biens situés sur le territoire de l'autre seront réglées et partagées conformément aux lois du pays où les biens dépendant de ces successions sont situés.

Les héritiers, légataires ou ayants cause ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes pourront sur le territoire de l'autre recueillir et emporter librement le produit de la vente des biens meubles et immeubles et tous autres biens ou valeurs leur appartenant, sans avoir à payer dans l'un ou l'autre cas d'autres droits, taxes ou impôts que ceux auxquels sont ou seront assujettis les nationaux dans des circonstances analogues.

Les dispositions du présent article ne portent pas atteinte aux lois spéciales des deux pays concernant l'état civil, d'après le droit privé international, les actes relatifs à la famille, tels que mariage, la communauté légale, la séparation de corps, le droit de paternité, la filiation, l'adoption, la majorité, la tutelle, la curatelle, l'interdiction et autres institutions analogues, ainsi que les successions testamentaires ou *ab intestat*, partage et dispositions à cet égard. Le droit de famille des ressortissants des parties contractantes sera seul compétent pour les faits auxquels il s'applique.

Les questions relatives aux immeubles seront réglées dans le pays dont relèvent les biens ressortissants.

La présente disposition ne porte pas atteinte aux attributions spéciales des consuls en matière d

...tensts of peace, the Near East ... to the Anglo-Turkish policy of ... the middle ... the last entries. No ... necessary to ... that such ... policy was likely to ... 5. I have ... they are ... after the ... needed ... to offer ... guarantee ... towards ... 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No. 15

Extract from the Despatch from Mr. Kedleston (Received ...

... the ... of the Ministry ...

...

...sha's fall at the ... three ... gave ... attack on the policy of ... which ... had been ... pause.

This ... however, proved ... to ... from ... the returned ... August ... to take ... the post of ... at Angora ... to ... specify ... the ... of last year. The ... with ... known to ... ship ... success ... was expected to be a ... to ... of the Chez Pastis ... and ... reported ... the ... ing ... Bey ... to ... ing ... out of ... regard ... ing ... show a ... tendency ... The ... ion ... hope ... ing ... suspect ... Fenian ... ing ... power ... of both ... ment ... desert ... matter ...

... ing of the ... assembly on ... last ... the ... as ... and ... despair ... Nothing ... Mr. ... gh the ... electors ... were ... angered ... to ... 300 ... new ... deputies were ... Angora ... appointed ... for ... seat ... the ... opening ... These ... of ... ing ... the ... of the new ... assembly ... ssed ... portunity ... a ... ... and ... fra ... of ... dictations ... Deputy ... ... elected ... Angora ... with ... ...

the attendance of the unity which had already been the nation such glorious years, and we do not only great hopes for the future. It was at this time conducted the parliament of the day, and the first national sovereignty was [illegible] and the royal house was consecrated the blessing of the Almighty in the life of the new Assembly.

I have &c.
NEVILLE MACLEAN
Acting High Commissioner

No. 177

Mr. Phipps (the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston) (Received August 20)

Paris August 19, 1923

(No. 706) By Bag

Telegraphic

THE President of the Council discussed with me that he was not at all pleased with the behaviour of the Turks since the signing of the treaty. General Weygand had reported hostile movements of troops on the Syrian frontier. M. Poincaré admitted, however, that this step might be the result of local anarchy and not of orders from Angora.

No. 178

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople (No. 253) *and Athens* (No. 169)

Foreign Office August 20, 1923

Telegraphic R

ACCORDING to press reports Turkish authorities are expelling Armenians from all parts of Turkish territory. Have you any American Representative? Can you give us details?

No. 179

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 22)

(No. 308) Washington August 22, 1923

Telegraphic R

MY telegram No. 316.

In the course of our conversation yesterday with Secretary of State Mr. Brooks enquired whether he could give us any indication of the views of the United States Government as to the Ahmed Izzet solution. They thought that whether or not Izzet went the Ahmed solution might be expected at least to [illegible] Charge d'Affaires to negotiate with Angora. He could not say. Charge Légation it would involve new appointment. Congress [illegible] appropriation being for Embassy. As regards place of residence he thought this would depend on Turkish Government.

No. 180

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

Foreign Office August 22, 1923

No. 255, Telegraphic R

ITALIAN Government state that while British and Italian post offices are to be closed on evacuation French is to remain and they are anxious that we should urge on French Government until proper time. Matter hardly seems to us of sufficient importance to warrant action at Paris. What are your views?

No. 181

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 23)

(No. 292) Athens, August 23, 1923

Telegraphic R

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 96 to Athens.

Head of Political Branch at Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whose attention I drew to the matter, assures me that at present moment Greek authorities are themselves encountering difficulties from Bulgarian and other bands, particularly in Thrace. They are

strictest cross-frontier, and anything in the nature of [illegible] as in paragraph 2.

Head of Political Branch considered that Turks were only seeking pretext for persecuting Greeks left in Turkey. He begs to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to fact that in spite of amnesty 1,500 Turks are detaining between 150 and 200 Ottoman Greeks in their prisons. Greek Government have twice protested. Spoke to Commercial Counsellor of improvement of roll so far as it exists at present. He observed that [illegible] best interests of Greeks and Turks alike would be served by [illegible] Konfold and Mersina had [illegible] which existed at [illegible] present extent of [illegible] prison.

I have [illegible] to British consul at Smyrna for information regarding reports lately published by Mr. Horton. I shall telegraph further instructions to you as I receive them.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 170.)

No. 182

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 23)

No. 42, Telegraphic R

Constantinople August 22, 1923

GENERAL HARINGTON has been into War Office telegram [illegible] Thrace [illegible] Turkish [illegible] territory see my telegram No. 115.

Turkish Embassy here [illegible] British [illegible] Greeks [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkish

No 184

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 24)

No 427)
(Telegraphic) R
Constantinople, August 24 1923

MY telegram No 426

Adnan Bey communicated to the three High Commissioners last night two communications addressed to them by Ismet Pasha stating that Grand National Assembly had voted yesterday 23rd August, draft laws ratifying Peace Treaty as well as the acts signed at Lausanne

First note refers to article 1 of Evacuation Protocol and recalls that evacuation is to begin from date of this second exchange

Second note refers to article 1 of protocol relating to Karagatch and asks that Greek Government be informed accordingly It recalls that territory mentioned in that article is to be handed over to Turkish authorities on 18th September

Repeated to Athens No 98

No 185

Mr Head sent to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received August 24

No 428)
Telegraphic R
Constantinople August 24 1923

MY immediately preceding telegram

Mixed Railway Commission at Karagatch will cease to function on 15th September

It is important that League of Nations should before that date appoint commissioner in accordance with article 107 of treaty My colleagues are making similar suggestions to their Governments

General Harington suggests British representative on present Mixed Commission Major Ross would be most suitable appointment He has had confidence of parties and I would strongly recommend his retention if possible

(Repeated to Athens No 99)

No 186

Mr Hohler sent to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received August 24)

(No 429)
Telegraphic R
Constantinople August 24 1923

MY telegram No 426

In forwarding memorandum respecting attribution of treaty Admiral Bristol refers to my telegram from Ismet expressing hope that Allies would now withdraw ships of war from Smyrna Telegram sent to Admiral Bristol on January last mentioning that Admiral intended to maintain guard ships there until signature of peace as well as to make communication addressed to Vahib by Admiral Nicolson

Foreign Office decision that Mediterranean squadron should withdraw ships as soon as possible I had been about to instruct Admiral Bristol in your telegram No 242 as from Government while in agreement in general principle was opposed to any previous agreement with Turks

Accordingly I informed Admiral that I had already been in communication with you on this subject and that withdrawal of ships from Smyrna with drawal not yet decided upon but I told him I understood that was question of telegraphic communication with Consul there which since Turkish overland telegraph would not take cypher message were at present transmitted by wireless to Angora Withdrawal would be announced until this restriction was removed Admiral said that question of withdrawal would be spoiled if made conditional on such but I answered that we did not telegraph urge Vahib Angora to get this restriction removed

I do not think Turks will raise difficulties, but consider that this point should be settled first I am therefore sending cypher text of this telegram to Adnan with request that it be sent to Smyrna through Turkish telegraph office If I receive in next two or three days cypher reply from acting consul general by same route I shall endeavour to arrange with colleagues for withdrawal about middle of next week

(Repeated to Smyrna, No 65)

No 187

Mr Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 24)

No 157)
(Telegraphic) R
Rome, August 24, 1923

YOUR telegram No 212

Instructions have been sent to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople to take action similar to that adopted by his colleagues

Repeated to Constantinople)

No 188

Mr Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston Received August 24)

(No 159)
Telegraphic) R
Rome, August 24, 1923

MY telegram No 152

Italian Government consider that representatives at Turkey should have rank of Ambassador They suggest that relations should be opened by Chargé d'Affaires first at period

They also consider that Ambassador should be resident at Constantinople and that a local representative should be appointed at Angora but however by His Majesty's Government but by Ambassador at whom all arrangements in this connection should be left

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No 189

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

No 257)
Telegraphic)
Foreign Office, August 24, 1923

MY telegram No 246 of 9th August Withdrawal of warships from Smyrna

As Turkish treaty not yet ratified we are waiting for your colleagues to receive similar instructions, inform representative of Angora Government that British man of war will be withdrawn from Smyrna

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No 190

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Kennard (Rome)

(No 220)
(Telegraphic) R
Foreign Office August 24 1923

MY telegram No 212 of 8th August Withdrawal of warships from Smyrna

Please inform Italian Government that Mr Henderson has now been instructed to inform representative of Angora Government informally that British men of war will be withdrawn from Smyrna

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No. 191

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received August 25.)

No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 24, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 255.

My Allied colleagues and I are agreed that practical difficulties in the way of maintenance of post offices after evacuation will be great, and that information in principle is distasteful to Turkish Government, but even if it were expedient for us now to modify arrangements already made in accordance with instructions, we are prepared, with verbal concurrence of French and Italian delegates at Lausanne, to see Lausanne despatch No. 105 of 30th January.

I think therefore that I should merely inform my colleagues here that so far as British post offices are concerned these arrangements will be carried out. I doubt if it will benefit French if they do not come into line. In my opinion no good purpose will be served by not co-operating in spirit of treaty in this respect.

No. 192

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — Received August 25.)

No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 430.

Acting French High Commissioner at Smyrna informed Admiral Brock that French Government had decided to withdraw French troops from Ismid, and that evacuation would begin on August 27th.

E 8191 1482 44

No. [illegible]

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir [illegible]

Foreign Office, August 27, 1923.

Your telegram [illegible] August 2, 1923.

You have [illegible] the Allied Governments represented by Ambassadors at Paris, the Imperial Ottoman Bank has [illegible] every effort to secure [illegible] payment of the Ottoman public debt, and that the Ottoman Government has [illegible] the Imperial Ottoman Bank to act as their agent in the matter.

I am directed by the principal Allied Governments represented on the Council of Ambassadors at Paris, namely, His Majesty's Government, the French Government, the Italian Government, the Japanese Government, and the Belgian Government, to inform the Imperial Ottoman Bank that they are prepared to [illegible] the Ottoman Government [illegible] the Imperial Ottoman Bank

No 194

Mr Ben ick to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received August 26)

No 297)
(Telegraphic R *Athens August 24 1923*

CONSTANTINOPLE Telegram No 427

Italian Minister considers that according to terms of article 1 of protocol of 24 July notification should be made by Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople through Spanish representative there who is in charge of Greek interests especially in view of rupture of diplomatic relations here

French Charge d'Affaires and I are also only telegraphing in this sense and I do not propose to take any action unless instructed by you

Repeated to Constantinople

E 8626 199 44] No 195

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — Received August 27

No 458
My Lord, *Constantinople August 18 1923*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a textual translation of the speech delivered on the 16th instant by Mustafa Kemal Pasha at the Grand National Assembly at Angora, owing to several distinct references which cannot be completely understood without my despatch No 447 of the 17th instant

2 As your Lordship will observe Kemal Pasha confined himself to a large extent to a recital of past events The old Assembly and the army were contrasted and a warning was issued to Turkish youth that the organisation of the Green Purses or Secret Society were not the spontaneous Mustafa Kemal asserts in regard to the Smyrna references were partially true and he is pressing to the front a new party to be called the Second Group which is to consist of the progressive elements willing to support all the progressive programme but taking no part in Nationalist movement It is hoped to secure this by the early days of the Nationalist movement It is hoped to secure this by the early days of the Nationalist movement

3 I have not however the material at present which is the case with all Mustafa Kemal's speeches, so I would draw attention to the reference to the army and the abolition of the old constitutional position which for some time to come will be the most valuable asset

4 I have not however the material at present which is the case with all Mustafa Kemal's speeches, so I would draw attention to the reference to the army and the abolition of the old constitutional position which for some time to come will be the most valuable asset

5 By carrying out the eighteen articles by fighting the Assembly and by securing the election of Feth Bey as President the former Mustafa Kemal appears to have secured a consolidation of his authority and to have arranged with the same means so that the Assembly will be at the present moment for the time being at any rate entirely the same means so that the Assembly will be at the present moment for the time being at any rate entirely

6 The delay which has occurred in the Treaty of Lausanne Fresh outbreaks of Constantinople evacuation of Constantinople evacuation of Kemalists associates by the pretty fair success which was secured at the Angora Grand National Assembly Sooner or later no doubt questions will have to be settled Mustafa Kemal appears to be in a position to dictate terms

I have &
NEVILLE HENDERSON
Brigadier-General

Enclosure in No 195

Text of speech delivered by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at Angora on August 16 1923

(Translation)
Gentlemen

WE find ourselves at the opening of the session of the second Grand National Assembly which has met with the utmost success in spite of our new Assembly At the same time the opening of the session of the second Assembly was not only a very great step forward in the history of our struggle but was also well calculated to ensure success for our Assembly A history of our struggle has been written which is worthy to be read by future generations

Gentlemen during the period of nearly two years which elapsed between the first National Assembly of Turkey having been opened and the present day I have exercised the responsibilities of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers Both of these two duties have been the object of the greatest care and concern My colleagues and myself always regarded the Assembly as the most heartfelt sign of the most grateful loyalty and respect and as the most important undertaking of the nation and all its energies were devoted to assuring the existence of the Assembly which has been painfully won and, having regard to our struggle, we can have confidence that what we have said about towns and districts worthy of the name of Turkish towns and districts

Gentlemen the historical duty of your assembly for the purpose of the task of making certain declarations I do not at present consider it necessary to say anything declaring my views and intentions on the subject Your Assembly is fully aware of the phases of the struggle and of all the sufferings as well as the joys and success through which the nation has passed I am going to summarise these events briefly as parts of the period of the armistice of Mudros up to the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its relations with the various governments of the Assembly and finally to represent the present and the new Assembly to the world These three periods contain a number of important events as well as lessons which have created the situation of to-day as well as the grave and serious responsibilities before the high Assembly which is the first of the period signalled by the New Turkey I deem it necessary to speak of the Ottoman Empire which has disappeared and of the general war which was in great part the cause of its disappearance and of the general war which was in great part the cause of its disappearance I shall therefore commence my remarks from the armistice of Mudros

Gentlemen the period from the conclusion of the armistice of Mudros up to the opening of our first National Assembly is full of the most tragic episodes and of the

in this manner, the tragedy would be enacted anew. Those who realised this truth continued their struggle in Anatolia. Thanks to these efforts the organisation in Anatolia grew stronger. In spite of the unfavourable position of the Assembly, which later on Anatolia would consolidate its labours. The situation did not appear favourable to the enemy. Besides assessing their undeniable material means they took heedless and tragic account of the state of public feeling. This took place on the 6th March 1920. A decision was at last made to dissolve the Ottoman Empire.

The workers' Anatolian victory was not unexpected. From the comfortable possibilities of saving the Ottoman Empire after the general unrest, the situation of the fatherland in the deepest crisis had completely disappeared. An unfortunate choice of Members of National Assembly became indispensable. Finally in the name of the former predecessor of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, assembled in the most unfavourable circumstances by Our first Assembly which will forever occupy a glorious place in Turkish history and which will remain the proof of energy to live, prevail in the struggle for the existence of the fatherland. It put an end to the sovereignty of the Ottoman Dynasty.

In order to create a state of a new national Government based on the principle of sovereignty for the nation, which comprises the Sultanate-Caliphate, it was necessary to enter into contact with the Powers who were going to meet in Paris. They would not extend the Armistice of October 30th, 1918, but declared the state of war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and they ordered the Arab provinces to revolt. They sent British officers and secret agents to Anatolia, where they were to gather the remnants of the defeated army, to incite them to revolt, and to form bands of partisans. They deceived the Arabs by promising them independence if they revolted against the Ottoman Empire. They deceived the Kurds by promising them autonomy if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Armenians by promising them the liberation of Armenia if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Greeks by promising them the annexation of Smyrna if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Circassians by promising them the restoration of their lands if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Jews by promising them the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Christians by promising them the establishment of a Christian state in Anatolia if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Muslims by promising them the establishment of a Muslim state in Anatolia if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Turks by promising them the establishment of a Turkish state in Anatolia if they revolted against the Turks. They deceived the Turks by promising them the establishment of a Turkish state in Anatolia if they revolted against the Turks.

treaty nature and all the fine arts of the nation rest for ever proudly glorify the sacred struggle and the love of fatherland.

Sirs, these military events which I have dealt were accompanied by very important political events. I concluded with the Russians a treaty of friendship which is still force. We concluded treaties of the same sort with Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. As a result of our victory in the eastern front we have peace with the Armenians. As regards our relations of that time with the Western governments, we were only able to conclude with the French the Agreement of Angora which I left unratified. However, although we are sincerely ready to restore peace before and after every victory our appeals remain without response. Whether it is because the Western governments, whatever we were to do, refuse to stand by rights unsupported by material forces, I cannot show an exact reason for this regardless? So long as the situation remains the present victory of Good loss of Peace of the open enemies of us.

To-day, when we are not Assembly was hastening to restore country from the fetters of every kind without exposing ourselves the grave of general peace for the last time, when we are Turkey. We have subject to material losses and it has several times come with the most difficult questions of current. In spite of the existence of enemy forces which, we will have succeeded to keep off this all way of peaceful and fair relations with the Assembly, these results have yet, and I agree I gave life only to be executed with [illegible] hatred.

After five years of struggle, all belonging only to the Military convention of Mudania today I possess [illegible] doubtful one of life-long regret. In this house [illegible] sacrifices across But I agree that we are [illegible] peace regret that we [illegible] that we have to [illegible] people [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] most powerful nations, he said to [illegible] the [illegible] and of the [illegible] so [illegible] only [illegible] of the English did not expose the [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] the greatest [illegible] this [illegible] has existed. For the [illegible] have been successfully [illegible] and [illegible] with [illegible] Assembly [illegible] and [illegible] dress [illegible] the results.

Gentlemen, [illegible] the Great Assembly [illegible] Velezos, [illegible] Asia [illegible] the Assembly [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] supporters [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Black Sea [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] sovereign rights [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received August 24.

(No. 410)

Oxford, August 21, 1924.

THE Grand National Assembly at Angora is busily occupied during the last week with formal business in clearing the way for the important questions which are now engaging its attention.

2. Until now the treaty has not been presented to the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Assembly, which is composed of 24 members elected by Yussuf Kemal Bey. The commission's report which is to be followed by a debate on the treaty before it is voted on by the Assembly, is expected to recommend that the treaty be ratified with certain reservations and that a number of amendments should be made in the text. The commission's report which is to be followed by a debate on the treaty before it is voted on by the Assembly, is expected to recommend that the treaty be ratified with certain reservations and that a number of amendments should be made in the text.

3. The Grand National Assembly consists of 315 members, of whom 286 were elected by the people in the last general election. The remaining 29 members are appointed by the Government. The Assembly is the supreme legislative and executive authority in Turkey. It elects the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, which is responsible to it.

4. The Assembly has been in session for about two years and has passed a large number of laws relating to the reorganization of the country. It has also ratified the Treaty of Lausanne and the Convention concerning the Straits.

5. The Assembly is composed of members of various political parties, but the majority of the members belong to the Republican People's Party, which is the party of the President of the Republic and the Government. The opposition parties are small and have little influence.

6. The Assembly is in session for about eight months in the year, from October to May. It meets in the Parliament House in Angora. The sessions are open to the public and the press.

7. The Assembly is divided into several committees, each of which deals with a particular branch of the business of the Assembly. The committees are appointed by the Assembly and report to it. The most important committee is the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for the examination of treaties and other international agreements.

8. The Assembly has the power to pass laws, to declare war, to make peace, to ratify treaties, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to control the finances of the country, and to exercise all the functions of government. It is the supreme authority in the country.

9. The Assembly is elected for a term of four years. The last election was held in October 1923. The next election will be held in October 1927.

10. The Assembly has a President, who is elected by the Assembly from among its members. The President presides over the sessions of the Assembly and represents it on ceremonial occasions.

11. The Assembly has a Secretary-General, who is responsible for the administration of the Assembly's business.

12. The Assembly has a number of officials, who are appointed by the Assembly and are responsible to it.

13. The Assembly has a budget, which is prepared by the Government and submitted to the Assembly for approval. The budget is examined by the Committee on Finance and then by the Assembly as a whole.

14. The Assembly has the power to impeach ministers for misconduct in office. The impeachment is tried by a special court.

15. The Assembly has the power to grant amnesty for political offences.

16. The Assembly has the power to confer honours and titles.

17. The Assembly has the power to regulate the currency and to issue banknotes.

18. The Assembly has the power to regulate foreign trade and to impose customs duties.

19. The Assembly has the power to regulate the press and to censor publications.

20. The Assembly has the power to regulate the police and to maintain order.

21. The Assembly has the power to regulate the army and to raise troops.

22. The Assembly has the power to regulate the navy and to build ships.

23. The Assembly has the power to regulate the air force and to build aircraft.

24. The Assembly has the power to regulate the railways and to build railways.

25. The Assembly has the power to regulate the telegraph and telephone services.

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Enclosure No 98

Letter from General Harington to Mr Henderson

No 11[P])

Sir, *Smyrna August 16, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the reports which are current to the effect that there is serious disorder in the Service de Santé.

2 There is some reality underlying these rumours, but the following are certain facts:—

(*a*) Insecurity has increased during the past few days as a result of alarming reports which have been circulated.

(*b*) Bus loads of armed Greek officers and troops from Smyrna are proceeding in large numbers to the region between Ushak and Afium Karahissar. These troops are part of the Thrassian Railway and Port Transport Staff and the Army Service Corps train of about fourteen hundred strong. Such units as have been fighting since the 14th August, and have been relieved by these troops, are now being withdrawn to Smyrna.

3 Both the Director of Services and Transport, who is in charge of the Greek Staff, and the Director of Medical Services, who is in charge of the Greek Medical Service, have been removed from their posts and have been replaced by officers of the Greek Army.

4 I believe, on both counts, that the reports have been of extraordinary severity and that martial law is now in force throughout Smyrna and the Vilayet.

5 I am, however, of opinion that the present unsettled state of affairs is due to the fact that the Greek Army is in process of withdrawal from Asia Minor, and that the Greek Staff are endeavouring to maintain discipline and to prevent the withdrawal from degenerating into a rout.

I have &c.

W. THOMAS HARINGTON.

No 199

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 27.)

No. 298.
Telegraphic. R. *Athens, August 26, 1923.*

MY despatch No. 624.

Decree was dated 24th August. Turkish Treaty of Lausanne and all the conventions annexed to it.

Second decree of same date puts in force of state of war.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 157.)

No 200

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 27.)

No 434.)
Telegraphic. D *Constantinople, August 27, 1923.*

UNDER Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Annex 7, by which Turkey is bound by article 259 of Lausanne Treaty, Germany renounced in favour of principal Allied Powers all her rights over certain railways including Constantinople–Constantza railway. German share in which railways will therefore be transferred to Reparation Commission.

On the other hand, article 110 of Lausanne Treaty, by which Roumania and Turkey are to come to an agreement about this railway, makes no mention of Allies' rights under Treaty of Versailles.

French military authorities have exported above since armistice for benefit of Allies and remain to export to-day they should hand over.

In view of divergence indicated above I have alleged instructions.

My Allied colleagues are addressing similar telegrams to their Governments.

No 201

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No 311), Berlin, and Rome (No 221).—(R.)

Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, August 27, 1923.*

PLEASE refer to telegram No. 305 (No. 217 of 17th August) concerning Greek Commissioner.

Repeated to Constantinople (No. 259.)

No 202

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received August 28.)

No 300.
Telegraphic. R. *Athens, August 28, 1923.*

HEAD of Political Bureau at Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that last Italian Greek attrocities succeeded in deterring anti-Greek agitation in Western Thrace directed from Bulgaria. Many Mussulman Greek subjects are implicated and are being tried by Field Service Courts-Martial and before civil tribunals. Special attention directed to leaflet referred to and before civil inspection of it that its pages were omitted with intent to few months' interval that could be under Insurance Treaty for acts committed before November 1922.

Greek Government have drawn attention through Nuncio's Minister's note of 2nd June, 1923, to the fact that these soldiers elected Under Secretary Foreign Affairs pointed out that this was not government of Western Thrace free from terror of the telegram. As Turkish Government refused to prosecute Ottoman Greeks responsible for atrocities they are not taking part in the trouble but the future relations between British interest be found of secret telegram (No. 292). He will send copy of Greek reply.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 160.)

No 203

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received August 28.)

No 301.
Telegraphic. R. *Athens, August 28, 1923.*

MY telegram of preceding telegram and my telegram No. 292.

Yesterday's Greek papers publish lists of 1,600 persons of Oushak and neighbouring districts. Head of Political Bureau informs that these lists are not published with Turkish knowledge and the persons listed according to information of 30th January, 1923. Representatives of International Red Cross is going to Constantinople to see Turks on the matter.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 204

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 437.)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, August 28, 1923.*

ATHENS telegram No. 297.

Swiss Chargé d'Affaires, at present in charge of Greek interests, does not represent a Government with which we correspond only through Spanish agent at Athens.

Restoration of relations, recently ruptured, of British and Italian Governments with Athens should enable representative there to make necessary inquiries as to Greek attitude.

My telegram of the 27th instant, paragraph 3, refers.

(Repeated to Athens No. 102.)

No. 205

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received August 28.)

No. 438.)
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, August 28, 1923.*

My telegram No. 429.

Turkish Ministers to Madrid, Berne, Stockholm, Copenhagen and The Hague have been instructed to present letters announcing their appointment as Ambassadors to their respective Governments.

Turkish Consulates-General and Consulates in the British Empire are being raised to the rank of Embassies and Legations, British Consuls in Turkey, especially Maltese and Maltese-born subjects, are being subjected to pressure to [illegible] French Government, which ought to be informed that measures of reprisal will be taken unless pressure is stopped at once.

The Egyptian Frontier Restriction Order in Council, as telegraphed, has been signed and has been received here. I am reporting this by same bag.

Reference: Secret No. 69.

E 8570 8570 44 No. 206.

From the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Sir, *Geneva, August 29, 1923.*

Mr. Secretary Balfour has requested me to request that the attention of the Council of the League of Nations should be drawn to Article 17 of the Treaty of Peace signed by Turkey on the 24th July, 1923, and to the fact that provision for the creation of a Commission to lay down the boundaries between Turkey and Greece, Bulgaria and Armenia is made in that Article.

I have accordingly the honour to request that the Council of the League of Nations will be so good as to select a person to represent the League on the Commission.

2. The Secretary-General proposes that the Council should request the Commissioner to report to the Council of the League of Nations on the progress of the work of the Commission from time to time, and that the Council should request the Commissioner to submit his final report to the Council of the League of Nations as soon as possible after the completion of the work of the Commission.

3. The Secretary-General suggests that the Commissioner should be instructed to communicate with the Governments concerned through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

4. My Right Honourable friend Mr. Kemal Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, has informed me that he proposes to appoint Mr. Ismet Bey, the Turkish Plenipotentiary at the Lausanne Conference, as Turkish representative on the Commission.

5. The Secretary-General suggests that the Council should express to Mr. Ismet Bey the satisfaction with which the Council of the League of Nations has learnt that he proposes to accept the appointment.

6. The Secretary-General suggests that the Council should express to Mr. Ismet Bey the hope that he will be able to arrange that the Commissioner shall be present at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations which will be held after the Commissioner has been appointed, in order that he may be able to explain to the Council the nature of the work which he proposes to undertake, and the methods by which he proposes to carry it out.

7. The Secretary-General suggests that the Council should express to the Commissioner the wish that he will be able to arrange to be present at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations which will be held in December, in order that he may be able to report to the Council the progress which has been made by the Commission.

8. The Secretary-General suggests that the Council should express to the Governments of Greece, Bulgaria and Armenia the hope that they will afford to the Commissioner all the facilities which he may require for the carrying out of his duties.

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No. 211

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — *Received September 1.*

(No. 444.)

Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, August 31, 1923.*

My telegram No. 438.

French High Commissioner having received necessary instructions three Allied admirals met this morning and decided that Allied men-of-war at Smyrna be withdrawn simultaneously at 9 a.m. 3rd September. Naval commanders at Smyrna will notify Greek General Headquarters of their intention.

(Repeated to Smyrna No. 72.)

E 8815/21/44 No. 212

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — *Received September 5.*

No. 541.

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 7, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. [illegible] of the 14th August, on the question of the access to the ports of Georgia and Armenia for vessels of the Allied Powers.

2. As they will see from the enclosed Argus article, the Allied Commissioners-General have now addressed a note to the Allied Governments, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, in which they recommend that the Allied Governments should [illegible]

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 212.

Allied High Commissioners.

Les soussignés, Hauts Commissaires des Puissances Alliées, ont l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de leurs Gouvernements ce qui suit au sujet de la question de l'accès aux ports de la Mer Noire, et notamment à ceux de Géorgie et d'Arménie.

Le Gouvernement de la République Fédérative Socialiste Soviétique de Russie, par sa note du 24 juillet dernier, a déclaré qu'il était prêt à accorder aux navires de commerce de toutes les nations, sans exception, le droit de libre navigation dans la Mer Noire, ainsi que l'accès aux ports de Géorgie et d'Arménie.

Les Hauts Commissaires ont l'honneur de faire connaître à leurs Gouvernements qu'ils ont été informés officieusement par le Gouvernement Soviétique que, dans le cas où les Puissances Alliées désireraient envoyer des navires de guerre dans les ports de Géorgie et d'Arménie, le Gouvernement Soviétique ne s'opposerait pas à ce que ces navires y pénètrent.

Les Hauts Commissaires ont l'honneur de faire connaître à leurs Gouvernements qu'ils ne sont pas d'accord sur la question de savoir si l'accès aux ports de Géorgie et d'Arménie doit être accordé à tous les navires de commerce, ou seulement à ceux des Puissances Alliées.

Les Hauts Commissaires soussignés sont d'avis que, dans le cas où les Puissances Alliées désireraient envoyer des navires de guerre dans les ports de Géorgie et d'Arménie, le Gouvernement Soviétique ne s'opposerait pas à ce que ces navires y pénètrent

[E 8826 199 44] No. 211

Memorandum to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received September 3.)

(No. 185.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 31, 1923.*

I WAS received yesterday by the Ralph [illegible] the text of the terms to the Turkish Government as settled at the Conference. I was told that the Turkish delegates had agreed to sign the Treaty for Turkey but that they [illegible] to sign it without having had an opportunity to lay it before the Grand National Assembly at Angora. They had, however, undertaken to recommend to the Assembly that it should be accepted, and they had given a guarantee that His Majesty Mr. Ismet Pasha would exert his influence to secure its acceptance. Moreover, they had [illegible] without consulting the Grand National Assembly themselves, that if the Treaty were not signed at once the Conference would break up and that the Turkish delegates would be held responsible for the consequences.

The Turkish delegates had also asked that the Treaty should be signed at Constantinople, and not at Lausanne, as they had no means of communicating with Angora from Lausanne, but could do so from Constantinople. His Majesty's Government had agreed to this request. Mr. Ismet Pasha, however, had refused to sign the Treaty at Constantinople, and had insisted that it should be signed at Lausanne. Moreover, they had [illegible] without consulting the Grand National Assembly themselves, that if the Treaty were not signed at once the Conference would break up and that the Turkish delegates would be held responsible for the consequences.

His Majesty's Government had also agreed to the request of the Turkish delegates

the occasion of my first audience with him last November. His impressions as a boy of some 15 years of age during the Russian invasion of the seventies. He spoke with great and unassumed bitterness of Russia's perfidy and of Russia's fixed determination to crush Turkey. Great Britain, he said, had saved Turkey then and was the great and powerful friend on whom Turkey counted in the future. I observed that Turkey had repeatedly proved that England was always willing to assist small nations that sought to level playing ground, but I did not think that she would withhold that support and guidance which His Majesty's Government of Turkey's earnest wish and desire for and gave proof that she desired their.

7. The Cabinet remains unchanged by reason of the present Turkish Government except Ismet Pasha, who has been compelled for having succeeded in wrecking your Lordship's peace conference at Lausanne. He added that he felt sure for him that you were to examine the various speeches at Angora to-night, this in the Grand National Assembly. His reference to that assembly was [illegible] Ismet Pasha was somewhat unsettled, but not to the degree that his words would have readily proved. The general [illegible] nobler and better instincts, not to be clogged and not attached weight to the exercise of the [illegible] Ismet had probably given [illegible] existing [illegible].

8. The Cabinet spoke very warmly of Sir Horace Rumbold who he said had served Great Britain well and faithfully, and who had done his best to bring about the [illegible] I took the opportunity to wish him [illegible]. After a conversation which lasted [illegible] hour and a half we [illegible] His Majesty was [illegible] for [illegible] instructions.

I have [illegible] Foreign Office.

I have &c.
NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

No. 215

Mr. Heaton at the Hague to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 4*)

No. 449
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople September 4, 1923*

TURKISH [illegible] restrict [illegible] of refugees into [illegible] should be [illegible] authorities but this [illegible] Minister of Angora [illegible] indispensable. Turkish visa [illegible] Greek [illegible] places such as Malta where [illegible] terms will [illegible] part of [illegible].

Passing [illegible] Greek [illegible] Governor General [illegible] with [illegible] Greek subjects and particularly Maltese.

(Repeated to Athens No. 107, Smyrna No. 77, and Malta No. 14.)

No. 216

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindsay (Athens).

(No. 144)
Telegraphic. R. *Foreign Office, September 4, 1923.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 445 (of 31st August) Greek and Turkish Treaty.

Please telegraph your observations.

No. 217

Earl Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

No. 268.)
Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, September 4, 1923.*

My despatch No. 488 of 18th June. Ex-Sultan.

Ex-Sultan has addressed personal letters to the King and to Lord Peterborough asking to be allowed to reside with his family and private suite in Cyprus, stating that he will be desired otherwise to come to London. He also asks His Majesty's Government's help for recovery of his property, &c., under sequestration at Constantinople.

Consular Officers are [illegible] to Cyprus as [illegible] other [illegible]. What is your view?

What is present view of Angora authorities regarding [illegible] Sultan's family [illegible] property?

No. 218

Mr. Heaton at the Hague to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 5*)

No. 456
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 5, 1923.*

My telegram No. 443.

[illegible] Angora [illegible] Moslem [illegible] Greece [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Lausanne [illegible] Exchange [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Moslem [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkey [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Greek [illegible] Turkish

There is no reason to suppose that any Parliament which might come into power after the elections would decline new law ratifying the treaty though it would probably be considered necessary to confirm ratification in a constitutional manner In spite of its unsatisfactory features only a few of the Deputies, such as General Pangalos, might wish to denounce the treaty (see my despatch No 624)

(Repeated to Constantinople)

[E 8984 8814 44] No 291

Note on Articles of Peace Treaty with the Powers to be concluded by His Majesty's Government as regards their Execution

Portugal.

I.—*Boundaries.*

(a) *Articles 27 and 28 of Treaty of Peace with Turkey.*

THE boundaries of Eastern Thrace between Bulgaria and Turkey have to be delimited within 3 months of the coming into force of the Convention which takes place as soon as Bulgaria has ratified the Treaty of Neuilly and Turkey has notified the latter to the Conference of Ambassadors. His Majesty's Government have to appoint a representative on the commission.

Discussions have taken place between the Foreign Office and War Office regarding the appointment to the Boundary Commission, which is to be concerned with Eastern Thrace, as to the diplomatic representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople and as to the delegation of duties to the British Military Attaché at Constantinople. Sofia has been asked to suggest whether Bulgaria is likely to ratify the Treaty of Neuilly.

(b) *Articles 4 and 5 of the Straits Convention.*

With regard to the navigation of the Straits, at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Turkey was signed, the Allied Powers signed a Convention relating to the Straits. This Convention is to come into force as soon as the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been ratified by the Powers whose ratification is necessary for the purpose of bringing the Treaty into force. The Convention provides for the demilitarisation of the Straits and for the passage of warships and merchant aircraft in time of peace and war. The Convention is to be executed by a Commission of which the British representative will be President. The Commission will have its seat at Constantinople and will be composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Turkey. The Commission will have the right to employ such technical and administrative staff as it may think necessary for the proper execution of its functions. The expenses of the Commission are to be borne by the States represented on the Commission in proportion to the tonnage of their warships which passed through the Straits during the preceding year. The Commission will have its own budget and will submit its accounts annually to the League of Nations. The Commission will have the right to address to any Power such observations as it may think necessary with regard to any infraction of the provisions of the Convention which may come to its notice. In case the Commission should not be able to obtain satisfaction, it will refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, which will take such steps as it may think necessary to ensure the observance of the Convention. The Commission will also have the right to call upon the local authorities to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure the execution of its decisions. The Commission will have the right to fortify the Straits and to maintain a force sufficient for the purpose. The Commission will have the right to fortify the Straits and to maintain a force sufficient for the purpose. The Commission will have the right to fortify the Straits and to maintain a force sufficient for the purpose.

letter to appoint the naval attaché instead of the Ambassador as British representative, but this would require some preliminary settlement as to the relations between France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey who appoint to the presidency of the commission. It might be well to discuss this with the French authorities at once.

II.—*League of Nations Treaties, Convention, &c.*

Under Article 17 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the League of Nations will have to appoint a commission to the Straits. The Foreign Office is in touch with the War Office as to the appointment of the British representative on this commission.

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III.—*Aliens Treaty, Convention, &c.*

Under Article 17 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the League of Nations will have to appoint a commission to the Straits. The Foreign Office is in touch with the War Office as to the appointment of the British representative on this commission.

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of justice (document X), especially as regards the appointment of European members and judges, and also as regards the questions to be dealt with by the Protocol, particular progress on which is indicated in Annex VIII of the Blue Book.

Action—The Department agreed with Mr Hurst's suggestion that to the

c. The Exchange of Population Question

Under article 1 of this convention two commissions are to be appointed on the coming into force of the convention, one of which has already taken place, but the members of which are to be appointed by Greece and Turkey and not by the League of Nations from neutrals. No British representative or expert is therefore involved.

Action—The League of Nations is carrying out the duties under this convention and action by His Majesty's Government is necessary.

CYPRUS

1. Calculation of amount of contribution payable by Cyprus to the Ottoman Public Debt

Under article 47, which governs this question, the competent authority of the Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt proceeds to its work. Interested Powers and States are given the opportunity of sending delegates to assist or to be present at the consular calculations.

Action—It will be necessary to consult the Crown Agents of this case in that Iraq, Palestine and Egypt all have a similar interest.

2. Under article 49 which governs the question of the determination of the amounts to be credited under article 47 to the Ottoman Public Debt, the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt is to be invited to submit to the Council of the League of Nations a report on the method of calculation of the amount to be credited to Cyprus.

Action—It will be necessary to consult the Crown Agents for the Colonies, Palestine and Transjordan as to the representative to be chosen to assist the British representative in the discussion at Constantinople.

Action—It will be necessary to consult the Treasury as to the attitude they may propose to take on this question.

ECONOMIC

1. Maritime Arbitral Tribunal

Under article 9 of the following articles, a mixed arbitral tribunal is to be established at Constantinople between each of the Allied Powers on the one hand and Turkey on the other with a view to the coming into force of the treaty. Each such tribunal will be composed of three members to be appointed respectively by each of the Governments concerned and will be entitled to delegates and assessors from whom according to the case in question they will choose a president or a member of the tribunal. The presidents will be chosen by agreement between the two governments concerned. In the number and quality of the cases just specified, the two governments concerned shall be entitled to exercise a casting vote. In one of these sections, the seat of which shall be in Constantinople, the first place may be given to a Turk. The duties of these sections shall be to examine and decide all claims of the nationals of the Allied Powers or Turkey against the Ottoman Government or against persons or companies established in the territories of the Allied Powers or Turkey, which may be referred to them by the Governments concerned.

Action—It will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to appoint a member for the British Mixed Anglo-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal and such members for the additional sections and agents as experience may prove necessary. It is understood that the Foreign Office, according to the precedent of the other treaties, will appoint the member to the Greek Mixed Arbitral Tribunal but presumably this will be done in consultation with the Board of Trade who, I gather, may suggest names. The Board of Trade will submit the selected members and agents. In the course of which it will be necessary to consult the Board of Trade regarding these appointments.

II—*Convention respecting the Conditions of Residence, Business and Jurisdiction*

(a) Under article 4 a separate convention is to be concluded between Turkey and each or any of the signatories within twelve months from the coming into force of the convention (i.e., roughly coinciding with the coming into force of the main treaty), in order to settle the admission of Turkey's nationals of the other contracting Powers to the different forms of commerce, professions or industries and reciprocally the admission of the nationals of the said Powers to Turkish territories for the said purposes.

Action—Presumably this will mainly devolve on the Board of Trade and will have to be consulted in due course with a view to the opening of the necessary negotiations and the appointment of the British representative or representatives.

(b) Under article 60 of the same convention each of the Contracting Powers reserves the right of declaring at the time of the coming into force of the convention that its provisions shall not apply to any one of the British self-governing dominions, colonies, protectorates, possessions or territories beyond the seas subject to their sovereignty or authority.

Action—The Foreign Office are already making arrangements to obtain a list of the dominions, colonies, &c., whose laws are to be notified to the Turkish Government by such declaration for the convention to come into force. No further action is necessary at present.

III—*Commercial Convention*

(a) Under article 9 of the same convention the tariffs exchanged between the British and Turkish delegates on the 16th July, 1923 (see pages 33 to 39 of the Lausanne Blue Book, Turkey No. 1 (1923)) are necessary for the Khaki Election Manifesto (see page 6 of the Lausanne Blue Book, Turkey No. 1 (1923)) and Mr Hurst's assistant in the Library has been endeavouring to obtain copies. It may be necessary to consult the Treasury as to the course they may eventually be authorised to adopt in the matter of negotiations with Turkey for such period as may be provided for the duration of the Convention with the Turkish Government with respect to the treaty rights of the Capitulations.

Action—The Foreign Office are already making arrangements to obtain a list of the dominions, colonies, &c., whose laws are to be notified to the Turkish Government by such declaration for the convention to come into force. No further action is necessary at present.

IV—*Commercial Contracts*

(a) Under article 9 of the same convention the tariffs exchanged between the British and Turkish delegates on the 16th July, 1923 (see pages 33 to 39 of the Lausanne Blue Book, Turkey No. 1 (1923)) are necessary for the Khaki Election Manifesto (see page 6 of the Lausanne Blue Book, Turkey No. 1 (1923)) and Mr Hurst's assistant in the Library has been endeavouring to obtain copies. It may be necessary to consult the Treasury as to the course they may eventually be authorised to adopt in the matter of negotiations with Turkey for such period as may be provided for the duration of the Convention with the Turkish Government with respect to the treaty rights of the Capitulations.

Action—It may be useful to suggest to the Board of Trade that in the course they draw attention of the companies concerned to the situation.

(b) Under the same convention the Allied countries are to determine as to questions arising out of records, registers and designs in connection with the services relating to industrial property, and their eventual transmission to the Turkish authorities. Notes of the Board of Trade in favour of which certificates may be obtained from Turkey. No time limit should be fixed for the completion of the operations.

Action—No action will be necessary on the part of the Department after the treaty has come into force. It will, however, be necessary to draw the attention of the Board of Trade to Article 9 of the Convention regarding the necessity for an Anglo-Turkish convention on this matter.

(c) Under the same convention the contracting Powers reserve the right to declare that agreements between companies, &c., and concessions granted by the Ottoman Government in relation to forests, &c., and certain articles of the mines convention relating to forests &c., are void.

Action—The Foreign Office will be asked to give instructions regarding this declaration and further action will be necessary at present.

IV—*Concessions Protocol*

(a) Under article 2 it will be necessary for Armstrong Whitworth and Messrs Vickers to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government as soon as possible after the treaty has come into force with a view to the modification of the provisions of their pre-war concessions in Turkey, or to the grant of new concessions in substitution of equivalent importance.

Action—Action will be taken by the Department to draw the attention of the companies to this article officially before the treaty has come into force.

(b) Under articles 3, 4 and 5 of the same Turkish Declaration attached to the concessions protocol it will be necessary for British ex-ottoman companies which, before 1st August 1914 British capital was preponderant to ask with the Turkish Government as soon as possible after the treaty has come into force of the treaty, the question of getting into conformity with the new conditions and declare the provisions of their pre-war contracts and agreements &c.

[illegible]ction As the treaty is [illegible] interested concessionaires [illegible] presented by the earlier [illegible] concessions, it does not seem necessary for the present to [illegible] any decision as to [illegible] whether attention [illegible] the concessions

V Outstanding Italian

By letter of the 6th addressed to the 24th July 1923 by Ismet Pasha to the President of the Turkish Delegation regarding certain railway concessions [illegible] agreements of the Ankara and Smyrna to Kasaba Railway Extension Railways and the Haidar Pasha [illegible] Ismid to the coming into force of the present treaty and [illegible]

Action As the Allied Governments [illegible] to be consulted for the purpose of securing to the Turkish Government [illegible] action in regard to any such [illegible] as may be necessary to obtain [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible]

I have &c. HORACE RUMBOLD

Foreign Office, September 6, 1923

No. 222

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7)

(No. 370)
Telegraphic. R. *Athens, September 6, 1923*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 450

Reference to the treaty was received by telegram No. 298, and I presume there is no objection to my doing so. (Athens No. 359)

Spanish Legation were duly notified by letter a few days ago and to-day informed Greek Government that notification had been transmitted telegraphically to Constantinople.

No. 223

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7)

(No. 371)
Telegraphic. R. *Athens, September 6, 1923*

MY telegram No. 301

I received from Greek Government last night a note dated 1st September acknowledging my notification of the coming into force of the Treaty in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 224

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7)

(No. 453)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 7, 1923*

ATHENS telegram No. 308 and my telegram No. 450.

Turkish Government are not to be invited to sign with exception of Polish Minorities Convention [illegible] variety of Greek satisfaction proceed Powers regret Turkish Government [illegible] how we expect to be satisfied already Greeks [illegible] first step [illegible] Spanish Legation Athens [illegible] Spanish Legation Allied High Commissioners [illegible] latter would probably satisfy Greeks but as replying acceptance by Greek authorities some form or another [illegible] notification should be received shortly [illegible] as soon as possible Turkish Government.

Repeated to Athens No. 110.

No. 225

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7)

(No. 452)
Telegraphic. R.
MY telegram No. 428 *Constantinople, September 7, 1923*

French Government have informed High Commissioners that since article No. 143 does not become operative till it [illegible] into force, League of Nations cannot appoint temporary commissioner and therefore non-Allied entitled should [illegible] to an agreement with Turkish Government on the subject.

As I saw no objection to this proposal I proceeded to Ahmed Bey to say that I presumed discussion should continue [illegible] position to engage [illegible] necessary appointment. I said that my colleagues were in agreement in principle subject to possible modification of personnel [illegible] commissioners. Would be necessary to retain after termination of evacuation Officer Commanding [illegible] prepared subject to War Office concurrence to allow Major Ross to continue to [illegible] present [illegible]. I asked Ahmed Bey whether Angora would agree to this. He said that [illegible] to engage [illegible] work of Mixed Commissions regarding construction of railways [illegible] period prior to [illegible] force of treaty, and that [illegible] related to [illegible] proceed to [illegible] force of treaty.

I [illegible] to hear if you [illegible] whether [illegible] arrangements [illegible] agreed. Please repeat to Athens as Greek Government [illegible] approval should [illegible] be obtained.

(Repeated to Athens No. 111.)

No. 226

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received September 7

(No. 454)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 7, 1923*

I HAVE received note from Ismet Pasha stating that [illegible] article 143 of treaty Turkish Government [illegible] instructed to [illegible] request of six Powers to deposit at Paris instruments [illegible] Treaty. Another resolution [illegible] questions respecting Straits [illegible] Turkish [illegible] communications [illegible] foreigners [illegible] Portugal.

As regards [illegible] Portugal [illegible] after [illegible] necessary to [illegible] rather than [illegible] desirable [illegible] Portuguese [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] paid out particularly when [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] Straits [illegible] above mentioned.

Similar [illegible] sent to Rome, Brussels, Tokio, High Commissioners.

No. 227

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Received September 7

(No. 474)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 7, 1923*

YOUR telegram No. 269

Is sequestration of [illegible] stock to be [illegible]?

French High Commissioner will [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] is pressing for reply from British and Italian Governments since it is [illegible] to be lost.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 228

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—Received September 8.)

(No. 455.) *Constantinople, September 7, 1923.*
Telegraphic.)

MY despatch No. 364.

I would be grateful for early reply. I learn from secret source that Shereef Ali Haidar has informed Caliph that he has decided to go to Egypt and has asked latter to give him letter recognising him as Shereef of Mecca.

Caliph, who was still in doubt, advised that he should not do this, then suggested Turkish Government should help shereef and latter's son Abdul Mejid will probably go to Angora and appeal there for assistance.

No. 229

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 7.)

(No. 456.) *Constantinople, September 7, 1923.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 268.

I think that it would be better that ex-Sultan should not reside in Cyprus. Close proximity of Turkey with consequent contingencies which might be more or less awkward for us, as well as the resentment of Turks. His presence in Cyprus might even lead to attempt to assassinate him. For reasons I regard proposal as undesirable.

Treasury authorities would probably not be in the way of departure of Sultan's family from Constantinople. I am not aware that he has any private property here except possibly his palaces. Palaces and estates are State property since 1910. In principle of the treaty Angora would have the right to refuse release from sequestration, but they might not exercise that right, as stipulated under protocol attached to Lausanne Treaty. I do not know whether Angora would be prepared to do anything further, even if he were to offer readily to abdicate.

No. 230

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople.)

No. 272.)
Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, September 7, 1923.*

THRACIAN Frontier Convention between Greece and Turkey was signed and under article 2 of the Boundary Commission Convention between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey of the latter of these two Conventions the Greek and Turkish Governments are entitled to appoint each an agent to watch on their behalf the proceedings of the Boundary Commission, and to lay before it such observations as they may think fit to make. Bulgaria, not being a party to the Thracian Convention, has no such right, but it is understood that the Bulgarian Government may avail themselves of the facilities afforded by article 2 of the Boundary Convention to appoint an agent to watch the proceedings of the Commission.

2. This raises the general question what Diplomatic Body is to co-ordinate salaries and other expenses of each Commission under the Lausanne settlement. While present I think Boundary Commission is the only instrument on the frontiers of Turkey which must affect the question of boundaries or demilitarised zones under articles 4 and 5 of Straits Convention as well as any co-ordination of appointments, &c. which may be necessary under the treaty settlement. Only other Boundary Commission on that for Graeco-Turkish frontier under article 2 of main treaty as between Greece and Turkey who were alone represented on it and territory adjacent to it is present.

3. In the case of other treaties this kind of work has been done by Ambassadors Conference as in Paris to the Treaty of Lausanne suffers from other treaties with ex-enemy Powers in that France, Great Britain and Italy were placed in a special position with regard to the execution of the latter and the Ambassadors Conference was set up and organised in virtue of that special position. In the case of the Lausanne Treaty all treaty articles are generally speaking on a footing of equality as regards the execution of the treaty and a special body is established for this purpose. France, Great Britain and Italy would certainly not be entitled therefore to set up any co-ordinating or supervising body in which they would hold a predominant position. I therefore incline to the view that meetings of the diplomatic representatives of the interested Powers at Constantinople should be held from time to time to do this work. This body would be notified by each Government of the appointments to any commission to be set up under the treaty, and would discuss and fix by joint agreement the salaries and expenses of the commissioners, &c. It would also see that the time limits laid down in the treaty for the appointments of commissions, &c. and the completion of their work were adhered to.

4. Please discuss this informally with your French and Italian colleagues and Adnan Bey, and telegraph your views as soon as possible. You should, of course, make it quite clear especially to the latter, that I am not suggesting the establishment on Turkish territory of any internationalised body to control the execution of the treaties as a whole, but simply an agency for the convenience of the signatories as regards the co-ordination of appointments, salaries and the setting to work of commissions under the treaty. In the case of the Thracian Frontier Convention, the Greek and Bulgarian diplomatic representatives would be represented on the diplomatic body as well as France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey. As regards the Boundary Commission for the demilitarised zones under the Straits Convention only France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey will be concerned under the terms of the Convention.

5. This telegram is being repeated to Rome and Paris for the views of the French and Italian Governments.

6. This proposal may entail extra work on your staff, but except as regards the Thracian Frontier Convention this should not be the case until towards the end of the two-year period, since the treaty as a whole is unlikely to enter into force.

(Addressed to Constantinople No. 272, repeated to Paris No. 327 (by bag), Rome No. 230, Sofia No. 39, and Athens, No. 147.)

No. 231

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Erskine (Sofia.)

No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, September 7, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 272 to Constantinople.

Please see communication which Bulgarian Legation are instructed to make to you regarding ratification by Bulgaria of Thracian Frontier Convention, and reply to Athens and Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 273.)

No. 232

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 8.)

No. 459.)
Telegraphic.) R *Constantinople, September 8, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 451.

Delegate of Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been officially notified by Spanish Legation of Greek ratification.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 113.)

No. 233

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople.)

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, September 8, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 450 of 5th September. Exchange of Populations Convention.

Please see my telegram No. 329 to Paris. British member of Council of the League of Nations is being asked to execute appointment of League members of mixed commissions under article 11.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 149.)

No. 234

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 329.
Telegraph. R. *Foreign Office, September 8, 1923*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 443 (of 31st August) Turkey and Greek ratification of the Lausanne treaty.

Please inform the French Government as soon as possible of the Turkish Government's enquiry and state that His Majesty's Government propose to reply that they see no reason to question the validity of the Greek Government's ratification of the treaty as regards the right of the Greek representatives to sign it.

You should add that His Majesty's Government assume that the French Government's attitude is now cordial and should ask for a very early reply.

No. 235

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 9.)

No. 451.
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, September 9, 1923.*

GREEK chargé d'affaires called at 4th September (sic) to say that Mr. Venizelos's statement to Reuter's correspondent (my telegram No. 443) [of 31st August] was not to be taken as official declaration of Greek Government's attitude towards Lausanne Treaty. Greek Government had not yet had time to study Treaty, and would not be in a position to make official declaration for some days. Meanwhile, Greek Government would not take any steps which might be regarded as contravening Treaty.

2. I told chargé d'affaires that I had no official information on the subject, but that I had read Venizelos's statement in the press. I could not believe that Greek Government would be so foolish as to refuse to ratify Treaty, which was the best they could hope for in the circumstances.

3. Chargé d'affaires replied that Greek Government had no intention of refusing to ratify Treaty, but that they must have time to study it.

4. I said that I could not understand why Greek Government should require time to study Treaty, which they had had in their hands for more than a month, and which they had had ample opportunity to study during the Conference. I could only repeat that I hoped that Greek Government would not be so foolish as to refuse to ratify Treaty.

5. Chargé d'affaires then said that Greek Government had no intention of refusing to ratify Treaty, but that they must have time to study it. He added that Greek Government would not take any steps which might be regarded as contravening Treaty.

6. I said that I could not understand why Greek Government should require time to study Treaty, which they had had in their hands for more than a month, and which they had had ample opportunity to study during the Conference. I could only repeat that I hoped that Greek Government would not be so foolish as to refuse to ratify Treaty.

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No. 236

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 9.)

No. 452.
Telegraphic. *Private.* *Constantinople, September 9, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 439 (repeated to Paris).

Inverse General [illegible] Ministers. At present is utilised to [illegible] Greek press and Greek statesmen to interference to Armenia. But will [illegible] British subjects generally.

Repeated to Athens No. 117 and Malta No. 15.

E 9073 199 44] No. 237

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received September 10.)

No. 453.
My dear [illegible] *Constantinople, September 9, 1923.*

SINCE [illegible] of the Treaty of Lausanne the sittings of the Greek National Assembly [illegible] the [illegible] of the Democratic Party [illegible] Venizelist party [illegible].

[illegible] the Assembly's debates party [illegible] Assembly [illegible] settlement [illegible] of

the party, the lessons of which are [illegible] merely submitted to the Assembly for approval. In this way the general public is apparently to be left in ignorance of the views expressed by dissentient deputies, while the treasonable attacks [illegible] open at the regular critical [illegible] public speeches and in the press. The procedure is in fact government by caucus, which however practicable in a more civilised country, may act for some time [illegible] by the [illegible] object of his country.

3. Meanwhile [illegible] that the secret [illegible] assassins have not shaken the general [illegible] which [illegible] had been expected. The resignation of Reouf Bey as [illegible] to [illegible] of Morsse Kazim Effendi as Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] accepted that [illegible] may fix [illegible] changes. The official reason given for this resignation is, as usual, that [illegible] Constantinople press has refused to accept this version and [illegible] ascribed it to the Minister's refusal to accept the Government's proposals for [illegible] or rejection of the prohibition [illegible] to the [illegible] the Government's action was to [illegible] the Assembly's debates [illegible] dissatisfaction has been caused [illegible] by the neglect of the third condition [illegible] deputies. Fuad Bey, [illegible] by the Government, has [illegible] Morsse Kazim Effendi, who is [illegible] Minister was for [illegible] and Reouf Bey [illegible] successor is certain Mustafa Fevzi Effendi, one of the deputies for Sivas, [illegible] by a vote in Assembly of 170 [illegible] votes received [illegible] by which Ministry [illegible] interest [illegible] lead [illegible].

4. Sir [illegible] has received [illegible] from Angora [illegible] days ago Kazim Karabekir Pasha [illegible] Minister of Marine, Kemal [illegible] Ali Fuad Pasha [illegible] Vice-President of the Assembly, [illegible] present [illegible] Government [illegible] the [illegible] of the Assembly [illegible] Ismet Pasha [illegible] Foreign Affairs [illegible] Commander-in-Chief [illegible] General Staff [illegible] Assembly [illegible] Government [illegible] Assembly [illegible] Government [illegible] Assembly [illegible] Government

the collaboration of foreign experts. On the 31st [illegible] the newspaper "Ikdam," in its leading article, even deplored the fact that the only Turk who would be likely efficiently to discharge the duties of prefect was Dr Djemil Pasha, a former prefect and Minister of Public Works under Damad Ferid Pasha. As however this able official was in his absence [illegible] of some years of imprisonment owing to his association with Ferid Pasha, the 'Ikdam' like some other organs which subsequently referred to the article of their contemporary, has [illegible] perforce to resign itself to regarding its choice as unrealisable.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner

[E 9074/313/34] No. 238

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 11)

No. 714 Confidential *Constantinople, September 4, 1923*
My Lord

THE Persian Ambassador called upon me to-day to tell me of his recent [illegible] adventures in Angora.

2. He first of all recalled to my mind the fact that he had [illegible] his letters of credence and of the speech he proposed to make on presenting them, the use thereof in the event of Ismet Pasha's attempting to [illegible] the use thereof in the event of Ismet Pasha's attempting to [illegible] subsequently altered owing to [illegible] fact that the letters were addressed to Mustafa Kemal Pasha as President of the Government instead of to the Grand National Assembly as [illegible] to regard the [illegible] maintained that in effect [illegible] Isaak Khan whatever explanation [illegible] meant to imply the contrary.

3. Isaak Khan then proceeded to [illegible] translation which accompanied [illegible] Excellence Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

4. Isaak Khan then [illegible] Turkish draftsmen were [illegible] to have overlooked the fact that the letters of credence should be addressed to the Grand National Assembly and not to the President of the Government, and that the Ambassador should be accredited personally to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. [illegible] to the Persian Sublime Porte, and [illegible] Angora for [illegible] Isaak Khan replied that he was instructed by his Government to present his letters of credence to the President of the Government, and that he could not [illegible] to the Grand National Assembly. He was [illegible] Government to give Mustafa Kemal a position which [illegible] recognised Turkish assembly.

5. Isaak Khan then [illegible] Angora for an answer from his Government, but [illegible] to return at once to Angora with a letter from the Shah [illegible] Mustafa Kemal Pasha. [illegible] post such letters over to Persia, to request the Foreign Office to [illegible] of the letters of credence should be made out. [illegible] apology had been made by Turkish Ambassador there [illegible] that as he had been instructed to return without [illegible] explanation of the facts of the case his Government [illegible] Affairs [illegible] Constantinople.

6. Isaak Khan expressed [illegible] solution [illegible] which [illegible] Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Ambassador has been [illegible] Persian Government at the indignity to which their Ambassador has been

exposed. He was obviously and naturally feeling hurt and resentful and was at pains to inform me of the various expressions of respect for his own person which he had received. He gave me a further picture of the discomforts of Ismet Angora and the hundreds of [illegible] de poussière which [illegible] the residence [illegible] had been placed at his disposal.

7. I elicited that he had conversed with both the Soviet Ambassador and the Afghan representative. They were he said both profoundly discontented with the present Turkish Government and he [illegible] between Russia and Turkey the Caucasus will [illegible] two years. The Persian Ambassador [illegible] at a party the day of his return from Angora, and [illegible] that he found there a strong [illegible] opposition to Mustafa Kemal. I gathered from Isaak Khan, or the general [illegible] the great majority of the Assembly were devoted to the Ghazi Pasha and [illegible] and that it was upon existing in the same house [illegible] Ismet however that Refik Suny Bey had said [illegible] that he did not propose to resign. [illegible] were generally known that Mustafa Kemal [illegible] foreign Ambassadors being accredited to him personally rather than to the Grand National Assembly.

8. The [illegible] interest the object of the [illegible] with the letters of credence was [illegible] day. He read aloud the reply, and was at [illegible] brought forward [illegible] the passage in the speech referring to Mustafa Kemal in the case of the [illegible] Persian Government would have [illegible] the Sublime Porte regarding Mustafa Kemal's [illegible] of the Supreme Authority. His powers are [illegible] and [illegible] and [illegible] and his [illegible] and [illegible] and [illegible] and

tans. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the "Times" to-day describes the outbreak of Organisation in Anatolia as largely political. It quotes as its cause a party certain Opposition leaders who suffered in the recent elections because of the reader of Ankara.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner

No. 240

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (General)

No. 63.)
(Telegraphic) R
Foreign Office, September 10, 1923

FOLLOWING for Mr. Tufton:—

"Your letters of 1st and 7th September to Mr. Oliphant. Appointment by League of Nations of Commissioner for Greco-Turk railway through Karagatch under article 107 of Lausanne Treaty.

"Please arrange that no action be taken on our letter to the League of Nations of 29th August regarding appointment of Commissioner under article 107 of the Lausanne Treaty. French Government take technically correct view that no such action can be taken by League until treaty enters into force. Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have therefore suggested to the Turkish Government continuance in office during interim period of present Allied Naval Commission under Mudros armistice, and they anticipate Turks will raise no objection. Greek Government are being sounded, but are also unlikely to object.

"Letter follows."

No. 241

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 330) and Rome (No. 231)

(Telegraphic) R
Foreign Office, September 10, 1923

MY telegram No. 272 to Constantinople.

Please ascertain French and Italian Governments' views.

(Addressed to Paris No. 330 and Rome No. 231.)

No. 242

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 331), Athens and Rome (No. 234).

(Telegraphic)
Foreign Office, September 10, 1923

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 272 of 7th September. Article 107 of Lausanne Treaty regarding supervision of traffic over railway between Greece and Turkey in Europe and Greco-Turkish frontier.

Please inform French (Italian) Government that His Majesty's Government had suggested to the Secretary General of the League of Nations on 29th August that the League of Nations should at once appoint the commissioner referred to in article 107 of the Treaty. Latter has been requested to submit the name of a British officer for the post who in their opinion has special qualifications for the work. They realise however that such a nomination before the treaty could only be effected with the assent of the Greek and Turkish Governments.

2. As the Allied High Commissioners have now suggested the continuance in office of the present Inter-Allied Railway Commission during the interim period before the entry into force of the treaty, His Majesty's Government will take no further action on the above-mentioned request to the League.

3. You should therefore invite the French (Italian) Government, if they agree, to send immediate instructions to the French (Italian) representative at Athens to request the Greek Government jointly with his British colleague to agree to the proposal of the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople.

(Addressed to Paris No. 331 and Rome No. 234, repeated to Athens No. 153, and Constantinople No. 277 (in R).)

No. 243

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)

No. 154.)
Telegraphic R
Foreign Office, September 10, 1923

MY telegram No. 331 to Paris.

You should act accordingly as soon as your French and Italian colleagues receive instructions.

E 9974/1/44] No. 41

Summaries of and Memorandum on the Main Events in Europe since June 1921

[Following is summary of main events since the Near East situation became acute in June 1921.]

June–July 1921.

The Greek Government, after the offensive checked by the Nationalists in front of the Sakaria, prepared for a further advance.

July

On the 10th July the Greeks again started operations. By the 20th they had occupied Afiun Karahissar, but Vezirkhan and Eskishehr

September

On the 1st September the Greek army reached the Sakaria River, the furthest point it was to advance. By the 11th September the Greeks had lost the offensive battle, and on the 23rd September Eskishehr was again apparently forty miles in front of the Greek army just west of Eskishehr was Afiun Karahissar.

October

Shortly after the victory the Angora Government concluded with the Russian Soviet Government a treaty of alliance at Kars on the 13th October, and they also, as part of the conclusion of the Kars agreement of the 20th October with M. Franklin Bouillon, a pact on behalf of the French Government. This agreement confirmed Bolshevik recognition of Turkey, the northern frontier of Syria was laid down by the Treaty of Sèvres, all pecuniary claims of Angora against Russia were abandoned, and Russia undertook to support Angora's claims regarding the Straits, Turkey on the same lines as the Soviet Republic had concluded treaties with European States and generally speaking pledged herself to no other agreements in respect of settlement of questions which were of Moscow and not purely of Eastern importance. Lord Curzon at once protested against the conclusion of this agreement, and correspondence was exchanged with the Soviet Government resulting in effect in their assuring His Majesty's Government that the agreement was only intended to be of a defensive character as provision would be made to get rid of any general settlement to be concluded between the Allies and Turkey.

November

Towards the end of October the Greek Prime Minister M. Gounaris came to London and had a series of meetings with Lord Curzon, the last of which was on the 14th November. In these meetings he endeavoured unsuccessfully to throw us

case into the sole hands of Great Britain but Lord Curzon eventually succeeded in extracting a somewhat qualified assurance from him and his Government that he would accept Allied mediation

Having obtained this assurance Lord Curzon endeavoured towards the end of 1921 to bring the Greeks and Italians into conference to discuss the terms of such mediation

January 1922

Short lived French and M Bonar Law soon after the Cannes Conference caused a further set back to Allied unity as regards the formation of the Government in Rome [illegible] unstable interregnum being [illegible] until March 1922

February

Meanwhile Mr Lloyd George had written to Lord Curzon on the 15th February intending His Majesty's Government on Greece's acceptance of the offer of joint Allied mediation [illegible] naval and military assistance from Great Britain [illegible] that the Greek territorial rights should be [illegible] *quo* in Asia Minor which Mr Lloyd George felt essential if Turkey were to be persuaded to accept terms of the most liberal character Hereupon on the 6th March appeared Mr Lloyd George's historic ultimatum Greece left alone to settle with Mustapha Kemal Angora Turkey and Soviet Russia with the knowledge that the Allies were determined to enforce neutrality in the Graeco Turkish conflict should the latter desire it was declared neutrality in the Graeco Turkish conflict should the latter desire it was declared that any attempt by Greece to raise the siege of Ismid would be regarded as an unfriendly act and possibly [illegible] reprisals

March

Representatives of the Associated Powers and Angora Government were invited to London on March 1922 as a preliminary to the meeting of the Allied conference The representatives of both Governments had several interviews with Lord Curzon at which the grounds for a possible solution were explored The Allied conference met in London on the 22nd 26th March and agreed upon certain proposals to be put to the two belligerent countries These proposals were [illegible] together with [illegible] would be entered into the Greek Smyrna [illegible] regarding the terms [illegible] Agreement was reached upon the question of Thrace the Greek Government [illegible] to support the Turkish claim to the line [illegible] Turkey [illegible] to support the Greek claim to the line [illegible] Lord Curzon [illegible] the Greek Government [illegible] Thrace [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] Thrace [illegible]

Convention. Bulgaria delegates were participated. Representatives of Belgium and Portugal took part in the discussions on the economic, financial and capitulatory questions and the discussions on the latter questions were also attended by the representatives of various neutral countries.

February 1923

The first phase of the Lausanne Conference lasted from the 20th November, 1922 to the 4th February 1923. It was followed by the formal presentation on the 31st January and the 1st February of the Turkish counter-treaty settlement with which it was hoped to reach finality. It was to be a process in concessions and submissions in which the united Powers, Ismet Pasha and Pirate negotiations between leaders of the three Allied delegations and Ismet Pasha continued during the next six days. The 4th February Ismet Pasha, emerging after the meeting of the three delegates, visited the talk, the points of territorial clauses of the Turkish counter-treaty, the capitulatory articles, the question of Eastern possessions were dealt by the Allies in the order to meet Soviet Russia's Eastern Pasha remained constant of the great Belgian Sunday, on the 4th February, and the outcome was announced specially. The delegates to bring home Minutes of the sitting of the Allied Powers to the Allied counter-treaty is exactly the details of the latter are together with explanation of the concessions offered in the Book of the conference was published in a Blue Book by His Majesty's Government.

March

On the 21st March the Turkish Note of Ismet Pasha, dated the 19th March, was published. It was the Turkish counter-proposals which parts of the proposals the Allied delegates brought to Lausanne on the 4th February and the proposals of the Allied delegates on the 20th March.

These proposals were discussed at the three Foreign Ministers' meeting in London on the 21st March 1923. As a result the Turkish Government were informed by the Foreign Powers that the Lausanne conditions the signed on the 20th April.

Meanwhile, the Lausanne Conference had been adjourned to the 23rd April, after the Turkish delegates had left Lausanne. The Grand National Assembly at Angora had ratified the concession to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration of the Ottoman Empire, and the Turkish Government had also signed the Treaty of Lausanne. The Allied Powers were to sign the Treaty on the 24th July 1923. Early in its proceedings it was hoped that the Conference would be concluded by the 20th August 1920. It is quite true that the Treaty of Sèvres had been detached from the Turkish territories except Thrace, but Turkey territories left with Turkey Street. Allied troops in order that Turkey might be forced to make more for the large war stores ceased to the Allies by the Armistice of 1914. The first stage consisted of virtually Allied control over the Straits, the Turkish budget, Turkish communications, and the Turkish army, navy, and air forces.

The Lausanne Treaty does not include Eastern Thrace to Turkey. It leaves the questions of frontiers and access to the Turkish government. It not only leaves all questions of independent Armenia, carved partly out of Turkish eastern vilayets, but it also gives Turkey's frontier with Russia where it was fixed in Turkey's past treaties or treaties with the Russian Soviet Government. Thus Kars, Ardahan, a large strip of territory which was Russian in 1914 are included in Turkey, and territory of Russian Armenia, still nominally a semi-independent State federated with the Russian Soviet, is much circumscribed. For the rest, while the treaty recognises the cession of all the other territories and, in

were on the way to settlement. The other two questions, the one financial and the other economic, mainly concerned France, although there was a substantial British interest in the latter concessions. Largely by British negotiation, the French were induced to accept settlement of the pre-war debt question which left the question of the arrears outside the treaty for future discussion between the Turkish Government and the bondholders. The concessions question was settled by the Ottoman Turks in the main agreeing to give a substantial measure of satisfaction to the Allied economic interests concerned. The issue was, however, modified and the terms obtained were less favourable than they might have been if the Allies were agreed on the interim period between the two phases of the conference. The agreement between the Grand National Assembly and what is generally known as the Ismet interests was reviewed, what precisely amounted to a monopoly of the railways in Turkey, to the exploitation of mines on the side of the Allies, but the American observer, while regarding the new rate of duties, the agreed assistance to the Allies in the negotiations, and the little resistance in the two stages of the conference, the question of concessions.

The first of the Government's objectives by the Treaty of Lausanne and other documents was to be the former ratification might take place in the period of the evacuation of Constantinople by the Allied troops, which was to be completed within six weeks, namely, by the 4th October. Under the terms of the treaty, all the provisions of the Executive Period, the period of the Straits, and the Treaty of Great Britain will come into force to enable negotiations with Turkey to be carried with a treaty at date. The ratifications of Greece and Turkey to be exchanged into force the Exchange of Ratifications of the Treaty of Peace of the evacuation of military and naval forces of the Allied Powers from Turkey and Greece. The ratifications also record the new status between Greece and Turkey. Associates Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria. The ratifications of Greece will be the Greece.

Countries to be set in the Convention are the other countries to be signatories to the Treaty of Peace of the Allied Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. In the process all parties concerned will with a view to the early execution of measures that costs is desirable but the ratification shall be expedited as far as possible. It is the intention that the Dominions and Colonial Governments who were the day before by the Colonial Office and the India Office will be given an early date and at any rate before Parliament meets in November, so that they have assented to ratification of the treaty by Great Britain.

General observations on the Lausanne Settlement

The general impression was seen as the sea-serpent letters in this country and abroad were those as they stood upon the rushing victory of the Allies in 1918 and the first terms which peace has been made five years later. These terms are to be those of Sèvres unfavourably to the present settlement with that signed at Sèvres with the representatives of the Constantinople Government on the 10th August 1920. It is quite true that the Treaty of Sèvres left Turkey detached, and Turkey territories left Turkey except it also imposed on the former left with Turkey street. Allied troops in order that Turkey might be forced to make more for the large war stores ceased to the Allies by the Armistice of 1914. The first stage consisted of virtually Allied control over the Straits, the Turkish budget, Turkish communications, and the Turkish army, navy, and air forces.

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particular the Arab countries detached by the Treaty of Sèvres, with, however, a frontier with Syria more favourable to Turkey and with a possibility for Turkey of negotiating with Great Britain a frontier with Iraq more advantageous to Turkey than that laid down in the Sèvres Treaty. It leaves the Turks masters in their own house. The Allied controls contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres and the old privileges of foreigners under the capitulatory treaties, and of the Ottoman Greek and Armenian communities in Turkey are no longer recognised.

The articles of the Lausanne Treaty must however be taken with full account of the circumstances under which the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne were respectively negotiated, and the sequence of events since the armistice which had moved the Allied Powers to give Turkey the more favourable terms embodied in the latter instrument.

The Treaty of Sèvres was drawn up on the model of all the previous treaties which had been made with enemy Powers since the 1918 armistice. Drastic articles on the model of those in the other treaties were introduced into the Sèvres Treaty regarding reparations, war criminals, extradition, &c., and the measure of government control over Turkey's administration which existed before the war was largely increased. The settlement reached between Turkey and the Allies was bound up inextricably with the idea that by such drastic control Turkey could be established and retained as a Power in Europe. Article 1 of the Sèvres Treaty was never discussed or agreed with the Turkish Government, the main discussions and disputes were those between the Allies themselves, the terms which were finally imposed on the Turks were those which the Allies could practically impose upon them. The Treaty of Sèvres was in fact imposed upon Turkey but not entirely to the satisfaction of the Powers who had international political interests, which they considered to be of greater importance than the strength of the Government. The Grand National Assembly at Angora under Mustafa Kemal, who was already in the field against the Greeks on the Smyrna front, had at that time established a government in Asia Minor which was not prepared to accept the Treaty of Sèvres without drastic revision. Mustafa Kemal's victories in the spring of 1921 led to the Turkish-Bolshevik Agreement of the 16th March 1921 and the Franco-Turkish Agreement of October 1921 in the Near East. Mr. Lloyd George's fall in October 1922 and the defection of Great Britain from the Allies in September 1922 were the final blows.

The Lausanne Conference had therefore to deal altogether afresh with the Turkish question, which had ceased to be a question of the terms to be imposed upon a defeated enemy, but had become a question of how to secure the victory of the Nationalist Turks, who were in fact in a position to dictate terms with all the other Powers endeavouring to offset each other's demands. The Lausanne Conference had necessarily to be conducted largely by debate on the part of the various Powers and by persuasion and compromise. The divergence of view between Great Britain and her Allies on the one side, and the Turkish Nationalists on the other, had been clearly shown in the Near East crisis of September 1922, which had been followed by the Mudania Armistice of October 1922. Throughout the Lausanne Conference the Turkish delegation persisted in their refusal to accept any of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres which they considered derogatory to Turkish sovereignty. This attitude gave rise to great difficulty in obtaining from the Turks any concessions of importance, and Turkish arguments were backed by Soviet Russia, which had always been opposed to the Treaty of Sèvres and had refused to sign it. The Soviet Government had throughout been in close touch with the Turkish Nationalists, and had given them considerable support in men, money and munitions of war. Soviet Russia's object was to prevent the establishment of a Power which might be used as a base for operations against Russia in the Black Sea. The attitude of Soviet Russia was clearly shown by the Russian Note of the 23rd January 1923, which declared that the Straits and Bosphorus must be under Turkish control, and demanded the right of the Turks to pass troops across Thrace and the Straits. The object of Soviet Russia in obtaining control of the Straits was to establish a Soviet Government at Constantinople which Great Britain represented as to be established to supervise the Straits Convention. As a necessary corollary of this control over the Straits, Turkey has been given an international guarantee for the safety of Constantinople and the territories and

the Straits under which Great Britain, among other Powers, undertakes to carry out any measure decided upon for this purpose by the Council of the League of Nations. But this conditional and optional guarantee is not too large a price to pay for the change in the status of the Straits so manifestly favourable to British Imperial interests.

Arab Countries

Under articles in the treaty Turkey has definitely renounced all administrative or political rights over the territories detached from her Mediterranean and Arabian countries. It was stated that Great Britain, before the Lausanne Conference, had been in touch with Ibn Saud, the Arab ruler of Nejd, in connection with the frontier between Iraq and Nejd, which Great Britain desired to see on such a line as would not constitute a menace to the safety of Mosul, which was a cardinal factor in the military defence of Iraq. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne were not able to obtain any agreement to conduct their negotiations. It must also be remembered that while the Lausanne Treaty was being negotiated there was a considerable party at home clamouring not only for the surrender of Mosul by Great Britain but for the total withdrawal of British forces and interests from Iraq. Without the lukewarm support from the Allies Great Britain stood firm against the cession of Mosul to the Turkish assertion in the treaty which left the frontier between Iraq and Turkey to be settled by direct negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey or the decision of the question by surrender of the whole matter to the League of Nations. Turkey

Greece

Great Britain had never ceased to exert pressure during the first phase of the Lausanne Conference to induce Ismet Pasha to withdraw his troops from Gallipoli, on which the Greek British forces remained in occupation pending a permanent British control of the Straits, and to agree to the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the district round it being subject to a mandate from the League of Nations. It was on the full text of the Armistice of Mudania not being accepted by Ismet Pasha that Lord Curzon on the 4th October 1922 broke off the Lausanne Conference. The British Government had been in touch with the Greek Government throughout the Lausanne Conference, and the policy of the Greek Government was one which Lord Curzon had been instructed to support. Lord Curzon on the 4th October 1922 was able to announce that the Allies were prepared to agree to Eastern Thrace being restored to Turkey. At the same time he pressed strongly for the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Thrace, which was a result of the war with Turkey, and not provided for by the Treaty of Sèvres. The Greek Government had agreed to withdraw their troops from Thrace, but the withdrawal was delayed by the Greek Government's request that Adrianople should be retained by Greece. This request was refused by the Allies, and the Greek troops withdrew from Thrace on the 14th October 1922. The Greek Government had also agreed to withdraw their troops from Smyrna, but the withdrawal was delayed by the Greek Government's request that Adrianople should be retained by Greece. This request was refused by the Allies, and the Greek troops withdrew from Thrace on the 14th October 1922. The Greek Government had also agreed to withdraw their troops from Smyrna, but the withdrawal was delayed by the Greek Government's request that Adrianople should be retained by Greece. This request was refused by the Allies, and the Greek troops withdrew from Thrace on the 14th October 1922.

Finance and Economics

It was agreed that the Ottoman Public Debt, for which Turkey in the Lausanne Treaty undertook responsibility, should be apportioned between the successor States of the Ottoman Empire, and that Turkey should be relieved of all financial obligations and servitudes imposed upon her by the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkey was to be relieved of all financial obligations and servitudes imposed upon her by the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkey was to be relieved of all financial obligations and servitudes imposed upon her by the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkey was to be relieved of all financial obligations and servitudes imposed upon her by the Treaty of Sèvres.

It was stated that the Turkish Government had been in touch with the Ottoman Public Debt Council, and that the Council had been in touch with the Turkish Government. The Council had been in touch with the Turkish Government. The Council had been in touch with the Turkish Government.

countries together with the appeasement of Moslem countries which appears likely to follow the reconciliation between Great Britain and Turkey, seem sufficiently important achievements to silence most critics of the Lausanne settlement

Future of Turkey

It is impossible to forecast to what extent Turkey has now before her a period of external and internal peace but the fact that there has been no indication of any desire on the part of Turkey to fish in the neighbouring waters troubled by the Italo Greek crisis and the Turkish intrigue in other Moslem countries such as the Arab countries, Persia and Afghanistan appears to have abated, point to the possible sincerity of statements by Turkish statesmen that they really wish to concentrate now upon Turkey's internal reconstruction and development Such a policy can also be read into the recent statements made by the new Turkish Prime Minister Fethi Bey to the Grand National Assembly at Angora after its ratification of the Lausanne Treaty Turkey as however faced by those post peace problems by which other countries in Europe were seriously troubled after the conclusion of the post armistice peace treaties, and in particular she has to reorganise her civil service cut down her armed forces and provide employment for ex officers and soldiers The expulsion of experienced Greeks in Anatolia and the consequent dearth of skilled clerical and other labour which this entails are likely to increase her difficulties The task of Italian dyeing her hands already given rise to renewed brigandage and almost open rebellion in the Adalia Vilayet It remains to be seen whether Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues will retain sufficient prestige and strength to continue the task they have begun and to prevent the elements of opposition, which appear now to be concentrating round the remains of the old Committee of Union and Progress weakening to the point where their country will possibly be left to settle revolution as best it can On the whole however their position at present seems secure and it is possible that Europe may see some settlement and stability and reconstruction in the new independent Turkey

Foreign Office September 1923

H. LORBES VDAN

No 247

Sir Harold to the Marquess of Kedleston (Received September 11)

(No 533)
Telegraphic
Secret

Constantinople September 10 1923

YOUR telegram No 340

Secretary General Mudros will send Admiral Brock to Athens to discuss with Greek Admiralty question of withdrawal of Greek naval vessels from Dardanelles Conference to be held about 15th November

He added that he expected to be able to start on his return journey about 15th September

(Sent to Athens and Constantinople)

No 248

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir Horace Rumbold (Athens)

(No 156)
Telegraphic R

Foreign Office September 11, 1923

YOUR telegram No 375 of 8th September Attitude to be adopted by Mr Benthick towards Greek Minister of War

In exceptional circumstances of the present crisis I see no objection to War Office action reported in your telegram No 384 approved

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No 248

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No 334 (by bag)) and Rome (No 236 (R))

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office September 11, 1923

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 453 of 7th September has been received at Foreign Office

Please call French and Italian Government's attention to the fact that the Allied Governments have by treaty the power to assume control of the Straits in certain circumstances, and that it is therefore essential that the Allied Governments should be consulted in the event of the demilitarised zone of Thrace being occupied by Turkish troops, as would be the case if the Straits were attacked by Greek fleet and Greek troops were landed in Thrace with a view to the occupation of Constantinople

Please also ascertain if the French Government are in agreement with the instructions which have been issued to the British representative at the Straits Conference regarding the withdrawal of Greek refugees from Thrace and the return of Thrace to Greece It seems necessary that the last three paragraphs of the Allied instruments of ratification should be dealt with at the same time as the Straits Convention

It is important however that the three Allies should take the same line as regards the treaty obligations of Turkey that is to say that the signature was necessary if Turkey was to be admitted to the League of Nations but that the Straits should not be used to further Turkish aggression

(Repeated to Paris No 334 (by bag) and Rome No 236 (R) and to Constantinople No 278)

No 249

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Henderson (Constantinople)

(No 270)
Telegraphic R

Foreign Office September 11, 1923

YOUR telegram No 461 of 9th September Temporary occupation by Greeks of Gumruk Island in Maritza River

Before this question is taken up at Athens it will be useful to have a partial opinion as to present actual position of this island with reference to the question of the wire way of the Maritza or of its principal branch, or, if this part of the river is navigable, of the main channel of navigation We can hardly take action on partial Turkish statement without checking it Presumably General Harington still has officers near the spot who could report Please consult him

(Repeated to Athens No 158)

I think it would be as well to contemplate eventual extension in practice of powers of this body in which case heads of missions would be principal members. Question of presidency which Turks would probably claim on the ground that Frenchman presides at Ambassadors Conference in Paris, would then have to be considered

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No 247

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr Bentinck (Athens)

(No 156)
(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office September 11, 1923

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(Repeated to Athens No 158)

No. 250

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 13.*)

(No. 391.)
Telegraphic. R. *Athens, September 12, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 158.

As Greek Chief Secretary of Martial Law has been replaced all the press this morning is full of Political Director's letter to Allied Powers on the matter which has really nothing to do with Political Director. He says that Greek Government hope for speedy evacuation of Greek occupation. Last hope opened. He says that Allied Powers have agreed in principle on both sides of Greeks are to be locked in Thrace there have been a few casualties on both sides. Greeks are still in the process of retirement and as Boundary Commission would start operations in a few weeks time it is to remain as they were until then. He had to day been instructed by Minister for Foreign Affairs to draw up note of protest against Turkish attack.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 173.

No. 251

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 13.*)

(No. 29.)
Telegraphic. R. *Rome, September 13, 1923.*

YOUR telegram No. 217.

I shall have more good deal to say to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 252

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (*Received September 15.*)

(No. 231.)
Telegraphic. R. *Rome, September 15, 1923.*

YOUR despatch No. 1070.

[illegible] Government's attitude [illegible] suggestions would also meet views [illegible] disliked most. They like [illegible] matter which could be submitted to [illegible] Conference. Article 65 is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

illustrate the need for reforms admitted. It is also however the made[illegible] of the measures possible for their execution.

3. The following telegram is intended as a general point of future internal policy. No extra duties are to be collected as these are considered [illegible] which can be collected at present rates. The general [illegible] from all sources of the regular revenue of the interest be forthcoming proposal now under consideration, assist the re-establishment of Russian credit. Agricultural experts to be encouraged. States of the Agricultural Bank of the state to assist the less [illegible] progress by the issue of bonds [illegible] by the co-operative [illegible] necessary to the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The Italian Government were not averse to the suggestions that some amount should be placed on the amount to be received by the concessionary companies, and had suggested that the amount to be received by these companies should be limited to the proceeds of the 5 per cent Turkish Treasury bills 1911, referred to in article 14.

The British experts submitted that such a limitation was of the nature of an arbitrary character to be acceptable but agreed to the Italian Government's proposal in a modified form—namely, that the amount should be the proceeds of these Treasury bills or the sum of £846,100*l*. It is expected that the amount to be received by the companies in question will fall far short of this sum.

The British and Italian experts did not discuss drafting amendments to the 2 to August, but it was pointed out that moreover it was felt that the final French text would require the following drafting amendments may be pondered on:—

(*a*) The Treaty of Lausanne should read preferably to the Treaty of Peace with the Ottoman Empire signed at Lausanne on 24th July 1923" in paragraph 2 of the preamble and "the Treaty of Lausanne" in article 1, article 2 and article 3 where the words "the Treaty" should be omitted.

(*b*) Article 1 "The articles specified in the subjoined Protocol" (article 37 in accordance with the French drafting of the other treaties).

(*c*) Article 2 (1) (*a*) paragraph 2 of the Agreement dated [illegible] As regards the Allied States in question, the sum which, in accordance with the subjoined Protocol, is to be substituted for the sum of £T [illegible] paragraph 2 of the Protocol".

(*d*) Article 2 (2) (*b*) The date 24 [illegible] should be inserted.

(*e*) Article 2 (2) (*c*) The words "the Ottoman Empire" [illegible] should be omitted in the French version as the Protocol to which reference is made applies to the Ottoman Empire.

Convention relative à l'Emprunt et à l'indemnité pour les dommages subis en temps de guerre par les ressortissants de certains des Alliés en Turquie.

Le Président de la République Française, le Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Italie, Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes, et Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume de Grèce,

Désireux d'affecter à la réparation des dommages subis par les ressortissants des Puissances alliées et associées visées par le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie

Ont résolu de conclure une Convention à cet effet et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires savoir:

Lesquels, après avoir échangé [illegible] sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

ARTICLE 1er

Les Puissances [illegible] contractantes conviennent [illegible] sont engagées sous les conditions ci-après à [illegible] ressortissants:

1. Les sommes [illegible] du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie du [illegible] ci-après;

2. Les fonds du Trésor 5 pour cent 1911, [illegible] Sterling, que le Gouvernement [illegible] pour faire face aux dommages subis par les ressortissants [illegible] des dommages.

Ce fonds sera [illegible] par la Commission [illegible] Article 2 ci-après désignée comme suit:

ARTICLE 2

[illegible] Commission [illegible] sera [illegible] dans un délai [illegible] Traité avec la Turquie pour [illegible] dommages subis par les ressortissants [illegible] autres [illegible] Grèce tels [illegible] sont [illegible] désignées.

ARTICLE 3

Cette Commission se composera [illegible] trois membres nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie. Dans le cas où le dommage

intéresse au premier ressortissant [illegible] autre Gouvernement signataire, il sera alors fait à la Commission pour l'évaluation de ce dommage un membre additionnel nommé par ce Gouvernement. En cas de partage des voix, celle du président sera prépondérante.

ARTICLE 4

La Commission établira ses procédures et ses règlements assurant le prompt règlement des dommages.

La présidence sera tenue successivement par les représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie.

Les décisions seront prises à la majorité des voix.

Les décisions de la Commission seront sans appel.

Le Président de la Commission aura le droit de nommer des experts et de recevoir des dépositions sous serment.

Les dépenses de la Commission seront prélevées sur le fonds ci-dessus mentionné.

ARTICLE 5

Les litiges [illegible] intéressés devront être résolus dans le délai [illegible] à compter de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

ARTICLE 6

1. La Commission [illegible] les dispositions prévues à la présente Convention [illegible] ci-après:

(*a*) Les [illegible] autres que ceux visés au paragraphe 2 de cet article sans [illegible] les [illegible] du 1er août 1914 ou survenus par les ressortissants des Gouvernements signataires et ayant causé dans [illegible] personnelles ou leurs [illegible] ou [illegible] contre l'Empire [illegible] en général contractés avec [illegible] de prendre le tout et [illegible] engagements [illegible] ottomane. Tous les dommages [illegible] sont [illegible] ou [illegible] les [illegible] séquestre [illegible] biens, [illegible] dommages [illegible] ces sinistres [illegible] les [illegible] pertes par les ressortissants [illegible] et [illegible] par suite de tous faits de guerre, [illegible] ou [illegible].

(*b*) Les [illegible] grecs causés par [illegible] de Smyrne [illegible] et [illegible] propriétés des ressortissants [illegible] gouvernements signataires.

La Commission [illegible] pour [illegible] le [illegible] [illegible] attribuées à ce titre [illegible] sommes [illegible] reçues [illegible] [illegible] ailleurs [illegible] sera également [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Les reclamations des sociétés ou associations pour raison de la nationalisation par le Gouvernement turc de leurs propriétés, de leurs services qui devront être réglés par le Gouvernement turc conformément à l'article relatif aux sociétés de l'annexe [illegible] à la déclaration ci-annexée concernant les arrangements intervenus entre le Gouvernement turc et certaines sociétés.

ARTICLE 7

La commission instituera les fonds de garantie ou intéressera proportionnellement les porteurs de titres. Les décisions prises par la commission à la majorité simple des voix seront exécutoires par les soins des Gouvernements alliés [illegible] sur les ressortissants.

ARTICLE 8

La [illegible] conservatoire [illegible] après échange des ratifications de la présente convention [illegible] Traité de paix [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No. 266

H. Bentinck to the Marquess of Crewe (F.O. Receive September 20)

(No. 450 Confidential.) R. Athens, September 20, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE despatch of 1st September with reference to your telegram No. 331 to Paris.

It is not clear to what recommendations are made by all three High Commissioners or by Britain alone. My dispatches have not received further report on boat question, but I presume subject will be according to terms of article 107, League of Nations, relating to select commissioner.

In view of consumption of Rome telegram No. 233 statement of Turkish assurances to Italian Minister of Interior with regard to disposal of fact reported in my telegram No. 414, I propose to wait further instructions before acting on your telegram No. 154 (Dutch Minister is telegraphing to Rome in similar sense).

(Repeated to Constantinople and Rome.)

E 9437 1019 65] No. 267

Colonial Office to Foreign Office — (received September 21)

Secret.) *Downing Street, September 20, 1923.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 30th September, enclosing draft of reply to the Greek Government's note of 28th September regarding the treaty of Lausanne, and to say that Lord Curzon has already consulted the Secretary of State for India on the subject, and has requested your lordship to inform Viscount Peel that he will be glad to receive Sir H. Dobbs's reply to the telegram No. 485 of the 31st August, of which a copy was communicated to you with the letter from this Office of the 7th instant.

It will be seen that Sir H. Dobbs is in agreement with the Kaimakam of Baghdad and Prime Minister Hikmet in trying to view with sympathy the expressions of discontent which have recently been voiced by the Kurds, and to endeavour to conciliate them. The Duke of Devonshire is disposed to take at any rate a similar view, but appears to think that suggestions of such importance as to the grant of some form of self-government to the Kurds should be taken up by the Iraq Government themselves, and not by His Majesty's Government. He also thinks that any step of the kind would be premature at present, and likely to create a bad impression in Turkey and Persia. It is not likely that any offer of the kind would be made in the course of the impending negotiations at Lausanne, but if it were, Constantinople and the Turkish Government would be more likely to consider it favourably if they were not already aware that the British Government had in contemplation the grant of Kurdish self-government.

His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt, on the other hand, thinks that the Kurds are not yet sufficiently advanced to make self-government a success, and that the grant of it would be likely to lead to disorder and bloodshed. He is therefore opposed to any suggestion that the Kurds should be encouraged to look to Great Britain for support in the event of their attempting to secure self-government. He considers that the arguments for the grant of Kurdish autonomy against the Turks would be weakened if it were known that Great Britain had already promised it to the Kurds, and that the Turks would be more likely to consider favourably the question of granting autonomy to the Kurds if they were aware that the grant of it was not contemplated by Great Britain.

Lord Curzon would be grateful to have your views on the above points, and in particular on the question whether the time has arrived when the Turkish Government should be informed that His Majesty's Government are prepared to grant autonomy to the Kurds.

I am, &c.,

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

No. 268

H. Bentinck to the Marquess of Crewe (F.O. Received September 21)

No.

(Telegraphic.) R. Athens, September 21, 1923.

FOLLOWING is translation of telegram No. 414:—

Your telegram No. 154.

My last despatch dealing with Italian attitude in all sessions was sent to you under No. 331 to Paris.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 178, repeated to Rome No. 78.)

No. 269

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 341), Angora, Athens, Rome (No. 254, R.), Belgrade, Bucharest, Constantinople, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw (No. 178, R.), Berlin (No. 1,000, R.), Brussels (No. 1,000, R.), Copenhagen (No. 1,000, R.), Madrid (No. 1,000, R.), Stockholm (No. 1,000, R.), Tokio (No. 1,000, R.), Washington (No. 1,000, R.), Cairo (No. 1,000, R.), Tehran (No. 1,000, R.), Berne (No. 1,000, R.), Christiania (No. 1,000, R.), Rio de Janeiro (No. 1,000, R.), Buenos Aires (No. 1,000, R.), Santiago (No. 1,000, R.), Lima (No. 1,000, R.), Mexico (No. 1,000, R.), Montevideo (No. 1,000, R.), Peking (No. 1,000, R.), Bogota (No. 1,000, R.), Caracas (No. 1,000, R.), Guatemala (No. 1,000, R.), Habana (No. 1,000, R.), Quito (No. 1,000, R.), Rio de Janeiro (No. 1,000, R.), Salvador (No. 1,000, R.), Tegucigalpa (No. 1,000, R.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1923.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 473 of 18th September (Karagatch Railway Commission).

Please inform Government to which you are accredited and suggest that last sentence should be taken to mean that Allies and Constantinople Delegates Allied Generals are subject to proviso at last paragraph of despatch.

Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 1,000 (strict secret) concerning that it is authorised to the execution of article 107, when the treaty enters into force. This is one of the concessions which Greek Government are also prepared to accept [illegible] agreement.

(Addressed to Paris No. 341 and Rome No. 254, repeated to Constantinople No. 291, Athens No. 177 and Angora No. 88.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 270

The Ambassador at Constantinople to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 299 *Foreign Office, September 21, 1923*
Telegraphic.

YOUR Rodosto No. 443 of 31st August: Turkish attack on Greek outposts.

I am glad to hear that Ismet Pasha has decided to refer to Geneva question of Turkish attack on Greek outposts. Under Exchange of Notes of 13th October, 1922, Turkish Government would in fact appear to have no alternative.

2. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government regard it as certain that Turkish attack was effected in violation of Greek rights under the treaty as to which no real question who does not accept other signatories.

3. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government hope and trust that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question.

4. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government hope and trust that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question.

5. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government hope and trust that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question.

6. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government hope and trust that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question.

7. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government hope and trust that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question.

8. You should inform Ismet that His Majesty's Government hope and trust that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question. They also hope that Turkish Government will not take any step which could prejudice the peaceful settlement of the question.

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E 9479 199 44 No. 271

Mr. [illegible] to Mr. [illegible] Foreign Office, September 24

(No. 1)
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 1 of the 18th instant, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, relating to the question of Persian [illegible].

I am directed by Secretary Sir [illegible] to inform you that he has received

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[illegible] Mosul [illegible]

[illegible] Mosul [illegible]

[illegible] Mosul [illegible]

was installed in Shattakh, a small place, once half Armenian, on the upper waters of the Bohtan River, and connected with Van by a good road over a low easy pass.

From here the Nurduz district immediately to the south, consisting of high uplands or downs easy to traverse, was controlled. Sometimes a mudir, under the kaimakam, was installed in Merwanen, or a local agha was employed to look after the several villages of sedentary Kurds in Nurduz. These, with the district of Kho-shab (Makmudie) to the east, also the seat of a kaimakam, rarely gave any trouble, and these districts were well under control.

But it was to the south-west of Merwanen where difficulties began, as in that direction habitations ceased, and the great upland pasturages or "yailas" of the nomad Kurds commenced.

One of the largest of these "yailas" was that of Farashin, under the northern slope of Kokobulend Peak, usually occupied by the Hartoshi confederation of Kurds.

I have travelled along the line of migration of these nomads without seeing a single habitation after leaving Shernakh, near Jezire-ibn-Omar, until I reached Merwanen a fortnight later.

These nomads, principally of the Hartoshi and Miran confederations, were a constant source of trouble to the Vali of Van; after having wintered on the west bank of the Tigris, and crossed that river in spring by the boat bridge at Jezire, the sheep tax being collected as they traversed the bridge. His difficulty was to prevent petty raids and looting by these invaders, who might properly be said to belong to the Vilayet of Diarbekr, in which Jezire was situated, on villages of sedentary Kurds and Armenians in the Shattakh and Merwanen districts, and also to prevent inter-tribal fighting between the two great factions, the Hartoshi and the Miran, of the nomads.

For this latter purpose a half squadron of regular cavalry from the Van garrison was usually posted with the chief of the Hartoshi in the Farashin Yaila to watch his movements; and it may be noted that these troops were under the military Pasha of the Van garrison, and not directly under the Vali or Civil Governor, while these two officials did not always work together, thereby causing further trouble.

Generally, no military operations were undertaken against these two great confederations from Van, they being left to fight it out on their own in the autumn towards Jezire, which they usually did; the region between Merwanen and Shernakh being regarded as a sort of no man's land, at any rate outside the jurisdiction of the Governor of Van. As I have mentioned, the authority of the Sanjak of Hakkiari terminated about the Kokobulend Peak, and thus there was a wide area of country south-west of Nurduz before the authority of the Mosul Vilayet could be said to be reached, and consequently there was no idea at all of a settled frontier between the Vilayets of Van and Mosul in this direction.

It is true that at one time an attempt was made to instal a kaimakam under Van at Elk, a small village on the head waters of the Khabur, but shortly after I passed the charred remains of the kaimakam's house in that place, he having just escaped with his life from the surrounding Kurds, who burnt it over his head. As a result, the attempt was abandoned and not tried again, and, except when a small military expedition was sent to chastise some outlaws of the Zshiriki Kurds who attacked my caravan passing above Elk at Haidan-i-Ziril, the district was left alone, and no touch was preserved with the Mosul Government.

Looked at from the south, from the point of view of Mosul, a kaimakam was maintained at Amadia, who established a very shadowy authority over the powerful Kurdish Sheikh Berwari, who dominated the middle Khabur Valley, and was generally left alone by him.

Since our occupation, Mr. Jardine, one of our district officers, has travelled over and surveyed this middle Khabur district, and it would seem that any effective control by the Government of Van remains as far off as ever, namely, that it is still confined to Nurduz and Shattakh, a very long way off.

It may be mentioned that Shattakh was completely devastated and destroyed during the war, and that the uplands of Nurduz also suffered, so that the control of Van in this direction is probably more shadowy than ever, and miles out of touch with our present Mesopotamian border.

Thus again, taking the intricate mountain districts which lie north of Zakho traversed by the middle course of the Hazil River, we find that before the war the Mosul Government maintained a kaimakam in Zakho, but that he had little or no control over the Kurdish aghas who held various natural fastnesses in the gorges of the middle Hazil; they were left severely alone, except when their conduct became

outrageous, and then a small military expedition was organised in Mosul, and after much trouble managed to storm through their narrow gorges into their strongholds and extract some reparation for their continual looting.

Our own troops during the later stages of the war sent a small expedition into this district, and had some difficulty in penetrating the difficult fastnesses of these Kurds. The course of this river Hazil is a very curious one.

The upper waters consist of a large number of streams rising in Harakol Dagh and the other ranges which surround a wooded basin called Bestenjik, and then converging like the sticks of a fan to one enormous gorge in the hills to the south, where they unite to form the course of the middle Hazil, which, after traversing some very remarkable gorges and receiving tributaries through narrow limestone gateways on either hand, finally emerges into the Zakho plain and joins the Khabur below that town.

Now, the wide basin of the Bestenjik, although some 30 miles across, remained entirely uninhabited, except for a few parties of Kurds whom I saw gathering oak galls.

There were no villages at all, for the simple reason that it was on the track of the annual migrations of the nomad Kurds, the Hartoshi and Muran, to whom I have referred above, and to them a village was usually a place to loot.

Taking this with the semi-independent district along the middle Hazil, it will be seen that the Turkish kaimakam when in Zakho had to look far before he could find the frontier of any vilayet to the north of him.

As we have seen, that of Van was far away to the north-east in Nurduz. Directly north he would discern no settled government until he reached the other side of the great Harakol range, where the Vilayet of Bitlis maintained kaimakams in Khoskheir and Deh in the Bohtan. These depended on the mutaserif of the Sanjak of Sairt, who actually had an imperfect control over his kazas. Khoskheir was noted for its street fighting, when the adherents of the various local aghas were wont to exchange shots and conduct their local affrays up and down the main street in front of the konak. Such a kaza could scarcely be termed settled, and its frontiers to the south were quite indefinite.

Deh was a large village containing many Armenians, and is now probably derelict, while its boundaries have doubtless entirely lapsed.

Thus, with the wide independent space intervening, the frontiers of the Mosul Vilayet can scarcely be said to have marched with those of Bitlis at all.

Then, to the north-west of Zakho, the territory of an entirely separate vilayet was introduced, as at Jezire a kaimakam was posted under the Vilayet of Diarbekr.

The frontier between the two kazas, on the Zakho–Jezire road, were fairly well defined across the Nahrwan Plain, following our present line with the Turks there.

But the authority of the Jezire kaimakam did not extend far from the banks of the Tigris into the wild mountains which approach the bank east of that place.

Among these hills is Shernakh, the stronghold of the sedentary section of the powerful tribe of Hartoshi Kurds, under an agha who still exercises a very powerful influence, and claims to be a descendant or relation of Bedr Khan Bey, the Kurdish hero of 1837.

Beyond Shernakh to the east comes the uninhabited area of Bestenjik, which I have already described, while Derigule, in the Robsur Valley below Shernakh to the north, and a place on the nomad migration route, is under the Hartoshi chief also.

Shakh, in the hills a few miles east of Jezire, is the gateway leading to Shernakh, standing as it does at the mouth of the Tang-i-Ghelli, a fine limestone gorge, up which the track to Shernakh leads, the passage being once defended by two fine castles overlooking the gorge, which are now in ruins.

Shakh itself has walls and defences of the Roman period in good preservation, similar to those of Jezire, while the remains of a remarkable irrigation canal cut by the Romans in solid rock for a long distance, and meant to utilise the water of the stream in the gorge, can still be traced. The Kurds of Shakh regard themselves as under the Hartoshi chief of Shernakh, and the guardians of this gateway for him.

It was usual for the kaimakam of Jezire to fall in with this arrangement, while he exercised little authority over the Hartoshi, and probably the present Turkish Government find it convenient to do the same, unless they seek by underground propaganda to utilise the Hartoshi aghas for some action against our position in Zakho. It is to be hoped that our officers have taken measures to counter this, as these Hartoshi struck me as a fine stamp of Kurd, who would readily be loyal to us.

In article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora, 1921, the frontier regarding Jezire is referred to as follows: "Thence it will follow the old road between

" Nisibin and Jezire-bin-Omar, where it will join the Tigris. The localities of Nisibin " and Jezire-bin-Omar, as well as the road, will remain Turkish, but the two countries " shall have the same rights to the use of the road."

A commission comprising delegates of the two parties was to have been constituted within a period of one month from the signature of the agreement to determine the above-mentioned line, and it is to be hoped that the subtle mind of the Angora delegate did not put too wide a meaning on the word " locality " of Jezire-bin-Omar, a rather vague expression, I think, and extend the territory occupied rather too widely.

Now, taking the districts referred to as a whole, we find the Turks had only two general lines of control over this wide area of Kurdish mountains, one on the extreme east, that of Van–Bashkala–Diza and Neri, towards Rowanduz, and another on the extreme west from Bitlis, through Sairt and Jezire, towards Zakho, and they seem still to be utilising the same lines in the method of governing the country.

And I should imagine that at present the Turkish, or, rather Angora, Government has a rather weaker hold over these regions than the Government of the Ottoman Empire before the war.

The growth of the Kurdish national spirit, due largely to the presence of our forces and the evidence of our administration in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan, is, in my opinion, largely answerable for this, and should be encouraged further by us as far as possible.

The discussion of the Mosul frontier took place in January 1923 at the Lausanne Conference, the arguments put forward by Ismet Pasha for a Turkish occupation of the former Mosul Vilayet down to Jebel Hamrin being completely refuted in a speech by Lord Curzon at that time.

Among other details,* Lord Curzon remarked, on the point of strategy, that Ismet Pasha had said very little, and perhaps wisely. His Lordship added that Mosul would be an excellent place for an army corps to be stationed. The southern frontier was only 60 miles from Bagdad. Was it not obvious that a Turkish army placed at Mosul would have Bagdad at its mercy, and could make an Arab kingdom well-nigh impossible.

Such an argument holds with probably greater force to-day, as the Irak army is still insufficiently strong to withstand any Turkish advance without strong backing from us, especially as now in the minds of the Irak people the Lausanne Treaty was a moral victory for the Turks in the sense that in their eyes they have been able to flout the Western Powers, especially England, whom they thought so powerful, and to gain the right to expel foreigners and infidels from their country at will.

I might even add that, in my opinion, the Irak army will never be able to stand against the Turks without our support.

Or if I may put it more clearly, King Feisal's Irak army with its British advisers could not be trusted to stand for a moment against the Turks if the British garrison were withdrawn. The advisers would be quickly swept aside and might suffer an unfortunate fate.

Babylonia and Chaldaea were never able to stand against Assyria and invaders from the north, and their descendants could not do it to-day. But the Irak levies, composed of Kurds and Assyrians under the control of British officers, supported by British military and especially air force, may be expected to show a determined front to the Turks, and drive them out of their country and beyond, if called upon. The Turkish arguments regarding Mosul were completely refuted in January at Lausanne, but I scarcely think that sufficient attention was then directed to the very important strategic importance of Rowanduz looked at in conjunction with Mosul.

Assuming that the adjoining district with the various Kurdish tribes are under control, as they are at present under Sayyid Taha, Rowanduz stands as the key point on a very important trade route into North-West Persia and Tabriz by Rayat and the easy pass of the Garwa Sheikh on the frontier, up to which point the Russians constructed a metalled road during the war.

It would be an easy feat for modern engineering to construct a motor road through the Rowanduz gorge to join this road at the summit of the pass. Then there is the possibility of constructing a railway from Bagdad through Kirkuk, Rania and the Wazna Pass up the Lesser Zab Valley into Lahjan Plain, and thus entering North-West Persia from the south-west. With Rowanduz in hostile hands such a line would be impossible, and there is no other pass by which to cross the frontier ranges except near the Tak-i-Girra, a long way to the south and heading away from North-West Persia.

* "Times" report of January 23, 1923.

With Rowanduz in our hands the Wazna Pass line would be securely protected on the north. As I have shown above, Rowanduz is the terminal of an important line of Turkish advance, both for military action and propaganda from Van through Bashkala, Diza and Neri.

By this threatening attitude in recently massing troops at Neri an indication is given that they appreciate the value of this line, and intend to utilise it as a lever in their negotiations.

Then again, Rowanduz in hostile hands would always constitute a threat on the right flank of our position at Mosul.

The Turks felt this acutely when the Russians advanced and captured the place during the war, although they were prevented from moving far west of the town by the Turks holding some trenches on the crests above the gorge.

Moreover, when Rowanduz was in Turkish hands during the early part of this present year we found to our cost that they used it as a centre for their intrigues and propaganda, which penetrated as far south as Rania and Suleimanieh, and jeopardised our whole position in Southern Kurdistan. Is it wise that we should then gratuitously give them the opportunity of repeating these manœuvres, which would become intensified if permanent occupation were guaranteed? Even if we decided to hold on to Mosul such action would mean a constant menace on the right flank of our whole position in Mesopotamia and in Bagdad itself.

Then again, there is always the possibility in the future of a reorganised army and an aggressive attitude on the part of Persia, which quite lately during the Khalizi incident has shown an unwelcome desire to interfere in Irak affairs.

They seem not to have entirely forgotten that it was only some 300 years ago when the Sultan wrested Bagdad from the Shah, and certainly, if the British left Irak, these ambitions might revive, and it has even been rumoured that they might trade off their province of Azerbaijan with the Turks in exchange for permission from them to reoccupy Bagdad.

In such eventualities, or rather, to prevent their occurring, the strategic position of Rowanduz is invaluable, as it provides a direct gateway from Mesopotamia into North-West Persia, through which such actions might be controlled and a too restless Persia brought to reason. A watch could also be kept on such as that on the frontier at Bulakbashi further north.

Turning now to the part of the proposed frontier directly north of Mosul, we find that in the correspondence stating the British objections of the conclusion of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921, Lord Curzon, in a letter to M. de Montille dated the 21st November, 1921, said; "His Majesty's Government " cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in " Irak of the return of the track of the Bagdad Railway to Turkey or of the transfer to " that Power of the localities of Jezire-bin-Omar and Nizibin."

This warning has since been fully justified as the Turks have utilised Jezire as a military station of importance directly threatening our outpost of Zakho.

Jezire in Roman times was Bezabde, and as the ancient walls still standing testify, it was a frontier post of considerable importance against Parthia. This is due to its geographical position at a point of crossing of the Tigris just after the river emerges from a long series of difficult gorges upstream.

The Turks now seem to wish to emulate the Romans by constituting the place as a frontier post threatening our position in Mosul, where we may be taken to represent similar influence to that of Parthia.

The present Turkish garrison in Jezire is stated to be four battalions whose military headquarters are in Diarbekr with which they are connected by a good road through Nisibin and Mardin, a route, it may be mentioned, very vulnerable to air attack. From Jezire northward along the Tigris left bank, is a rough track, but one which the Turks have utilised for moving troops and even light artillery, up to Sairt and thence to Bitlis.

By this route connection can be established with troops of the IXth Army Corps and if necessary reinforcements brought from that force.

This it may be remarked is the same corps which supplies the detachments in the Baskala direction.

Also, the narrow defiles on the Tigris and the Bitlis Pass are not entirely immune from air attack.

As regards the locality of Nisibin, this is clearly an important strategic concentration point for an advance directed against Mosul, owing to its being the railhead of the Bagdad Railway and also connected with Diarbekr through Mardin by

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a good military road. From Nisibin to Mosul the route lies over open country, open to air action.

In this connection it may be as well to note the recent attack on the French post at Armida, between Nisibin and Ras-ul-Ain, when a Kurdish force of 2,000 men, stated to be led by Turkish regular officers, barbarously murdered the garrison after surrender. This incident indicates that the Angora Government are not above utilising disaffected bands of Kurds for their own purposes, and rousing the latent sense of cruelty which these semi-civilised races possess to serve their own ends.

The fact that machine-guns were supplied to the Kurds and Turkish regular officers led them, makes the matter rather more serious than ordinary propaganda efforts among the tribes.

Facing Jezire, at the northernmost corner of our mandate, we are fortunate in possessing the strong defensive position of Zakho–Feishkhabur, to which I have alluded in a former memorandum.

This definitely bars an advance from Jezire across the open plain of Nahrwan in front of it, while the passage of the Khabur at Zakho, and the forcing of the defile of the main road from Mosul leading to that place would be a difficult task for the enemy were it adequately held.

But it may be well to consider the general point of view from which the Angora Government may be expected to approach the whole question of the Mosul frontier, now that they have ratified the Lausanne Treaty, and must enter into further discussion with a view to settling it.

I should like to be permitted to give what I imagine to be the view of the Angora Turks and those of the interior rather than of those who tell plausible tales at Constantinople to officials who have never penetrated into the interior during their service.

First of all, we have the violent speeches on the subject delivered in the National Assembly at Angora just previous to the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, both on the Mosul frontier question and also as regards the French and Syrian frontier.

These may appear as foolishly bombastic to Western people, but I think they should be considered as really serious expressions of opinion of what the Deputies of the interior think, and, moreover, in such a subservient body as the Assembly they would not have been permitted to be delivered unless by the express sanction of Mustafa Kemal himself, who remained somewhat discreetly in the background on this occasion.

Then there are the recent concentrations of Turkish troops at Neri threatening Rowanduz, and the retention of a needlessly strong garrison of some four battalions at Jezire, which may certainly be taken to contravene Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which enjoins the Turkish and British Governments reciprocally to undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier (that of Mosul), no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

Then there is the sudden incident which has just cropped up at Bulahlashi (near Katur), on the Turko-Persian frontier, not far north of the Rowanduz sector of the Mosul frontier under discussion.

Mustafa Kemal seems to have modelled his action on that of Mussolini at Corfu, and, moreover, his action is directly aimed at us as one of the four signatories of the Turko-Persian Frontier Commission.

The incident may be looked on as a slight one, but I do not think this should be the case, in view of the opening of the Mosul frontier question, which is imminent.

It is quite clear that the Frontier Commission completed its labours up to Mount Ararat from the Persian Gulf a short time before the outbreak of the great war in 1914; the map-sheets showing the boundary pillars of the new frontier and the accompanying text were signed by the delegates of all four Powers—Great Britain, Turkey, Russia and Persia—and accepted and ratified in due form just before war broke out.

It will be found that the new frontier as then accepted has been inserted on the various sheets of my War Office 1:250,000 map dealing with this frontier, this being done from the larger scale sheets signed by the delegates of the Frontier Commission. The new frontier has also been inserted on the 1:2,000,000 R.G.S. map.

There was certainly then no question that this frontier, which had been under dispute for some seventy years, was then finally decided, and I think will be found to be so.

I think this arbitrary and sudden action of the Angora Government in much the same area renders the general aspect of the Mosul question more serious than if it had been taken under ordinary circumstances, and it will have the effect of impressing the local Kurds along this section of the frontier, most of whom are adherents of Simko Agha, with a sense of the power which the Angora Government can now arrogate to itself after its victories in the field and at the council table further west. This is no doubt one effect which they certainly intended to produce. Strange as it may appear to Western thought, I submit that the following may be taken as the view that the Angora Government and the ignorant fanatics whom Mustafa Kemal leads or, rather, drives.

At Angora they imagine they have esconced themselves in a stronghold so far in the interior that they feel themselves quite secure from any Western interference, and certainly it is true that no Western Power is now inclined for adventures in the interior of Asia Minor, while the Greeks are out of the picture for the present.

The triumphant return of Ismet Pasha from Lausanne brought to mind the victories of the council table, but the withdrawal of our great fleet and our troops even from the hardly-contested field of the Gallipoli Peninsula must have conveyed an inordinate sense of their own might against the Western Powers to the mind of the meanest Turkish peasant of the highlands of Anatolia.

To the devout Moslem it must have been ecstatic to see Greek and Armenian Christians driven from homes they had occupied for centuries before the Turks ever arrived in the land, driven forth with scarce a protest from the great Christian Powers, while the corresponding return of Turks from Thessaly and Macedonia seems delayed in deference to specious arguments from Angora.

Then, again, the position of foreigners has been deprived of the safeguards they so hardly won from great Sultans and enjoyed for centuries.

That a Turkish policeman should be able to hale an Englishman before a Turkish magistrate in Constantinople may seem only right and proper to some Western minds, but think of the same being done in Sivas or Kaisarie and its effect on the local population. Again at the trial of Mme. Fahmy at the Old Bailey the judge did not object to a Moslem witness taking the usual oath on the Bible.

Would the local Kadi of Erzingan or Konia have permitted such a thing or even have allowed a Bible to be brought into his court at all?

All these things, which seem trivial to us, must have given an undue sense of elation to the Turkish people, and moreover seemed to have raised the prestige of the Turks among the peoples of Syria and Mesopotamia so recently under their yoke as well.

But in contrast to this feeling of elation it may be as well to consider if there is any solid foundation for all this arrogance. Mustafa Kemal, with the National Assembly packed with his friends, has gone some way to becoming a military dictator, but he is still far from being secure. Discontent is growing among the large body of officers whom he has displaced, the usual violent repressive measures are being taken, executions are being planned and the Aidin district is in a state of siege, where two divisions are employed.

It may be that Mustafa Kemal, as the best way of solving a difficult problem, may elect to precipitate an attack on the French or ourselves in Syria or Mesopotamia. He may win some initial success in either field which would have the effect of increasing tenfold the arrogance and elation of the Angora Turks and their dictator, and, moreover, it might create such a stir throughout Islam that the Moslem world might come forward to acclaim Ghazi Mustafa Kemal as the only sovereign leader fit to wield the sword of Islam; in fact, to assume the title of Caliph itself.

But the Turkish army, numbering now some 200,000 in place of a peace strength of 600,000 in 1913, seems none too large for such excursions when the many vulnerable frontiers situated all round the present area of Turkey come to be considered. In Eastern Thrace the Turk has been placed face to face again with the Balkans and all its troubles, Mussolini has been faced in Smyrna and Adalia, the situation on the Transcaucasus frontier, though quiescent, has to be faced, without counting the Syrian and Mosul frontiers; munitions cannot be produced in Turkey itself, but must be purchased from some outside Power who will require payment, and, above all, the British fleet, which may have dipped beyond the horizon for the moment, can return with surprising and disconcerting speed, convoying transports, and supported by winged clouds of aeroplanes.

Still, a military dictator in the position of Mustafa Kemal is a desperate man, and may imagine that a bold stroke in some direction is the only way left to him out of

his internal dissensions, or that some such action is necessary to ensure the concessions he may demand during the negotiations about to commence on the Mosul frontier question.

Then, there is a further passage in Lord Curzon's speech at the Lausanne Conference last January in reply to Ismet Pasha's claims regarding Mosul which runs as follows:—

> "There had been constant manifestations of Kurdish discontent under Turkish "rule, and during the last four years the British Government has been bombarded "with representations from disappointed Kurds asking them to take up the matter "of Kurdish autonomy or Kurdish independence. As to the Assyrian and "Nestorian Christians on the frontier of Mosul, do they want to be handed over "to Angora? Not a day passes that I do not get letters from them appealing to "be saved from that fate."

Since that date in the mountain districts, over which the Turks have so little real control, which I have referred to above in the Hakkiari, the Bohtan and the Bitlis districts, the Kurdish desire for autonomy or independence continues to express itself, and still looks to British justice to further its aims.

The recent installation of Sayyid Taha as district Governor of Rowanduz must have done much to further hopes on that side of the frontier, while the cruel treatment of Simko Agha and his son by the authorities at Van must have done much to demonstrate the treatment which they may expect from Turkish masters, and to cause secret resentment among the Kurdish tribes of that area.

Bitlis and Sairt are also important centres of the Kurdish national movement as well as Jezire, as I have already shown, and places at which the national spirit could be fostered.

As for the Assyrian and Nestorian Christians, their once fertile valleys in the basis of the Great Zab still remain places of desolation, and the little mountain churches, so sacred to the faith, are heaps of ruins.

When the frontier of our area in Mesopotamia was being discussed after the armistice, I put forward to the War Office, as drawn on sheets of my 1 : 250,000 map, a suggested frontier, which ran along the Chukh Dagh, north of Bashkala, by Bashit Dagh, to the south of Lake Van, by Vestan, thence to the crest of Bitlis Pass, with an outlet on the lake at Tadvan, the Sanjak of Bitlis south of that point, the boundaries of the Sanjak of Sairt, and the "locality" of Jezire, with the kaza at present depending on that place.

This frontier, given only in outline, would provide for the inclusion in the area of the two general lines which have been shown to control all the intervening area, namely, Bashkala–Diza–Neri and Rowanduz on one side and Bitlis–Sairt–Jezire on the other. The area is predominantly Kurdish, almost entirely so, since the Armenians have been removed. The Assyrian (Nestorian) districts along the Great Zab are included in it.

This area might be arranged in one general State, with the present Kurdish districts under our mandate and under the same system of government. It is, I submit, a mistake to place the Kurds too much under the control of the Irak Government, the Arab and Kurdish races being so different in character, but in Southern Kurdistan the influence of Bagdad must continue to be felt to a certain degree for economic and geographical reasons. Yet the wider area proposed would give them a more considerable degree of autonomy and an area sufficiently large in which they might at least commence to foster ideas of national independence.

In their present frame of mind it is not easy to think of the Turks agreeing to such a scheme as they seem inclined to put forward, and assert again their far-reaching claims of last January, this time backed by threats.

But events may tend to alter this during the discussion, and the above suggestion might, I think, in any case be taken into consideration. On the other hand, if the Turks maintain their obdurate and threatening attitude it would be unwise to concede them anything of the area at present within our frontiers, either at Rowanduz or at Zakho especially, both of them important strategic points.

In their present attitude any concession would so weaken our entire position in Irak that we should ultimately have to abandon the country altogether, and King Feisal's position be rendered impossible.

His Majesty's Government surely wishes that King Feisal should be assisted along "the golden road to Samarkand" rather than that he should fall again into the hands of a tyrant worse than Harun-el-Rashid, namely, the Angora Turk.

This can only be done by retaining our military and air forces, as at present organised for his assistance, as well as giving political help to his Government, until the moods and ambitions of the tyrant entirely change and become more reasonable.

September 22, 1923. F. R. MAUNSELL, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

No. 274.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 457 of 7th September: Extension of amnesty.

You may give individual guarantee desired regarding extension of clause 2 of amnesty as regards Irak and Palestine provided that Turks agree that extension of clause 1 includes Turkish subjects, such as Assyrians who have entered and fought for Great Britain in the Irak levies, and were originally domiciled in parts of Turkey other than Constantinople. Guarantee must also be worded to exclude offences against agreement for maintenance of *status quo* in the Mosul area embodied in last paragraph of article 3 of Treaty of Lausanne and clause 7 of Evacuation Protocol.

Please inform your French and Italian colleagues of your action.